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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 301 Records
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2002 (6) TMI 610 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... purpose of the Factories Act and not for all other purposes unless it was otherwise proved that the establishment exercised complete administrative control over the employees serving in the canteen. See also Bharat Fritz Werner Limited v. State of Karnataka, (2001) ILLJ 763 SC. 11. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we allow the writ appeals and set aside the common order of the learned single Judge dated 27-9-1999 insofar as the appellants are concerned and allow WP Nos. 1866 of 1989, 13628 of 1990, 9596 of 1990, 2313 of 1990, 13426 of 1994, 4968 of 1990, 4410 of 1990, 13515 of 1990 and 6207 of 1991 and quash the impugned Government Orders, G.O. Ms. No. 914, Labour, Employment and Technical Education (Lab.II) Department dated 24-8-1978, G.O. Ms. No. 915, Labour, Employment and Technical Education (Lab.11) Department dated 24-8-1978 and G.O. Ms. No. 11, Women's Development, Child Welfare and Labour (Lab.II) Department dated 12-2-1990, with no order as to costs.
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2002 (6) TMI 609 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Judge and all consequential proceedings. The prosecution would be free to file a fresh charge-sheet, if so advised, after following the procedure laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Vineet Narain and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr., 1988 (1) SCC 226. It would also be open to the prosecution/Government to consider the feasibility of carrying on with this case in view of the circumstances and in accordance with law. It is prayed by learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was admitted to bail, but virtue of this judgment the order admitting him to bail may also be deemed to be set aside and the petitioner's liberty would be in peril. He, Therefore, prays that the bail granted to the petitioner should not be disturbed. Learned counsel for the CBI has no objection to this prayer made by learned counsel for the petitioner. In this view of the matter, the bail granted to the petitioner and the conditions imposed by the Supreme Court shall remain intact.
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2002 (6) TMI 608 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g the respondent to withdraw the suit. It clearly state that considering averment in para 8 of the application for withdrawal, the plaintiff has been allowed to withdraw the suit. The contents of the para 8 of the application disclose that the respondent-plaintiff wants to file a fresh suit for various reliefs on a different cause of action, and by way of abundant caution, the respondent had sought permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit. Once the party wants to file a suit on the basis of a cause of action different from the one in the suit which is to be withdrawn, then the question of leave or liberty to file a fresh suit does not arise at all and hence. the trial Court has rightly allowed the respondent to withdraw the suit simpliciter. 13. Being so, there is no substance in the challenge by the petitioners to the impugned order and hence, the petition fails and is dismissed. Rule is discharge, with no order as to costs. Certified copy expedited.
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2002 (6) TMI 607 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... same cannot be interfered with by this court. 3 . It is to be observed that the Courts are flooded with lakhs of cases and each case consumes considerable time to reach finality. Litigants are eagerly waiting for disposal of their cases. Such being the position of the Courts, allowing a party to prosecute the suit filed by him till it reaches its fag end and thereafter grant of permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file fresh suit on the same cause of action leads to multiplicity of proceedings and the Courts are not in a position to afford trying such multiple proceedings in respect of same cause of action unless special circumstances warrant. Having regard to the precious time spent for the trial of the suit, the rejection of application is justified. The reliance placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in is misplaced as the ratio laid down in that case is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case. 4. The revision petition stands dismissed.
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2002 (6) TMI 606 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Vishwasrao Chudaman Patil v. Lok Ayukta, State of Maharashtra, rendered under the Maharashtra Lokayukta and Upa Lokayukta Act, 1971 was cited, we find that the Division Bench of this Court in Dr. V.C. Komalu and Ors. (supra) has disagreed with the view taken by the Bombay High Court on the ground that the provisions of the two Acts are not pari materia. We, therefore, rest our conclusions and the judgments on the construction of the Kerala Lok Ayukta Act, 1999, and the attendant circumstances to which we have referred. 16. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the order of the Lok Ayukta needs to be interfered with. We quash and set aside the impugned order of the Lok Ayukta. The complaint is revived on the file of the Lok Ayukta and shall be dealt with by the Lok Ayukta or Upa Lok Ayukta as may be decided in accordance, with Section 7 of the Act, in the light of the judgment in Dr. Kamalu and Ors. (supra), and disposed of in accordance with the law as laid down by us.
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2002 (6) TMI 605 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n or their legitimate due and in the instant case they had in fact filed application before the payment of gratuity authority. The resolution of the Board of Directors also accepted their legitimate dues while making it clear that, it should not create financial burden beyond legal provision on continuity of service. 21. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the deduction claimed by the company would not fall under section 36(1)(v) but would be in the nature of revenue expenditure wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business. In that view of the matter, in our view, the decision arrived at by the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as by the Tribunal cannot be faulted and the Tribunal was justified incoming to the conclusion in the facts and circumstance of the case that the expenditure of Rs. 3,70,755 incurred by the assessee as retirement compensation was allowable as revenue expenditure. 22. The Appeal is, therefore, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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2002 (6) TMI 604 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ants and the idea is to protect those in commerce, who deal with such a partnership firm in business. Such said third parties, who deal with the partners ought to be enabled to know what the names of the partners of the firm before they deal with them in business". It is evident that Section 69 (2) is not attracted to any and every contract. 14. Admittedly, in this case, the suit is not for enforcement of any right arising out of a contract entered into by or on behalf of the Plaintiffs firm with the defendant in the course of business transaction. Moreover, Section 69 (2) does not bar a suit to enforce common law right even if the firm is unregistered on the date of the suit. Hence, the suit is not barred by Section 69 (2) of the Partnership Act. With the result, all the other substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the Respondents/Plaintiffs. For the aforesaid reasons, the second appeal fails, liable to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed, with costs.
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2002 (6) TMI 603 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... part of the guarantors to carry out the obligation, hence the period of limitation could not be said to have commenced running. The limitation would only run from the date of breach under Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Both the accounts which were guaranteed by defendants 2 and 3 by the execution of the guarantee bonds continued to be a live account even after they ceased their business. The plaintiff has issued notices Ex.P4 dated 6.12.1979 and Ex.P5 dated 6.10.1982 invoking the guarantees and filed the suit on 1.11.1982 within three years from the said dates. The suit, which was filed on 1.11.1982, was, therefore, clearly within time under Article 55 of the Limitation Act. In this aspect, we disagree with the finding of the learned Single Judge. 20. In the result, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge is set aside and the suit is decreed against defendants 2 and 3 as prayed for with cost.
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2002 (6) TMI 602 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nce, every person, who was in-charge and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty. But under Section 141(2) of the Act, the presumption would arise against the director, manager, etc., only when it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of those persons. Therefore, mere words that the petitioners-directors are responsible for the failure to make the payment of the cheque amounts without any further material would not be sufficient to conclude that it would cover Section 141(2) of the Act. 18. For these reasons mentioned above, I am of the view that the proceedings as against the petitioners, namely, A-3, A-4, A-6 and A-7 are liable to be dropped and accordingly dropped. The revisions are allowed. The trial Court is directed to dispose of the trial as against the other accused as expeditiously as possible.
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2002 (6) TMI 601 - CEGAT KOLKATA
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... ... ..... pon by the ld. Advocate are not applicable as facts are different. In DCW Ltd., penalty was held to be not imposable for a mere procedural lapse in taking modvat credit and in absence of intention to evade duty. In the present matter, there is no procedural lapse as appropriate duty of Excise was not paid before the clearance of goods. Similarly, in Singh Traders case, mistake was detected and rectified by the assessee himself which is not so in the present matter. However, taking into consideration all facts and circumstances of the case coupled with the fact that the Appellants had deposited the entire amount of duty short paid before issue of show-cause notice and following the ratio of the Tribunal's decision in Escorts JCB Ltd. v. CCE, we are of the view that penalty imposed is on the higher side. We, therefore reduce the penalty to ₹ 4 lakhs (Rupees four lakhs only) which in our view will meet the ends of justice. But for this modification, appeal is rejected.
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2002 (6) TMI 600 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he AAC rejected the assessee’s appeal. However, the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and directed the GTO to apply the yield method. 4. At the hearing of this reference, Mr. Tanvish Bhatt for the revenue has invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Hari Singhania v. CWT 1994 207 ITR 11 in support of his contention that rule 1D providing for valuation of unquoted shares is mandatory in nature. 5. Having perused rule 1D, which was applicable at the relevant period and the aforesaid decision, we are of the view that since rule 1D providing for valuation of unquoted equity shares by the break-up method is mandatory in nature, the Tribunal was not justified in directing the GTO to value the shares according to the yield method. 6. In view of the above discussion, our answer to question referred to us is in the negative, i.e., in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. 7. The reference accordingly stands disposed of.
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2002 (6) TMI 599 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ivil Application No. 164 of 2002 and other cognate matters. 5. We accordingly allow this petition and quash and set aside the impugned order-in-original, dated 1st January, 2002 at Annexure "E" to the petition in so far as the order impose penalty under Rule 96ZQ(5)(ii), and the matter is remanded to the authorities. The remaining portions of the impugned order are not interfered with, for the simple reason that the petitioners have preferred appeals for challenging the other portions of the orders levying duty and interest. The authorities will be at liberty to pass appropriate orders of penalty in accordance with law in light of the observations made by this Court in the aforesaid judgment dated 7th March 2002 in Special Civil Application No. 164 of 2002 and cognate petitions. It is again clarified that this judgment is only confined to the question of penalty levied upon the petitioners. 6. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.
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2002 (6) TMI 598 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... o the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants,the Respondents have already launched prosecution against the Appellants. As Shri Dada, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents didrightly point out, this Tribunal does not enjoy the inherent powers of High Courts under section 482 of the Cr.PC to issue any order for quashing pending proceedings before any Court of law. For the reasons stated above this Tribunal is of the view that it is beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to issue any order setting aside the Respondentsdirection to launch prosecution against the Appellant company though its directors and officers. Therefore I do not consider it necessary to examine the grounds adduced by the Appellants in support of their contention, in this regard. For the reasons stated above the Respondents order directed to the Appellant company not to raise money from the public in the capital market for a period of 3 years is set aside. Appeals allowed to the extent stated above.
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2002 (6) TMI 597 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... same. According to the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellants, the Respondents have already launched prosecution against the Appellants. As Shri Dada, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent rightly pointed out, this Tribunal does not enjoy the inherent powers of High Courts under section 482 of the Cr.PC to issue any order for quashing pending proceedings before any Court of law. For the reasons stated above this Tribunal is of the view that it is beyond the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to issue any order setting aside the Respondent’s direction to launch prosecution against the Appellant company through its directors/officers. Therefore I do not consider it necessary to examine the grounds adduced by the Appellants in support of their contention, in this regard. For the reasons stated above the Respondents order directed to the Appellant company not to access the capital market for a period of four years is set aside. Appeals allowed to the extent stated above.
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2002 (6) TMI 596 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ecovering the Provident Fund dues. Hence, the notices issued vide Exts. P1 and P3, and the orders at Exts. P4, P5(a), P5(b) and P5(c) were perfectly legal and justified. We are unable to accept the reasoning of the learned single Judge and conclusions arrived at on the inter se contest between the provisions of Section 46-B of the S.F.C. Act and Section 11(2) of the E.P.F. & M.P. Act. 16. In the result, we set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge holding that the dues of the Employees Provident Fund have higher priority as against the assets of the Darpan Electronics (Private) Limited, movable or immovable. Consequently, the appellant as Recovery Officer was entitled to issue the order of prohibition to the second respondent bank not to transfer ₹ 89,083/- standing to the credit of the company in its account. The notice at Exts. P1 and P3 and the, orders at Ext. P4, P5(a), P5(b) and P5(c) are hereby revived and shall be disposed of in accordance with law.
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2002 (6) TMI 595 - CESTAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... kers. Such goods are not covered by the provisions relating to affixing of MRP under the Weights and Measures Act. It is a pre-condition for invoking the provision under Section 4A that the goods in question attract the provisions of Weights and Measures Act and Rules thereunder. Since the bulk clearance of Lubricating oils were not covered by provisions of Weights and Measures Act, Section 4A of the Central Excise Act was not attracted for the valuation and assessment. 18. It is also seen that the original assessment of the goods was in conformity with the view taken by this Tribunal in the appellants’ own case 2000 (118) E.L.T. 35 . 19. In the above facts and circumstances, I agree with the view taken by ld. Member (J) that the appeal is required to be allowed. Sd/- (C.N.B. Nair) Member (T) MAJORITY ORDER 20. In terms of majority order, the impugned order is set aside and appeal is allowed. Sd/- (Jeet Ram Kait) Member (T) Sd/- (S.L. Peeran) Member (J)
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2002 (6) TMI 594 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... ion 37(1). On the other hand, it merely clarifies that an expenditure which is otherwise allowable under section 37(1) should not be disallowed merely because it does not fall under section 35D of the Act. For instance, expenditure incurred by a going company for its existing business is not deductible under section 35D and such expenditure is allowable, even after the insertion of section 35D, under section 37(1) of the Act. Thus, it can be seen that the aforecited cases are distinguishable on facts. 16. Upon careful consideration of the matter, we are of the view that the assessee is entitled to amortisation of 1/10th of the expenditure under section 35D read with section 35(2)(c)(iv) of the Income-tax Act to the extent of 1/10th of the total expenditure as has been claimed in the original return. Under the circumstances, we set aside the order of the CIT(Appeals) and restore the order of the Assessing Officer. 17. In the result, the appeal filed by the Revenue is allowed.
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2002 (6) TMI 593 - ITAT VISAKHAPATNAM
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... ... ..... d indicated about their source of investments, though the Assessing Officer was not satisfied with their source of investment. In view of these facts we find that the Commissioner (Appeals) has disposed off the appeal following the direction of the ITAT and hence, there is no justification in revenue’s ground that the Commissioner (Appeals) should have set aside the issue to the Assessing Officer. In their judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court have held in the case of Stellar Investment Ltd. (supra ) that even if the subscribers to the increased share capital were not genuine, the amount could not be regarded as undisclosed income of the assessee. In view of this we find no infirmity in the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) holding the share application money deposited by the share holders to be genuine and thereby deleting the addition made under section 68. Accordingly, the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is upheld. 7. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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2002 (6) TMI 592 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... hereafter conclusions have to be drawn on the basis of material on record in accordance with law. However, perusal of the impugned orders of the learned Commissioner would go to reveal that he has based his conclusions purely on conjectures and surmises and not on an appreciation of material on record in the right perspective. 20. We, therefore, hold that the orders of the learned Commissioner on both the issues, namely, deduction under section 80-O of the Act as also under section 80HHC of the Act are not sustainable in both the years. These have to be vacated. We do so. In this view of the matter, we do not propose to record our finding on the issue whether or not the orders of the Assessing Officer got merged with those of the learned Commissioner (Appeals) on these issues, as it would only be of academic interest. 21. In the result, the orders of the learned Commissioner are set aside on these issues in both the years. The assessee succeeds and the appeals stand allowed.
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2002 (6) TMI 591 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... rication of the items at site. 3. The contention of the respondents is that there is no such allegation in the show cause notice, therefore now the Revenue cannot take a new plea. 4. The reading of show cause notice shows that the duty is being demanded on the disposal' of waste and scrap pertaining to capital goods sold as waste/ scrap. The Tribunal in the case of A.C.C. Limited Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bhopal reported in 2001 (46) RLT 745 (CEGAT-Del.) 2001 (133) ELT 375 (Tri.-Del.) and in the case of Diesel Components Works Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh, reported in 2000 (40) RLT 641 (CEGAT) 2000 (120) ELT 648 (Tribunal) held that duty liability attracted only in regard to scrap generated out of manufacture or mechanical working of metals and metal goods. The scrap and waste generated by dismantling of used machinery are not excisable goods. In view of the above discussions, we find no infirmity in the impugned order. The appeal is rejected.
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