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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 559 Records
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2003 (11) TMI 651 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ator has not claimed any interest over the same unlike that in the said decision. In Kuppayammal (supra) the caveator had claimed interest in the assets and that this had more relevance and it was sought to be disclosed. In this case, no interest has been claimed by the caveator. That apart there is really no other ground for which the grant of probate is objected to. The reliance on section 276 of the Indian Succession Act also does not help the caveator having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. 6. The purpose of disclosure of assets is to assess the valuation of the assets so as to ensure payment of Court fees. In the present case, highest Court fees have since been paid. In that, the valuation of the assets would be immaterial for the purpose of Court fees. 7. In the circumstances, I do not find any reason to sustain the caveat. The caveat is hereby discharged. 8. All parties are to act on a signed xerox copy of this Dictated Order on the usual undertaking.
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2003 (11) TMI 650 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . Thakur Behari Singh and Ors., .On account of registration of a document, including a will or codicil, a presumption as to correctness or regularity of attestation cannot be drawn. Where in the facts and circumstances of a given case the Registrar of Deeds satisfies the requirement of an attesting witness, he must be called in the witness box to depose to the attestation. His evidence would be liable to be appreciated and evaluated like the testimony of any other attesting witness. Conclusion 25. So far as the Will dated 16.5.1973 is concerned, its execution is neither denied nor disputed. The factum of the Will dated 16.5.1973 having been duly executed and attested was an admitted fact. The disputed fact was the execution and attestation of the codicil dated 21.5.1973. The codicil is not proved. The codicil cannot have the effect of explaining altering or adding to the depositions made by the Will dated 16.5.1973. 26. The appeal is held devoid of any merit and is dismissed.
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2003 (11) TMI 649 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nefarious practices with immunity. Increasing the fine after reducing the imprisonment to a nominal period can also defeat the purpose as the corrupt public servant could easily raise the fine amount through the same means. 31. In the present case, how could the mere fact that this was pending for such a long time be considered as a special reason ? That is a general feature in almost all convictions under the Act and it is not a speciality of this particular case. It is the defect inherent in implementation of the system that longevity of the cases tried under the Act is too lengthy. If that is to be regarded, as sufficient for reducing the minimum sentence mandated by Parliament the legislative exercise would stand defeated. 32. Considering the age of the accused, we reduce only the sentence to the minimum of one year without touching the fine imposed, but do not find any justifiable reason to reduce it below the minimum. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.
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2003 (11) TMI 648 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cally laid down that when there is a description in an agreement of sale that the vendor shall execute another document at the office of the Sub-Registrar as and when required, it is an indication that the document by itself did not conclusively extinguish rights in vendor, therefore, by virtue of proviso to Section 49 the said document does not require registration. 12. In the light of the provisions of the Act and the judgments referred supra, I am of the view that the agreement of sale dated 18-8-1999 does not require registration and it can be marked on behalf of the plaintiff in the suit which was filed for specific performance of the said agreement of sale. The Lower Court was therefore right in admitting the document for the purpose of marking on behalf of the plaintiff. I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the impugned order and it needs no interference. 13. In the result, the revision petition is dismissed by confirming the order of the Lower Court. No costs.
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2003 (11) TMI 647 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nce of prior agreement of sale executed by the vendors in favour of the decree holder and despite such knowledge they purchased the suit property to frustrate the agreement existing in favour of the decree holder. 30. As the appellate court, having rejected the Objectors' application under Order XXI Rule 99, has not in greater details gone into the contested issues on merits, it is necessary to set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remand the case to it for decision of the appeal afresh in accordance with law. 31. In the result, the appeal preferred by the Objectors succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court dated 23.4.2001 is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the issues on merits in accordance with law. 32. Special Leave Petition .....(CC 8261/2001) is rejected. 33. In the circumstances, the costs incurred in these proceedings shall abide the final result of the appeal to be decided by the High Court.
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2003 (11) TMI 646 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... al in Para 3 of the Final Order that neither the facts of the case justify any penalty nor is a specific reason given in the impugned Order for imposing penalty; that this being a matter of classification for which classification list was filed on 17-11-93, involving genuine difference of opinion, no penalty is warranted. We observe that while passing impugned Order in question, no specific finding regarding penalty has been recorded in the Order. As such there is a mistake apparent on the face of the record as a specific pleading regarding the penalty was made which had not been considered. We, therefore, allow the ROM application. We also agree with the learned Advocate that this is not a fit case for imposition of penalty as they had filed the classification list and the issue related to whether the product manufactured by them is classifiable under Chapter 63 of the Tariff or Chapter 39 of the Tariff. Accordingly, we set aside the entire penalty imposed on the Appellants.
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2003 (11) TMI 645 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d authorities - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 46 if the assessing authority or the appellate Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that any person............................. ........................ (d) has submitted an untrue or incorrect return or" Here, admittedly the petitioner has at the first instance submitted untrue and incorrect return. He suppressed the turnover intentionally. There is clear mens rea. Only when the assessing officer pointed out the mistakes, he filed a revised return. For imposing penalty under Section 45A(1)(d) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, a best judgment assessment need not be a condition and the decision reported in 1990(2) KLT 117 (1991) 80 STC 177 is thus overruled. The penalty was rightly imposed and reasonable reduction was also given by the revisional authority. Learned Single Judge has correctly decided the matter. We see no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.
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2003 (11) TMI 644 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... easonable opportunity to defend the case. Any way, the case has been proved beyond any reasonable doubt before the trial Court and therefore, the trial Court as well as the Sessions Court were justified in holding the petitioner guilty for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. Suffice it to say that there is no merit in the present revision application and it deserves to be dismissed since the judgment and orders of the two Courts below are not found illegal. 51. For the foregoing reasons, this revision application is dismissed. The judgments and orders of the two Courts below are confirmed. The petitioner is on bail and therefore, his bail bonds are cancelled. The Court below will naturally issue appropriate warrant against the petitioner and notice to the surety with a view to see that the petitioner surrenders at the earliest. The petitioner shall also forthwith surrender to the custody of the trial Court to serve out the remaining sentence. Rule discharged.
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2003 (11) TMI 643 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n, the High Court has rightly discarded it. The declaration made by the deceased was not voluntary and in fact the answers were not given by her and it was her husband who was answering. Such nature and manner of response from the injured who ultimately succumbed to injuries can by no means be elevated to - the level of her 'dying declarations', even when it is found to sound - "the voice of Jacob". Stand of the prosecution that he tried to clarify by stating that it was the accused who had fired the gun does not improve the situation. In the true sense of the term or in legal parlance statement made by the deceased cannot be called a dying declaration. In view of the admitted hostility and strained relations, the natural effort was to rope in the accused. The High Court, therefore, discarded the evidence as not worthy of acceptance. 10. We do not find any infirmity in the judgment of the High Court to warrant interference. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
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2003 (11) TMI 642 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ly, the officers at the Head Post Office were also not very careful, and as a result A-3 succeeded in his evil design to fraudulently withdraw a large sum of money. Learned counsel submitted that on the basis of these facts not only the appellants were cheated by A-3 but even the officers of the Head Post Office were similarly cheated by A-3. 10. In the absence of any evidence to show that A-3 was acting in conspiracy with A-1 and A-2 or that A-1 and A-2 had knowledge of the fact that A-3 had fraudulently and dishonestly prepared forged vouchers on the basis of which the amounts were sought to be withdrawn, the offences under Sections 467, 471 or 409 IPC are not proved against the appellants. Consequently, the offence under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act is also not made out. 11. In the result, these appeals are allowed and the appellants are acquitted of the charges leveled against them. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds shall stand discharged.
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2003 (11) TMI 641 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he matter which may have to be decided ultimately while deciding the main suit and this need not be gone into at this stage. The proceedings are different proceedings and it may be that the result of one may depend upon another. It is needless to say that both the proceedings for the convenience of the parties may be tried together, if the parties are so advised in this regard. However, it is suffice to state that when there is a provision specified in the statute i.e., the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 21 of the Act, despite that, disallowing an amendment application either on the ground that there is a parallel proceeding pending or on the ground that the application is belated, in my considered opinion is an illegality while exercising the jurisdiction which may have to be rectified while exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order is hereby set aside. 16. Accordingly, the CRP is allowed. No costs.
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2003 (11) TMI 640 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... stayed, to be resumed only with the leave of the Court, and after the investigation by CBI in terms of the directions contained in this order has been completed. This protection has to be afforded to the petitioner so that he may be able to freely and fearlessly assist the investigating agency. 21. Insofar as the police protection extended to the petitioner under the orders of this Court is concerned, the Commissioner of Police, Delhi shall review the situation from time to time and may increase, reduce or withdraw the same depending on his satisfaction. 22. The petition stands disposed of. Parties are allowed liberty of seeking directions by moving appropriate application as and when necessary. 23. Before parting we would like to clarify that whatever has been stated hereinabove is based only on the averments contained in the pleadings of the parties and is not intended in any manner either to record a finding or to be a reflection on any of the parties or anyone concerned.
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2003 (11) TMI 639 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y the defendant. A separate money receipt is also issued by the defendant. After the said acknowledgment of the money, in paragraph No. 4, an obligation to pay money with interest is created by clause No. 5 and an obligation to pay interest at a higher rate is created by clause No. 6. The separate money receipt is merely an acknowledgment and does not by itself create an obligation to pay the money with interest, and further enhanced interest in case of default. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel that the Inter Corporate Deposit Agreement is merely an acknowledgment of a pre-existing liability is rejected. It has to be held that the Inter Corporate Deposit Agreement amounts a Bond as defined under Section 2(c) of the Bombay Stamp Act. 8. By virtue of a power conferred under proviso (b) to Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Bombay Stamp Act, the duty of impounding instrument is delegated to the Prothonotary and Sr. Master. Summons for Judgment adjourned for 8 weeks.
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2003 (11) TMI 638 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd are not attracted to the present suit. 25. The result of the above discussion is that the subject of this suit is liable to be referred to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement, as contained in the agreement dated 29.3.2001. The application is allowed. 26. Subject of the suit is referred for arbitration to the sole Arbitrator in accordance with the arbitration agreement dated 29.3.2001 to Mr. Justice (Retired) K.S.Gupta, a former Judge of this Court. The parties shall appear before the Arbitrator on 18.11.2003 and submit their claim and counter-claim before the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator shall enter upon the reference and shall make and publish the Award in accordance with law. The Arbitrator shall be paid by the parties in equal share, the fee at the rate of ₹ 7,000/- per sitting with maximum of ten sittings plus 10% charges for secretarial assistance. 27. A copy of the order shall be sent to the Arbitrator. 28. The application stands disposed of.
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2003 (11) TMI 637 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t on account of short deduction of tax deducted at source from its employees? (b) Whether the Tribunal was correct inholding that the assessee can merely proceed on the declaration filed by the employees without verifying whether the expenses incurred for levied travel allowance, have satisfied the parameters laid down in the Act and Rules for claiming such exemption only on the ground that no malafides on account of the declaration had been proved? 4. While considering similar questions in the case of THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX v. M/S. LARSEN & TOUBRO LIMITED made in ITA No. 143 of 2002 disposed of on 21st August 2003, following the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case in the case of UCO BANK V. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX reported in 237 ITR 889, we have answered the question in favour of the Assessee. In the light of what is stated above, these appeals are liable to be rejected. Accordingly they are rejected. However, no order is made as to costs.
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2003 (11) TMI 636 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL
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... ... ..... t part of the order directing "Rakesh Agrwal to deposit a sum of ₹ 34,00,000/- with Investor Protection fund of BSE and NSE to compensate the investors who may come forward at a later period of time seeking compensation for the loss incurred by them in selling at a price higher than the offer price" can not be sustained. The said part of the order is set aside. 160. SEBI has power to order adjudication under section 15 G and launch prosecution under section 24. In case the Appellant is aggrieved by the order of the adjudicating officer or the decision of the competent court in the criminal complaint, the Appellant is not short of appellate remedies. This Tribunal, is of the view that it is beyond its jurisdiction to issue any order setting aside the Respondent's direction to launch prosecution and initiate adjudication against the Appellant. No order on that part of the order directing adjudication/launching prosecution. Appeal, allowed in the above lines.
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2003 (11) TMI 635 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... was attributable to any negligence on the part of the appellants. Sub-section (2) of Section 47 requires that where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. There being no allegation as regards the requirement of Sub-section (2) of Section 47, the Vth Joint Judicial Magistrate committed an error in issuing summons to the appellants herein. 5. For the aforesaid reasons, the summons issued against the appellants are liable to be set aside. We, therefore, set aside the summons issued to the appellants herein as also the judgment under challenge. 6. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. No costs.
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2003 (11) TMI 634 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... uate material has all along been furnished by the assessee before the authorities, and copies of that material has also been filed before us. The assessee has filed copies of relevant invoices, as also copy of the agreement under which the payments were made to the bank. Perhaps, the authorities below were not satisfied with this material for the reason that factum of expenditure having been actually incurred by the ANZ International Merchant Banking was not established by assessee’s furnishing the evidence by way of supporting vouchers for expenses in their hands. Even if that be so, in our considered view, such an exercise was not really necessary. The factum of expenditure by this assessee, genuineness of expense and also purpose of expense is clearly established by the assessee. Accordingly, we deem it fit and proper to delete this disallowance of UK £ 430. 15. This ground of appeal is also, thus, allowed. 16. In the result, assessee’s appeal is allowed.
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2003 (11) TMI 633 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l Procedure. Therefore, it is to obviate that a meritless suit in such sense should not be continued only numerically. 21. Hence, upon going through the plaint, judgment of the Court of first instance as well as judgment of the First Appellate Court which remands the matter to hear out all the issues on evidence to come out to a definite finding. I have no other alternative but to hold that the learned Judge of the First Appellate Court erred in passing an affirmative order in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. Therefore, such order of the First Appellate Court has to be set aside. 22. Thus, appeal is allowed on contest. The order of the First Appellate Court stands set aside. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. The order of the Court of first instance stands confirmed. Lower Court Records will be returned as expeditiously as possible. Consequential steps by the Court of first instance will be taken up as expeditiously as possible. However, no order is passed as to costs.
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2003 (11) TMI 632 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
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... ... ..... arwat (supra) as indicated hereinbefore in no uncertain terms held that even such holders of such offices would not automatically be entitled, on acquisition of a higher qualification as higher scale of pay. The petitioners, as noticed, already had higher qualification and thus not entitled to benefit of any circular whatsoever. Unfortunately, this aspect of the matter have not been taken into consideration by the High Court. Further more, even an order cannot be passed under Article 142 of the Constitution of India which will be contrary to the Statute or statute of the Rules. 6. Thus in this view of the matter that any teacher who was granted, this pay scale was only those JBT teachers who were entitled to have a higher pay scale if they acquired qualification during the period of their service not prior to joining of the service. 7. For the aforesaid reason, the appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment is be set aside. 8. There shall be no order as to costs.
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