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Showing 1 to 20 of 440 Records
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2003 (2) TMI 561 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ary, their evidence will be essential for the just decision of the case. Under the circumstances, I do not find any illegality or impropriety in the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 29. Consequently, I do not find any merit in these Writ Petitioners. Both the Writ Petitioners are, therefore, dismissed. Rule discharged. 30. The learned Counsel for the petitioners, on pronouncement of the Judgment, requests that he may be granted four weeks time of going to the Supreme Court. The learned Counsel for the Respondents objects to the said request saying that even otherwise, in Silvassa, the sitting of the Sessions Judge is only 2 - 3 days in a month and the next sitting is somewhere in the middle of March, 2003. As such, automatically the petitioners get time. Even otherwise, the trial has been delayed for quite long. Therefore, I am not inclined to grant the request. The prayer is refused. 31. R P be sent to the Sessions Court, Dadra Nagar Haveli, Silvassa, immediately.
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2003 (2) TMI 560 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... od of one week from today in which event the petitioner is liable to pay 12% interest. In default of making payment within one week, the petitioner will be liable to pay interest at the rate of 18%.
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2003 (2) TMI 559 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nt specifically stated, thus - We make it clear that this order of ours is rendered on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case as mentioned earlier and will not be treated as a precedent in future. 14. It is unfortunate that the High Court treated the said judgment as a precedent despite this Court's saying that it will not be treated as a precedent in future, while confining the said judgment to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 15. In view of what is stated above and taking note of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that this Court may not disturb the impugned order exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 16. In our considered view, the impugned judgment and order of the High Court cannot be sustained. Hence, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and the order passed by the Tribunal is restored. No costs.
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2003 (2) TMI 558 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... law laid down by the apex Court in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd v. ITO (2003) 259 ITR 19 the petitioner is required to file its objections before the AO who will decide the same by passing a speaking order before proceeding further with the assessment. The writ petition against the notice is not maintainable. Consequently the same is dismissed.
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2003 (2) TMI 557 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... been duly transferred to the name of the applicant-accused. Thus no case has been made out by the applicant-accused to allow him to examine himself or lead evidence in his defence at the stage of Appeal. It is clearly an attempt to improve on the defence, if not to set up a anew defence altogether. This Court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as clearly laid down in various decisions of the Apex Court, is required to exercise its discretion with circumspection and caution and must disallow any such application if the power under Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is sought to be misused or abused. In the circumstances, the application must fail. The application is rejected and disposed of accordingly. The learned Judge hearing the appeal will not be influenced by any of the observations made above. 26. Parties to act on an ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Sheristedar of this Court.
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2003 (2) TMI 556 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... as it may, we are of the opinion that by introduction of Section 433A of the Code, the Parliament has not excluded or denuded the power of the appropriate Government to restrict the grant of remission to a class of prisoners only or exclude a class of prisoners from such benefit of remission. 17. Before we conclude, we must note that the notification in question was valid only for the year 1995 and the respondent herein having been given the benefit of remission by the High Court as far back as on 20.10.2001, we do not think the interest of justice requires us to interfere with that benefit given to the respondent. We, however, as stated above, uphold the classification made by the State Government in the impugned notification. 18. We place on record our appreciation for the services rendered by Mr. Anil Hooda, learned counsel, as an amicus curiae in this case. 19. For the reasons stated above, this appeal succeeds to the extend indicated hereinabove, and is thus disposed of.
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2003 (2) TMI 555 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t view of the matter the High Court, in our opinion, while setting aside the said order could only issue a direction directing the learned trial Judge to hold an inquiry so as to enable it to arrive at a finding as to whether the respondent herein was incapable of protecting her interest by reason of any mental infirmity or 'not. As no such inquiry was held, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the learned Single Judge committed a jurisdictional error in passing the impugned judgment which, the Division Bench as noticed hereinbefore upheld. 13. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments are set aside and the matter is directed to be remitted to the learned trial judge for consideration of the matter afresh strictly in terms of Order 32 Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure as also in the light of the observations made hereinbefore. 14. This appeal is, thus, allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2003 (2) TMI 554 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... thority created such impression. No waiver which would be against requisite compliances can be countenanced. Whether an expectation exists is self-evidently, a question of fact, Clear Statutory words override any expectation, however, founded,' (See Regina v. Director of Public Prosecutions, Ex parte Kebilence and Ors. (1999) 3 WLR 972. 29. The inevitable conclusion is that Division Bench judgment is on terra firma and needs no interference. However, one factor needs to be noted before we part with the case. The appellant has already put in 28 years of service, has participated in the provident fund, pension and gratuity schemes, and additionally she has applied for voluntary retirement, we hope that the Government would appropriately consider the prayers made by her for extending the benefits of the schemes and accepting the prayer for voluntary retirement in the proper perspective early, uninfluenced by the dismissal of the appeal. 30. Appeal dismissed. Costs made easy.
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2003 (2) TMI 553 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... am Sundar v. State of Haryana reported in A.I.R. 1984 53 held as follows - "It would be a travesty of justice to prosecute all partners and ask them to prove under the proviso to Sub-section (1) that the offence was committed without their knowledge. It is significant to note that the obligation for the accused to prove under the proviso that the offence took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such offence arises only when the prosecution establishes that the requisite condition mentioned in Sub-section (1) is established. The requisite condition is that the partner was responsible for carrying on the business and was during the relevant time in charge of the business. In the absence of any such proof no partner could be convicted. 12. In the light of the above discussion the application will have to be allowed. The impugned order dated 30.11.1996 is set aside. The applicants stand discharged in Case Nos. 248-S to 251-S of 1993.
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2003 (2) TMI 552 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... able as far as the landlord is concerned. The legal presumption arising from postal endorsement is different from the understanding of the factual situation to the landlord or understanding of the landlord regarding service of notice, and in that connection if the landlord makes another attempt to serve the notice by affixation of such notice to the suit premises and the same is effected in presence of any witness of factum of affixation at the door otherwise is established, the same can be considered as good service of notice in terms of Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act, and therefore service by affixation in the case in hand cannot be found fault with. In any case, the presumption arising from service of notice having not been rebutted, the concurrent findings arrived at by the Courts below regarding service of notice do not warrant interference in writ jurisdiction. The petition, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs.
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2003 (2) TMI 551 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... isproportionate and discriminatory. Therefore, if the Court finds that conviction is rightly recorded, then the sentence may be reduced. We find no special reasons for interfering with the quantum of sentence. The learned Judge has considered all the contentions raised before him and has used his judicial discretion. Nothing is shown to indicate improper exercise of judicial discretion by learned trial Judge. The appellants are found to be involved in drug trafficking on a large scale. Some have antecedents of smuggling activity. If drug menace is to be curbed, persons proved to have been involved therein need to be sternly dealt with. In our opinion, no interference is called for even for quantum of punishment. 12. The appeals must fail and are dismissed. The judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Additional City Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad, in Sessions Case Nos. 236 of 1994, 72 and 297 of 1995 and 160 of 1996, on May 14, 1998, is hereby confirmed.
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2003 (2) TMI 550 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e are in total agreement, that where an unjustified remand is directed, that the opposite party is virtually at the receiving end, the torture of lengthy litigation and another round of the case coming up to the higher Court as also the burden on the judicial forums is something that is contraindicated. We do concede however, that it is only in a small minority of cases where all the aforesaid ingredients are present that the Appellate Court will interfere with an order of remand. 7. Having regard to the aforesaid position, in our considered view, since the learned Single Judge was in error in having directed the remand, we partially modify the order passed by the learned Single Judge. While upholding the earlier part of the order setting aside the Tribunal's order granting occupancy rights, we set aside the latest part of it remanding the case. It necessarily follows by implication that the Form 7 stands rejected. The appeals succeed to this extent and stand disposed of.
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2003 (2) TMI 549 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cers subordinate to it, the same contains Form XV regarding "warrant to jailor, in the case of a prisoner at first released on bail pending the f disposal of appeal to the Appellate Court, but subsequently rearrested in Court on the dismissal of the appeal or reduction or alteration of sentence, and forwarded to jail to undergo the remaining portion of the sentence". The contents of the warrant clearly indicate that the warrant is to be issued by the Court confirming the conviction and accused appellant cannot be directed to surrender to the trial Court for issuance of conviction warrant. 16.These are not the issues relating to decision of present revision petition on merits. Since the operative part of the order of learned Sessions Judge requires rectification, atleast in future, above discussion for the purpose of enabling the Sessions Court to follow correct procedure in future. 17. The revision petition disposed of. Rule made absolute in terms of Para. 11 above.
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2003 (2) TMI 548 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ng between the parties and shall not be open to judicial review. (5) However, in the event, MSIL does not want to take recourse to made in Clause (4) above, it may take recourse to such proceedings for recovery of its dues in accordance with law; (6) MSIL shall be entitled to enforce its claims, if any, against the appellants in accordance with law; (7) On the amount found to be due and owing to MSIL by any of the appellants the same shall be paid with interest at the rate of 18% per annum shall be livable from the date of realisation till 12.2.1997 and thereafter at the rate of 9% per annum, within twelve weeks from the date of final determination. 32. These appeals are disposed of in the above terms. Parties shall bear their own costs of these proceedings. 33. In view of the aforesaid, no further orders are required to be passed in Contempt Petitions. Notice issued to the respondents in Contempt Petitions is hereby discharged. The Contempt Petitions shall stand disposed of.
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2003 (2) TMI 547 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ted before us that under Section 53 of the Act the Central Government could not invest any officer of the Department of Revenue including the NCB with the powers of an Officer In-charge of the Police Station for investigation of the offences under the Act. It is not necessary for us to go into that question because in the instant case cognizance was taken on the basis of a complaint lodged by an empowered officer and not on the basis of a police report. 31. In the result we find that the judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 248 of 1997 is wholly unsustainable and deserves to be set aside. We accordingly allow Criminal Appeal No. 1139 of 2000, set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi dated 13th December, 2000 and remit the matter to the High Court for its disposal on merits, in accordance with law. 32. In Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3816 of 2002 we find no merit and the same is accordingly dismissed.
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2003 (2) TMI 546 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... se in the customs duty or decrease in other duties, the Corporation would not have a right to insist that though the prevalent market value is lesser than the previous rate, the buyers of the gold should pay the price of the gold at the previous higher rate. This example is given by us only to show that incurring loss or making profit in a trade like this is very much inherent in the trade itself and therefore, simply because the petitioners are required to pay the price of the gold at the higher rate, consequent upon the increase in the customs duty and consequential increase in the sales tax etc., it is not the right of the petitioners to insist that the Corporation should sell the gold to them at the rate at which the Corporation imported gold. Looking from any angle, we do not find any merit in any of the contentions of Sri K.G. Raghavan, learned Counsel for the appellants. The writ appeals are devoid of merits and they are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2003 (2) TMI 545 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nature that it substantially interferes or tends to substantially interfere with the due course of justice. There may be cases where it may also be inexpedient to take action under the Contempt of Courts Act it would all depend on the circumstances of a given case. In the circumstances of the present case, though it could be said that there is disobedience of the direction of this Court, the fact remains that in the circumstances we have indicated, it is not just or necessary to punish the opposite parties for disobedience of the direction. We are satisfied that in the circumstances, it is inexpedient to proceed under the Contempt of Courts Act. Therefore, on an over all view of the situation we are satisfied that it is not a fit case where we should exercise our jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act to impose a punishment on the opposite parties. We, therefore, drop the contempt of court proceedings. Laxmi Kanta Mohapatra, J. 11. I agree. A.S. Naidu, J. 12. I agree.
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2003 (2) TMI 544 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... rishna, JJ. ORDER Leave granted
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2003 (2) TMI 543 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Article 20(3) if the complaint has not been filed at the time when the statement was recorded. The statement even though confessional in nature is not hit by Article 20(3) as the person was not an accused at the time when the said statement was recorded. In this regard, we would like to quote the Apex Court in Ramesh Chandra Mehta's Case "Till there is no formal accusation a person is not an accused and therefore the bar under Article 20(3) would not be available. 39. In the aforesaid circumstances, for the reasons set out hereinabove, we answer the question of law referred to us in the negative i.e. to say that the statements of a person recorded under Section of the NDPS Act even though they are confessional in nature cannot be said to be hit by Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India if the person was not an accused person at the time of making the statement. 40. The reference is answered accordingly. Office to place the matter before the learned Single Judge.
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2003 (2) TMI 542 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... y condoned. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
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