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Showing 1 to 20 of 612 Records
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2003 (3) TMI 781 - CEGAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... s whether new or old are assessable to duty on the basis of their list prices prevailing in the country of their manufacture. However, trade discount and depreciation on the value are deducted from the list price; but freight from the country of manufacture and insurance charges are added. The landing charges are also added to this to arrive at the final assessable value. (C.B.R C.Lr. F. No. 3/27/62-Cus.VI of 7-1-64 24-1-64 Boards letter F. No. 3/16/68-Cus. VI, dated 6-7-68) . 31. This extraordinary measure was adopted to ensure uniformity of pricing of imported cars irrespective of their port of loading. 32. As we have observed above, the cost of transport in terms of Rule 9(2) must be interpreted as the normal cost. A glance at the figures given in para 3 in the order of Member (J) would show the abnormality of the charges presumed to be on account of cost of transport. 33. With these observations, I concur with the findings of the Member (Judicial) in allowing the appeals.
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2003 (3) TMI 780 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t. 25. To sum up the case, the sale deeds allegedly executed by the respondent No. 3 in favour of respondent Nos. 4 to 6 are nullity as had been executed in disobedience of the interim order passed by the trial court on 18.8.1992. Secondly, respondent Nos. 4 to 6 could not be in possession of the land as there has been no partition by metes and bounds between co-sharers. If they are in possession, it is to be ignored, and thirdly, as the alleged sale deeds have to be ignored, the learned court below ought to have attached the entire property which, including the land sold vide two sale deeds. 26. Petition succeeds and is allowed. Learned trial court is directed to attach the entire land in dispute and force the respondent No. 3 to comply with the order passed by that Court on 18.8.1992 and further to conclude the trial of the suit expeditiously. 27. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondent Nos. 4 to 6 shall pay a sum of Rs. 5,000 as a cost to the petitioner.
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2003 (3) TMI 779 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... S. C. Pabreja has filed a false affidavit before this court with a view to mislead this Court and with a view to see that this court does not pass any order, adverse to what NOIDA Authority is contending. 11. It has been held in the case of Hiralal Chawala and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors. 1990 1 SCR 325 that filing of false affidavit also amounts to Contempt of this Court. The Registry is, therefore, directed to issue show cause notice to Sh. S. C. Pabreja, returnable before us within four weeks from today, as to why action in contempt should not be taken against him for having filed a false affidavit in this court. 12. As it is now clear that plots are available in sector No. 42, NOIDA Authorities are directed to comply with the directions of this court dated 4th of April, 1991 and to develop and bring before this Court a Housing Scheme for these 242 members in Sector 42. This to be done within four weeks from today. 13. The matter to be placed after four weeks from today.
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2003 (3) TMI 778 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The Trial Court felt that as per the statement made in the plaint the dispute was not covered either under Section 96 of the Gujarat Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 or under Section 167 of the same Act and coming to this conclusion as above by no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the court acted without jurisdiction or committed material irregularity or illegality. The decisions of various High Courts and the Apex Court cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner would not be helpful to the petitioner in view of what is stated above. 23. The petitioner herein may raise the dispute during the suit about the jurisdiction as well as barring of the filing of the suit which may be decided by the Trial Court according to law but at this stage the order impugned for the reasons above, is beyond any interference in revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 24. In above view of the matter, this Revision Application stands dismissed.
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2003 (3) TMI 777 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... are not inclined to make a detailed discussion on this aspect. Since it was represented that the defendant paid the plaintiff's arrears of income tax to avoid the sale of the house, he is entitled to recover the said amount by establishing the same in separate proceedings. 44. Before we part with the case, we want to record a word of appreciation for the meticulous manner in which the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant prepared and represented the case. Though he furnished every minute detail of the receipt of the money by plaintiff and the expenses incurred correspondingly, we do not propose to go into the same as the appeals are disposed of on the plea of benami alone. We place our appreciation on record for the assistance rendered by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant to assess the evidence. 45. In the result, the common judgment and decree made in C.S. Nos. 866 of 1994, 485 of 1997 and 1505 of 1995 is confirmed and the appeals are dismissed with costs.
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2003 (3) TMI 776 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the Code of Criminal Procedure and thereafter on 7-3-2001 the learned Trial Court heard the Counsel for the complainant, for registration of the complaint and issuance of process. Learned Counsel for the applicant has filed the certified copy of the order sheet and perusal thereof is revealing this fact and the same has been considered in Para 7 of the Revisional Court's order. In view of the Apex Court's judgment and in the facts and feature of the case, though the complaint was premature, but the cognizance was taken by the Trial Court as per provision under Section 142(b) of the Act, therefore, the order of dismissal passed by the learned Magistrate dated 6-7-2001 on the ground that the complaint was filed in a premature stage, was rightly set aside by the Revisional Court. In the result, this revision fails and is hereby dismissed. The order dated 2-7-2002 passed by the Revisional Court is upheld setting aside the order dated 6-7-2001 passed by the Trial Court.
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2003 (3) TMI 775 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ious grounds that the complaint has not been presented in time, the same cannot be accepted as reasonable and therefore, at this score also the judgment of the trial court fails. 13. In short, the judgments of the trial court suffer from patent errors of law and perversity in approach and therefore become only liable to be set aside and hence the following judgment In result, i) Both the above criminal appeals succeed and they are allowed. ii) The judgments dated 23.8.2002 rendered in C.C. Nos. 4219 & 4220 of 2001 by the Court of XIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai are set aside. iii). The accused is found guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in both the cases above and sentenced to undergo conviction for a period of six months in each case and to pay a compensation double the amounts of the cheques within thirty days from the date on which the copy of this judgment is made ready. Consequently, connected Crl. O.Ps are closed.
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2003 (3) TMI 774 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... circumstances justifying any defence. 13. In this view of the matter, we do not find any illegality much less jurisdictional error in the order under challenge to warrant interference of this Court. Inasmuch as having regard to the provisions of Section 34 of the C.P.C. and the facts of the case that the liability does not arise out of a commercial transaction, we are of the view that the grievance of the appellant with regard to rate of interest is justified. We, therefore, reduce the rate of interest from 18 per cent to 6 per cent per annum. 14. We directed the appellant to deposit the decree amount to serve as security for the suit amount in the event of this Court granting him leave to defend the suit. Since that relief is not granted to him, it will be open to him to withdraw the said amount or have it adjusted in satisfaction of the decree. 15. Subject to above modification of the order of the trial court as confirmed by the High Court the appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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2003 (3) TMI 773 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ted according to rule. His appointment was delayed for no fault of his and he came to be appointed in 1981, he is, therefore, entitled to the ranking given in the select list and appointment made accordingly. Under these circumstances, we do not find any illegality in the order." Furthermore, it is now well settled that a settled seniority position should not be unsettled. The respondents had already been posted to the post of Additional District Judge. As would appear from the report of the Sub-committee that the seniority list was published in the year 1992. Representations were, however, made only in the year 1997 which was rejected by the High Court on 22nd August, 1997. The writ petition was filed in March, 1998 which was dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment dated 18.8.1999. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal. It is dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2003 (3) TMI 772 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ection (1) of Section 11 for approval of the award could reduce the compensation fixed by the Collector. This Court followed the judgment in the case of Prem Kumar Singh (supra) in a later case in the case of State of Bihar and Ors. v. D.N. Singh (Dead) by LRs. and Ors. AIR1997SC4301 in Civil Appeal No. 7695 of 1997 decided on 13.11.1997. In both the above-cited judgments of this Court, we find the Court has not considered the nature of power exercised by the Commissioner under proviso to Section 11(1) of the Act nor has the Court considered the effect of introducing Section 15A of the Act. However, since the view taken by this Court in those two judgments is somewhat in conflict with the view we have expressed in this case, to settle the law in question, we think it appropriate that this matter should be referred to a larger Bench. Therefore, the papers in this appeal shall be placed before Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for necessary orders. 12. Ordered accordingly.
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2003 (3) TMI 771 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ion also. 20. In the result- (i) This Criminal Appeal is allowed. (ii) The impugned judgment is set aside. (iii) The respondent-accused is found guilty, convicted and sentenced under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act to undergo imprisonment till rising of Court. (iv) He is further directed to pay an amount of Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees thirty thousand only) as compensation under Section 357(3), Crl.P.C. and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months. If paid the amount shall be released to the complainant. (v) Out of the amount, Rs. 27,000/- (Rupees twenty-seven thousand only) shall be credited towards the liability under Ext. P1 cheque and the balance of Rs. 3,000/- (Rupees three thousand only) shall be credited to the expenses incurred for this prosecution. 21. The learned Magistrate shall lake necessary steps for execution of the sentence. The respondent shall appear before the learned Magistrate on 30.6.2003 for execution of the sentence.
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2003 (3) TMI 770 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 0, Cr.P.C. is not a bar for separate prosecutions for the offences punishable under Section 420, IPC and Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The question of application of the principles of double jeopardy or rule estoppel does not come into play. The acquittal of the accused for the charge under Section 420, IPC does not operate as estoppel or res judicata for a finding of fact or law to be given in prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The issue of fact and law to be tried and decided in prosecution under Section 420, IPC are not the same issue of fact and law to be tried in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Act. I, therefore, do not find any force in the contentions advanced on behalf of the accused for quashing the proceedings in C.C. No. 737 of 1999. Therefore, both the revision petition and quash proceedings are liable to be dismissed. 12. In the result, the Criminal Petition as well as the Criminal Revision Case are dismissed.
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2003 (3) TMI 769 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ould include the records available with the CIT at the time of passing of the order by the CIT. 7. He also relied on the decision of this Court in the case of CIT v. M.N. Sulaiman 1999 238ITR139(Mad) wherein this Court followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Manjunathesware (supra) and further held that the Explanation added to Section 263(1) of the Act in the year 1988 has to be regarded as declaratory, since this Court has considered the case which was of the year prior to the amendment. This position of law has not been disputed by the learned counsel for the assessee. If the above rulings of the apex Court and of this Court is applied to the facts of the present case, the order of the CIT cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. 8. In view of the binding decision of the Supreme Court as well as this Court referred to above, the question referred to has to be answered and is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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2003 (3) TMI 768 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and sentenced in all the three cases to undergo imprisonment till rising of court. iv. The accused is further directed under Section 357(3) Crl. P.C. (a) In Crl. Appeal 430of 1995 to pay an amount of ₹ 2,75,000/- (Rupees two lakhs seventy five thousand only) and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months. (b) In Crl. Appeal 431 of 1995 to pay an amount of ₹ 2,25,000/- (Rupees two lakhs twenty five thousand only) and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months. (c) In Crl. Appeal 435 of 1995 to pay an amount of ₹ 1,75,000/- (Rupees one lakh seventy five thousand only) and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months. v. If deposited the amount shall be released to the complainant. 42. The learned Magistrate shall take necessary steps for execution of the sentence hereby imposed. The respondent shall appear before the learned Magistrate on 30.6.2003 for execution of the sentence.
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2003 (3) TMI 767 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... endment of pleading without leave of Court under Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. etc., will become redundant and the plaintiff will not only be at liberty to amend, alter or modify the entire suit pleadings, but will be even free to withdraw his own admissions made in the pleadings and will be free to put the clock back as plaintiff has done in this case. 30. In view of above all the three Courts were right in holding that suit of the plaintiff is barred by the principles of res judicata , (sic) petitioner-plaintiffs objections of the petitioner have already been decided by the Board of Revenue in its judgment and which had become final as not challenged by the petitioner, therefore, the petitioner-plain tiff had no right to file suit. However, the Courts below wrongly held that withdrawal of Suit No. 49/83 cannot preclude petitioner from bringing second Suit No. 101/90, which is contrary to law. 31. Therefore, there is no force in the writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed.
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2003 (3) TMI 766 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... directed to by the learned single judge shall be undertaken and after fresh list is prepared by exclusion of B.Ed. candidates, if the appellants get the necessary rank against available vacancies at the relevant time, they would be given appointment and to make room for them, by terminating appointment, if necessary, of B.Ed. candidates who might have been selected in their places. 18. Consequently, we allow these appeals. The impugned judgment dated 18.2.2000 of the division bench is set aside and order of the learned single judge dated 25.1.1999 is restored with the modification made above. Since the petitioners in the High Court and in this Court have been waiting for selection and appointment, so long, let the directions made by the learned single judge as modified by this Court be carried out with expedition and within an outer limit of four months. The appellants will also be entitled to get costs from the respondents State of Kerala with Counsel's fee as per rules.
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2003 (3) TMI 765 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Regulation 16(a) are entirely different. Hence, there is no question of applying principle of double jeopardy to the present case." 7. Under these circumstances, there was no question of the respondent suffering a double jeopardy. The aid of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India was wrongly taken. Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India does not get attracted to the facts of the present case. Before the trial court, no issue was raised as to the respondent suffering a double jeopardy although in the first appellate court, the discussion was made on this point. In the view we have expressed above that the High Court committed a serious error in holding that the respondent was prosecuted and punished for the same offence twice, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. Hence, the same is set aside. The judgment and decree passed by the trial court as affirmed by the first appellate court is restored. The appeal is allowed accordingly put with no order as to costs.
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2003 (3) TMI 764 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ve waived their right to object. 44. It may be noticed that the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors. AIR 1968 SC 647, had clearly indicated as follows "A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it." 45. It its aforesaid decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while quoting various observations made in the case of Quinn v. Leathem 1901 AC 495, had indicated that it is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it. The decision in the case of Narayan Prasad Lohiya (supra), cannot come to the rescue of the appellant. 46. In view of our conclusions indicated hereinabove, this appeal being devoid of merits deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. 47. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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2003 (3) TMI 763 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... er Products is a partnership between Rita Dutta and Dr. Mrs. Tripta Dutta. M/s. Superior Pet. Pvt. Ltd. is a Company where Rita Dutta and Tripta Dutta had investment along with four other shareholders. Both the units were being managed by Rita Dutta. The question that came up for consideration was whether Rita Dutta can be treated as manufacturer of both the units for the purpose of availing SSI benefit. The Tribunal took the view that both the assessees being separate legally understood juridical persons clearances from units held by them cannot be clubbed. In the present case as mentioned earlier, the one unit being owned by an HUF where B.B. Jindal has only the status of Manager, its clearances cannot be clubbed with the clearances from the unit owned by him in his individual capacity. 6. We, therefore, set aside the order impugned and allow the appeals. The appellants will be entitled to consequential relief including refund of pre-deposit made before this Tribunal.
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2003 (3) TMI 762 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... withdrawn without any liberty to file fresh suit. In the circumstances filing of the subsequent suit is clearly barred under the provisions of Order 23, Rule 1, C.P.C. 20. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case coupled with the implications arising under the decisions referred to hereinabove, it has to be noticed that the agreement in question was vague and the portion of house required to be sold is also not definite. In the circumstances learned trial Court erred in granting a decree of specific performance. However, in the interest of justice the amount of advance is directed to be paid with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of its payment. 21. The appeal is partly allowed and the impugned Judgment and decree is set aside with a direction that the respondent No. 1 is entitled to payment of advance of ₹ 24,000/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of its payment till its realization from the appellant.
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