|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 628 Records
-
2004 (1) TMI 731 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ng and proof as regards readiness and willingness in terms of Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act. The first Appellate Court, unfortunately held that this can not be the solitary ground for refusing to grant relief in respect of specific performance of the contract. I have no semblance of doubt that such reasoning is not only wrong but also uncalled for. Therefore, I have no hesitation in my mind that the second appeal has been proceeded before this Court on the right substantial questions of law and shall be allowed on that score. 3. Therefore, the second appeal is allowed and accordingly the same is disposed of. The order of the first Appellate Court stands set aside. The order of the Court of first instance stands confirmed. Decree will be drawn up as early as possible, preferably by 25th February, 2004. Lower Court records will be sent down by 1st March, 2004. The appropriate proceedings in the Court below, if any, will be taken. However, no order is passed as to costs.
-
2004 (1) TMI 730 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ant was taken into custody and had to remain in jail for some time, may be for a few days, but without any justification whatsoever. She suffered in view of the total non-application of mind at the stage of passing of the two impugned orders. Some degree of care is supposed to be taken before passing an order of issue of warrants, bailable or non-bailable. Such orders cannot stand. 7. In view of the position as indicated above, we allow the appeal and quash the orders dated 9.10.2002, for issue of bailable warrants against the Appellant and the order dated 15.7.2003 for issue of non-bailable warrant passed by the High Court. It is informed that the Appellant was released on bail on furnishing personal bonds and sureties. The sureties and the personal bonds stand discharged. As a token of compensation, we direct Respondent 1 to pay a sum of Rs. 10,000 to the Appellant within a period of six weeks. 8. A copy of this order may also be sent to the Chief Justice of the High Court.
-
2004 (1) TMI 729 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... mind for the purpose of satisfying herself if prima facie case had been made out for issuance of process against the accused. The accused-opposite party, thus faced his trial on the basis of a validly instituted complaint and the trial, as indicated hereinabove, ended in his conviction and sentence. As the trial of the accused cannot be said to be on the basis of an illegally launched prosecution and as the only ground on which the conviction of the accused opposite party has been set aside is clearly on a misconceived and untenable proposition of law, the impugned judgment improper and incorrect in the face of the materials on record and the law relevant there to. Such an order shall, if allowed to stand good on record, cause serious miscarriage of justice and must, therefore, be set aside and quashed. 11. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this revision succeeds, the impugned judgment and order shall accordingly set aside and quashed. 12. Send back the LCR.
-
2004 (1) TMI 728 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ub-article (2) of Article 285, for that is a sphere in which the State legislation operates. The reasoning of the High Court to oust the applicability of Section 135 of the Indian Railways Act on the test of Sub-article (2) of Article 285 was totally misplaced, as also in not venturing to create room for it in Sub-article (1) of Article 285. The interplay of the constitutional and legal provisions being well cut and well defined requires no marked elaboration to stress the point. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and issue the writ and direction asked for in favour of the Union of India restraining the respondent council from raising demands on the railway in regard to service charges." 11. The same view was reiterated in 1996 2 SCR 761 Union of India and Anr. v. Ranchi Municipal Corporation and Ors. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is devoid, of merits and it is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
-
2004 (1) TMI 727 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... He admits that no enquiry was made regarding the nature of business of K. Narayhanan or where, the place of business was. Even after it was found out that that a cheque had been forged and stop payment notice had been issued, no enquiry was made by the Bank with the introducer. When asked why no enquiries were made, the answer given was that the bank has no responsibility to look into it. Another factor which mitigates against the 1st Respondent Bank is that it made no attempt to lead the evidence of the person who had introduced the account holder. 15. It appears to us that the above mentioned facts discloses that the 1st Respondent bank has not discharged the burden which lay upon it to show that it had acted in good faith and without negligence. 16. In this view of the matter, we are unable to sustain the impugned Judgment. It is accordingly set aside. The decree of the trial Court is restored. This Appeal stands disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
-
2004 (1) TMI 726 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ears of money and the effect of 22 of the tenants out of total 44 tenants surrendering possession. This is a matter which can be considered in the trial itself so far as it is relevant. It was submitted by learned counsel for the trust that in any event the District Court was the only Court having jurisdiction and not the Court where the suit was filed. This aspect does not appear to have been specifically urged before the Courts below. So we do not think it appropriate to express our opinion thereon. As regards the question of arrears it shall be open to the respondent-trust to move the trial Court for such directions as are available in law. Looking into the nature of dispute it would be appropriate if the trial Court makes an effort to complete the trial within six months from the date of the judgment. The parties are directed to cooperate for disposal of the suit early within the stipulated time. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated without any order as to costs.
-
2004 (1) TMI 725 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... e no reason to interfere. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
-
2004 (1) TMI 724 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... and applications of each of the petitioners is rejected and each of the petitioner is ordered to pay to the original complainant ₹ 5000/- by way of costs. Rule is discharged in each of the application/petition and interim relief is vacated with a direction to the trial Court to proceed with the original criminal cases as expeditiously as practicable. Criminal Misc. Applications Nos. 7717, 7719 and 9085 of 2003 do not survive in view of the above order. These applications are accordingly rejected. Notice in each application is discharged. 12. Upon pronouncement of the above judgment today, a request was made to stay the operation of the aforesaid order for a period of minimum six weeks because some of the petitioners propose to approach the higher forum, particularly in view of the recent order in ASHOK LEYLAND FINANCE LTD. v. R.S.AGGARWAL 2003 (10) SCALE 1000 referring certain issues to a larger Bench. The request is rejected in the facts and circumstances of the cases.
-
2004 (1) TMI 723 - ANDHRA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ime when it was signed; but subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), oral evidence of its contents shall not be received." 6. A bare perusal of this Section shows that the period of limitation in cases of acknowledgments in writing would start running from the date the acknowledgement is signed and not from any other date subsequent to signing of the acknowledgement. Therefore, the trial Court was not right in corning to the conclusion that the time would start to run after two months of the signing of the agreement. On this ground alone we find that the suit should have been dismissed. The other issues are not considered because the fate of the suit has got decided on the question of limitation itself. 7. Therefore, we allow this appeal. The judgment and decree of trial Court is set aside. The appellant is allowed to withdraw the amount deposited by him. If it has earned any interest, he will be entitled to that also. No order as to costs.
-
2004 (1) TMI 722 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... , AIR 2003 SC 4355 and Union of India v. Naveen Jindal and Anr., AIR 2004 SC 1559 ). 20. We, therefore, are of the opinion that although as a broad proposition of law it cannot be accepted that merely by change of religious person ceases to be a member of schedule tribe, but the question as to whether he ceases to be a member thereof or not must be determined by the appropriate court as such a question would depend upon the fact of each case. In such a situation, it has to be established that a person who has embraced another religion is still suffering from social disability and also following the customs and tradition of the community, which he earlier belonged to. Under such circumstances, we set aside the order under appeal and remit the same to the Sessions Court, Palakkad, to proceed in accordance with law. 21. The appeal, with the aforementioned observations is, accordingly, allowed. Since no one appears on behalf of the respondent, there shall be on order as to costs.
-
2004 (1) TMI 721 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... the reason that longer period of limitation is applicable in this case. On merit, the original authority has already held that the demand is sustainable. 5. The respondents however have contested that the issue on merit is squarely covered against the revenue. They cited the judgment of CEGAT in the case of Shakti Insulated Wires Ltd. v. CCE, Mumbai-IV reported in 2002 (51) RLT 115 (CEGAT-Mum), in which relying on the judgment of CEGAT in the case of Jindal Polymers v. CCE 2001 (43) RLT 680, it was held that clearances of finished goods on a job work basis, without payment of duty, does not tantamount to clearance of finished goods under full exemption or at nil rate of duty because, the said finished goods are subsequently cleared from the premises of the principal manufacturer on payment of duty. 6. Respectfully following the ratio of the law laid down in the said judgment, I find that the revenue appeal deserves to be rejected. 7. Accordingly 1 reject the revenue appeal.
-
2004 (1) TMI 720 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 6. It is a uniform practice that in the event that a particular Bench does not agree with the view of a Coordinate Bench, the matter should be referred to a Division Bench. This has not been done in Krishan Lal's case (supra). I would prefer to follow the view of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Yogeshwar Dayal in Babu Ram v. Devinder Mohan Kaura and Ors., AIR 1981 Delhi 14 and of the other High Courts which is to the effect that the Counsel must disclose the circumstances in which incorrect advice was given and it is not sufficient to make a perfunctory and general statement that the wrong advice was given bona fide. No sufficient cause has been shown for condoning the delay. No complaint has been filed against the Advocate who purportedly gave the wrong advice. Section 6 itself expects expeditious and speedy relief which cannot be frustrated by adopting a liberal approach. In any event no jurisdictional error has been disclosed. 7. The Petition is without merit and is dismissed.
-
2004 (1) TMI 719 - DELHI HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... y way of constitutional provisions, bound by the decision of the local High Court as is every Court of the country including the High Courts, bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court by virtue of provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution. If the subordinate Courts start ignoring the law laid down by their High Courts and start acting contrary thereto, then not only the legal anarchy will set in but the democratic structure of the country, rule of law and concept of liberty of citizens will be the first casualty. 29. Motion is disposed of with the aforesaid directions. 30. In view of the wide ramifications of the law laid in this case and cases referred therein and for the benefit of the society and people at large, Registrar General of this Court is directed to send the copy of the judgment to Police Commissioner for guidance and compliance by the SHOs/Investigating Officers and to all the Judicial Officers of Delhi and to the Director, Central Bureau of Investigation.
-
2004 (1) TMI 718 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... . ORDER Delay condoned. The civil appeals are dismissed.
-
2004 (1) TMI 717 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... 1996 under the interim orders of this Court which were subject to the final orders to be passed in the writ petition. No purpose would be served in withholding the declaration of the result on the basis of the examination already taken by him or depriving him of the degree in case he passes the examination. In terms of the orders passed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Milind and Ors., (Supra) we direct that his result be declared and he be allowed to take his degree with the condition he will not be treated as a Scheduled Caste candidate in future either in obtaining service or for any other benefits flowing from the caste certificate obtained by him. His caste certificate has been ordered to be cancelled. Henceforth, he will be treated as a person belonging to the general category for all purposes. 29. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order dated 15.3.2002 passed by the High Court of Kerala is set aside.
-
2004 (1) TMI 716 - NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION, NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... rawn in favour of Gokuldas Exports and that there was nothing on the face of the LC showing that it has been transferred to any other party. This contention also cannot help the Opposite Party No. 1, because it is for the consignor to decide from whom he should receive the consideration of the goods exported. Further, even if there is dispute between Gokuldas Exports and the notified party, it would not mean that Opposite Party No. 1 can directly deliver the goods to the notified party without clearance through the bank. E. Lastly, it was contended that the Complainant has received the payment from the notified Party. In our view, there is nothing on record to establish that Complainant has received the said amount from the notified party. 27. In the result, the Complainant is allowed. Opposite Party No. 1 is directed to pay a sum equivalent to US 71,615.75 as on today with 5% interest thereon from the date of the Complainant till its realisation and costs of ₹ 1 lakh.
-
2004 (1) TMI 715 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... gion of ₹ 15.37 to ₹ 15.40 per sq. yard. However there is evidence of high potentiality. The increase of 15 given by the High Court cannot therefore be said to be unreasonable. Of course, the 15 increase has to be on ₹ 15.40 which is the figure shown in the sale deed. It cannot be on ₹ 120 as wrongly taken by the High Court. The High Court also erred in considering only three years increase whereas in fact there is four years difference between the respondent's sale deed and the acquisition proceedings. Thus taking an increase of 60 over the price of ₹ 15.40 per sq. yard the value comes to ₹ 24.64 per sq. yard. We accordingly set aside the order of the Reference Court and the High Court and fix value at the rate of ₹ 24.64 per sq. yard. The respondent will also to be entitled to solatium and other statutory benefits under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Appeal stands disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to cost.
-
2004 (1) TMI 714 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... led up. He admits that no enquiry was made regarding the nature of business of K. Narayhanan or where the place of business was. Even after it was found out that that a cheque had been forged and stop payment notice had been issued, no enquiry was made by the Bank with the introducer. When asked why no enquiries were made, the answer given was that the bank has no responsibility to look into it. Another factor which mitigates against the 1st Respondent Bank is that it made no attempt to lead the evidence of the person who had introduced the account holder. It appears to us that the above mentioned facts discloses that the 1st Respondent bank has not discharged the burden which lay upon it to show that it had acted in good faith and without negligence. In this view of the matter, we are unable to sustain the impugned Judgment. It is accordingly set aside. The decree of the trial Court is restored. This Appeal stands disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
-
2004 (1) TMI 713 - COMPANY LAW BOARD SOUTHERN REGION BENCH, CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... Company becomes discharged from its obligations imposed under Section 113(1). The Company did not choose either to produce counterfoil of the share certificates said to have been delivered to the petitioner or furnish at least particulars of the shares such as registered folio, certificate Nos. and distinctive Nos. of the shares etc. The decisions cited by learned Counsel for the Company do not apply to the facts of the present case. In other words the Company has not produced any conclusive proof that it had delivered the share certificates to the petitioner. I, therefore, do not hesitate to hold that the Company defaulted in delivering the share certificates and further direct the Company to make good the default under Section 113(1) by delivering the share certificates in respect of 3,39,401 shares allotted in favour of the petitioner, within 21 days from the date of receipt of the order. With this direction, the petition stands disposed of without any order as to costs.
-
2004 (1) TMI 712 - COMPANY LAW BOARD NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... respondent company. Therefore, I am inclined to accept the arguments shareholder meeting was not held at the initial stage because all the directors are only shareholders and they had allotted the shares to the petitioner. 9. In view of the above discussions, the allotment of 7100 shares each to respondent No. 2,3,4 and 5 amounting to 28400 shares issued on 16.1.2003 without giving notice to the petitioner and without holding general meeting of the shareholders of the company, is illegal and void in terms of Article 9 of Articles of Association of the respondent company. Accordingly, the allotment of further issue of shares of 28400 mentioned above is set aside being wrongful, illegal and void abinitio. The other prayers made in the petitioner are not considered in view of the above decision and the same can be decided in the general meeting of the shareholders of the respondent company. The petition is disposed of with the above direction. 10. There are no order as to cost.
........
|
