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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 701 Records
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2005 (3) TMI 831 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... sessment of evidence, particularly when it is oral, would not be interfered with in appeal; though on being satisfied of a wrong approach of the trial court or injustice shown to have been done, this Court would not only have power, rather it would be its obligation, to rectify the mistake and dispense justice. 24. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that though an appeal under Section 116A of the Act is preferred as of right, yet the inherent power of this Court to summarily dismiss the appeal at the admission stage is not taken away. We hasten to add that such power would be exercised only by way of exception such as, on the Court feeling convinced that the appeal does not raise any such question of fact or law as would persuade this Court to put the respondent on notice before hearing. 25. The submission forcefully urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is rejected. Let the appeal be placed for preliminary hearing (i.e. hearing on admission) before the Court.
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2005 (3) TMI 830 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Board. This proceeding has been entertained and is being looked into by the said Board. I cannot make any comment. 38. The appointment of administrator pendente lite is permissible and entertainable under the provision of law undisputedly. Therefore, I cannot prima facie hold that this proceeding is an abuse of process of Court. It may be or may not be found later on upon affidavits. 39. At this stage appointment of administrator pendente lite is not called for however, the aforesaid interim order will continue till the disposal of this application. 40. Affidavit-in-opposition shall be filed by the respective parties in their mutual application within four weeks from date. 41. Reply two weeks thereafter. 42. Matter to appear 8 weeks hence. 43. It is made clear having regard to the nature of application, which are identical and in fact verbatim reproduction of each and every set of applications therefore, one affidavit-in-opposition may be filed in both the rival applications.
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2005 (3) TMI 829 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... not completed 18 years of age as on 1.4.2001. In the instant case undisputedly the respondent No. 2 accused had completed 18 years of age before 1.4.2001. 16. The Constitution Bench in Pratap Singh's case (supra) has held as under (i) In terms of the 1986 Act, the age of the offender must be reckoned from the date when the alleged offence was committed. (ii) The 2000 Act will have a limited application in the cases pending under the 1986 Act. (iii) The court would be entitled to apply the ordinary rules of evidence for the purpose of determining the age of the juvenile taking into consideration the provisions of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 as the model rules framed by the Central Government have no statutory force. 17. In that view of the matter, the trial court has to deal with the case of the respondent no. 2- accused keeping in view the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Pratap Singh's case (supra). 18. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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2005 (3) TMI 828 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the Government in contending otherwise in another case for valid reasons. We fully agree with the interpretation given by this Court in Kunhimoideenkutty's case (cited supra). In any event, it is a reasonable and possible interpretation and a different interpretation is not warranted at this distance of time. Since the State did not file any appeal against the decision in Kunhimoideenkutty's case (cited supra) and it ruled the field for the last one and a half decades and the rule making authority did not amend the rules, we are of the view that it is not for this Court to fill up the alleged lacuna or assign a different meaning to 'kerosene' than that is mentioned in the definition clause. We see no reason to overrule the decision in Kunhimoideenkutty v. State of Kerala 1988 (2) K.L.T. 128. Since it is not proved beyond doubt that what is seized from the Appellant is kerosene and the offences are not proved, the Appellants are acquitted. Appeals are allowed.
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2005 (3) TMI 827 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rinciples of law, is quite distinguishable in the present fact situation as discussed hereinabove. Materials were there in support of the ailment of the opposite party No. 1. Learned Magistrate may not have looked into it in so many words but this Court feels after perusing the same that the order cannot be interfered with. As such, the said decision of Puran (supra) is quite distinguishable in the present case. 24. This Court has very very carefully perused the Case Diary. Even on the question of merit it feels that there is hardly any justification for interfering in the matter as the materials collected by the Investigating Agency do not implore this Court to proceed in that direction. 25. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case the prayer for cancelling the interim bail granted by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bidhannagar is rejected and the interim order granted by this Court earlier on 25.1.2005 is vacated. 26. Return the Case Diary.
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2005 (3) TMI 826 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... f, Ex.A-4 dated 23-6-1995 - agreement of guarantee executed by the defendants 2 to 4 in favour of the plaintiff, Ex.A-5 dated 23-6-1995 promissory note executed by the defendants 1 to 4 in favour of the plaintiff's company. Therefore, I am unable to accede with the reasoning and view expressed by learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court in J.S. Sundararaj's case (supra). 13. The impugned Order does not suffer from any legal infirmity requiring any interference of this Court. The Civil Revision Petition fails and shall accordingly stand dismissed. No order as to costs. 14. The plaint was rejected by the court below inasmuch as the suit filed by the company was beyond three years from the due dates of 29 to 32 instalments, as they are time barred. Therefore, it is needless to mention here that the plaintiff company is at liberty to lay the plaint before the court below, after complying the objections, for recovery of the consolidated sum, in terms of the agreement.
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2005 (3) TMI 825 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... has not been fulfilled by the petitioner and therefore, conversion in question was not allowed. 8. The impugned order / communication dated 19th February 2004 does not give any such reason and in the circumstances, it is not possible to accept the reason assigned in the affidavit in reply which is improving upon order of rejection. It is settled law that an order has to stand or fall on its own, without deriving any support from subsequent averments made in the affidavit in reply. 9. In the circumstances, there being no reason, either on facts or in law, which would disentitle the petitioner from claiming conversion of its DFRC Shipping Bills to DEPB Shipping Bills, the impugned communication dated 19th February 2004 is hereby quashed and set aside. The respondent authorities are directed to permit conversion as claimed by the petitioner forthwith, not later than 18th March 2005. 10. The petition is allowed accordingly. Rule made absolute. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2005 (3) TMI 824 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... r, the Tribunal sustained the deletion of penalty on the ground that the audit report was obtained within the time allowed under section 139(1) of the Act and, therefore, no penalty can be levied in law. 4. Heard the learned standing counsel for the department. None appeared on behalf of the assessee /respondent. 5. We find that this court in CIT v. Jai Durga Construction 2000 245ITR857(All) has held that where the assessee has got the accounts audited before the specified date, no penalty can be levied under section 271B of the Act even though the assessee has not filed such audit report before the assessing officer before the specified date. To meet this situation, the law has been also amended by Finance Act, 1995. 6. in view of the above discussion we find no illegality in the order of the Tribunal. 7. We, therefore, answer the aforesaid question referred to us in the affirmative i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2005 (3) TMI 823 - ITAT HYDERABAD
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... ... ..... according to the assessee such income accrued in the year under consideration. In our considered opinion, such a claim is not permissible. In the immediately preceding year the assessee having declared income on the accrual basis, the only course open to the assessee to derecognise that income is to treat the same as bad-debt by following the RBI norms. Our view is supported by the decision of Apex Court in the case of State Bank of Travancore (158 ITR 102) as well as the decision of ITAT, Delhi Bench in the case of Poysha Oxygen (P) Ltd., (91 ITD 616). Admittedly, the assessee has not written off the impugned sum as bad-debt Under Section 36(1)(vii) of the Act and in fact the case of the assessee is that there is no question of write off Under Section 36(1)(vii) of the Act. Such being the case, we are of the view that the claim of the assessee is contrary to law and accordingly we reject the contention of the assesses. 11. In the result, both the appeals are allowed in part.
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2005 (3) TMI 822 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... le 226 of the Constitution to quash the proceedings of a subordinate Court situate in another State over which the Kerala High Court does not have the supervisory jurisdiction. Hence the above observations will not advance the contention of the appellants, in the facts and circumstances of this case. 12. For the above reasons we hold that it would not he proper for this Court to entertain the writ petition filed by the appellants and exercise the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the proceedings of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Erode which is under the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras. In the result this writ appeal is dismissed, without prejudice to the right of the appellants to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court of Madras. We make it clear that we have not expressed anything regarding the merits of the calendar case pending before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-II, Erode.
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2005 (3) TMI 821 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... question is whether any interference by this Court is called for in the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner. As we have noticed earlier, these proceedings have been initiated by private persons, namely respondents 5 to 7. So far as the police authorities are concerned, namely respondents 2 to 4, they are performing the statutory duties enjoined upon them. Those proceedings are not motivated by any personal animosity of the police officials concerned. The proceedings have been initiated on complaints made by private persons under the law and the proceedings are pending before the Courts which have jurisdiction to deal with them. The High Court has examined the matter and has come to the conclusion that those proceedings do not deserve to be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We entirely agree with the High Court. 13. We find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.
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2005 (3) TMI 820 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... of fact and Tribunal being the last authority, we see no reason to interfere. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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2005 (3) TMI 819 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... en the workers and the Secured Creditors on the basis of the second report given by the Chartered Accountant i.e. the workers' claim at 55.97% and the Secured Creditors' claim at 44.03%. The amount which is lying with the Official Liquidator is, therefore, distributed in future on the basis of this ratio. This ratio would also apply to any further distribution that may be taken place after realisation of sale proceeds of land. It is also made clear that the amount which has already been distributed till this date can also be appropriately adjusted at the time of making future distribution on the basis of this second report of the Chartered Accountant. 5. Once the distribution is taken place on the basis of this ratio, the Secured Creditors would inter-se decide the amount to be distributed amongst themselves on the basis of their priority claims and liberty is given to them in case of any difficulty. 6. With this direction, this application is accordingly disposed of.
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2005 (3) TMI 818 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ter was called out, the learned A.P.P. informs that all the Respondents are absconding and untraceable. Report of the concerned police station to support this position is tendered, which is taken on record. In other words, the Respondents have attempted to over-reach the authority of this Court, which cannot be countenanced. 13. In my opinion, taking overall view of the matter, this is not a case for showing any indulgence to the Respondents, especially having regard to the seriousness of the offence and the conduct of the Respondents ever since the order was passed by the lower Court in their favour and even during the pendency of this application right till the final order was pronounced today on this application. 14. Hence, this application succeeds. The anticipatory bail order granted in favour of the Respondents by the lower Court is set aside and cancelled with direction to the concerned police station to proceed against the Respondents forthwith in accordance with law.
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2005 (3) TMI 817 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mvada Devi Birla shall be heard, but the matter will appear in the list one after another. 92. There shall be cross order for discovery of the documents in relation to both the proceedings within four weeks from date, inspection forthwith thereafter. Both the suits should appear in the list for hearing eight weeks hence. 93. Mr. Sarkar appearing for all the caveators upon instruction prays for stay of operation of this judgment and order for a period of four weeks from date. Mr. Chatterjee appearing for Lodha opposes the prayer for stay. 94. Having considered the respective contentions of the learned Counsel I grant stay of operation of this judgment and order for a period of four weeks from date since I feel that there are substantial questions of law involved in this matter and chance should be given to the parties to agitate them before the higher forum. 95. Xerox certified copy of this judgment and order shall be made available to the parties as expeditiously as possible.
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2005 (3) TMI 816 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... would like to repeat that the professions like Lawyer's profession, Chartered Accountant's profession, etc cannot be compared to business enterprises as they have their own historical conventions and traditions which have evolved over centuries. Hence, the rulings of the Supreme Court or other Courts cannot be applied mechanically without properly understanding the context in which those rulings were delivered. What may be a reasonable restriction for a business may be unreasonable for a profession. Hence, we cannot accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant. 17. As regards Clause (i) of Article 19(6) of the Constitution, in our opinion, this has no application as the impugned notifications have nothing to do with professional qualifications for practising as a chartered accountant. 18. For the reasons given above there is no force in these appeals and they are accordingly dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected W.A.M.Ps. are also dismissed.
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2005 (3) TMI 815 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... tated that "where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on Admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the" relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled." The Supreme Court should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment" Therefore, in the present case, as appearing to us, there is a clear admission on behalf of the defendants that there existed a relationship of landlord and tenants, the rent is more than ₹ 3500/-and the tenancy is joint and composite one. As such on these admitted facts, there is no two opinion in the matter and the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the High Court appears to be correct and there is no ground to interfere in this Special Leave Petition and the same is dismissed.
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2005 (3) TMI 814 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... mbay, the criminal revision application was dismissed. Hence, this appeal by special leave. 4. A joint petition of compromise has been filed by the parties in which it has been stated that they have settled their dispute and grievances. In view of the facts stated in the compromise petition, we permit the parties to compound the offence. 5. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed, conviction and sentence of the Appellant are set aside in view of the compromise and he is acquitted of the charge. The Appellant, who is on bail, shall be discharged from the liability of bail bonds.
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2005 (3) TMI 813 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... erted for non business purposes. All that is germane is whether the borrowing was for business purpose or was not for the purpose of business. As expressed the Tribunal and also held by various Hon'ble Courts the expression "for the purpose of business" occurring in section 36(1)(iii) and also in section 37(1) is wider in its scope than the expression for the purpose of making or earning income occurring in section 57(iii). The decision cited such as Indian Bank's case (supra), CIT v. Cotton Fabrics 1981 131 ITR 999, CIT v. Sourth Indian Bank ITR 763, Rajasthan Warehousing Corporation v. CIT 242 ITR 45 0 and other citation supports the claim of the assessee in respect of interest earned as well as interest paid. Respectfully following these decisions and relying upon the decision of the Co-ordinate Bench cited supra, we hereby reverse the finding of ld. CIT(A) and allow the grounds raised by the assessee. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
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2005 (3) TMI 812 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e were sufficient materials available before the detaining authority to arrive at the subjective satisfaction regarding the head enumerated under Clause (i) of Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA independently of the grounds relating to transporting or keeping of the foreign currency under Section 3(1)(iii) which is stated to be not supported or established from the grounds of detention. Being so, the order in relation to the head comprised under Section 3(1)(i) of the COFEPOSA independently finds support from the materials on record revealed from the grounds of detention and therefore merely because the order under the head comprised under Section 3(1)(iii) of the COFEPOSA is not sustainable, the entire order cannot be held to be bad in law or invalid. 27. For the reasons stated above, therefore, we do not find any justification for interference in the impugned order of detention and hence the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The rule is discharged with no order as to costs.
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