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Showing 1 to 20 of 749 Records
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2006 (3) TMI 812 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... made by the Government of the erstwhile State automatically lapsed and were rendered ineffective on the coming into existence of the new successor States. 21. We are therefore of the opinion that the disputes raised in this suit have been excluded from the original jurisdiction of this Court by the proviso to Article 131 of the Constitution. On this short point the suit must fail and it is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Needless to say we are not expressing any view on the respective contentions of the parties relating to the merits of the case. 22. At an interlocutory stage during the pendency of the proceedings this Court had passed an order dated 2-12-1968 directing status quo to be maintained between the parties. The parties now consent that the order of status quo may continue until it is varied by an appropriate authority in accordance with law. Since we have dismissed the suit, we can only and do hereby record this agreement between the parties.
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2006 (3) TMI 811 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t it is no ground for implicating his client with the offence of cheating, and there appears to be enough force in such contention. Therefore, as the petitioner had no legal obligation to disclose the patent defect which the buyer could with ordinary care discover, it did not amount to cheating. 9. In the premises, in the light of the above discussion, the prosecution cannot be held to have brought home the charge against the petitioner beyond all reasonable doubts, and accordingly the present application be allowed. 10. As such, the impugned order dated 31.08.2004 passed by learned Court of appeal below in Criminal Appeal No. 30/2003 be set aside. 11. The petitioner being found not guilty be acquitted of the charge under Section 420 IPC and he be set at liberty at once. Let a copy of this order along with the LCR be sent down at once to the learned Court below. Urgent xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties as expeditiously as possible.
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2006 (3) TMI 810 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... arned counsel for the appellant. No merits. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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2006 (3) TMI 809 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... quent officer should be given a fair opportunity to cross-examine the said witnesses. The context and the controversy involved in the said case was entirely different. 36. We may also point out that in the present case the petitioner had only appeared only once before the enquiry officer and did not participate in the enquiry proceedings. He did not cross-examine the witnesses, file any written statement or give his defense against allegations made against him. There is no allegation that procedure as prescribed in Rule 16 has not been followed. The petitioner had filed an appeal against the order passed by the disciplinary authority which was dismissed. It appears that the petitioner has challenged the procedure prescribed under Rule 16 only because he had no other ground to challenge and question the disciplinary proceedings and the punishment awarded to him. 37. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in the present writ petition and the same is dismissed. No costs.
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2006 (3) TMI 808 - CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... kept by ROC and obtain copy of any document from the ROC concerned on payment of prescribed fee'. The appellant has however insisted that the CPIO of the Ministry should compile and provide the information to him. Commission's Decision 2. There is already a provision for seeking information under the Companies Act. 3. The appellant may accordingly approach the Registrar of the Companies (ROC), as advised by the appellate authority, to obtain the relevant information. There is no question of denial of information to him. 4. The appeal is accordingly disposed off.
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2006 (3) TMI 807 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... but the infraction coupled with the right itself. This expression means every fact which might be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. The learned District Judge was, therefore, wrong when he considered that death of the alienor alone was the cause of action for the plaintiffs in this case. 6. The finding of the learned District Judge that this suit was time-barred is, therefore, erroneous and cannot be maintained. It is hereby set aside. 7. The appeal was decided by the learned District Judge merely on the point of limitation after receiving the amended plaint. Further proceedings have, therefore, to be taken. This revision petition is accepted. The decree of the District Judge, Barnala, for further necessary action in accordance with law. (Sic) The costs in this petition shall be the costs in the suit. The counsel for the plaintiffs petitioners is directed to appear in that Court on 17th sawan 2006.
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2006 (3) TMI 806 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eedings contemplated under Section 446 of the Companies Act from that of the criminal proceedings under Section 138 r/w Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 15. As the Negotiable Instruments Act is a Special Act which overrides the provisions of the Companies Act, the legal liability contemplated under Section 446 of the Companies Act does not synchronise with the criminal proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act and the personal criminal liability and not the civil liability of the company is enforced under Section 138 r/w Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The company and its Directors cannot shirk their criminal liability on the ground that the company was already wound up and the Official Liquidator had taken charge of the affairs of the company. There is no merit in the contentions of the accused. 16. In the result, the criminal original petitions stand dismissed. Consequently, connected criminal miscellaneous petitions also stand dismissed.
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2006 (3) TMI 805 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e claim in respect of delay in delivery of the goods. (iv). In so far as issue no. 5 is concerned, I answer the same in the affirmative that the plaintiff has committed breach in effecting timely delivery as per the contract and thus there is delay in delivery of the goods. Consequently the defendants are entitled to damages in respect thereof. (v). In so far as issue no. 6 is concerned, I am of the opinion that answer to issue no. 6 is covered by answer to issue nos. 4 and 5. (vi). In so far as issue nos. 7, 8 and 9 are concerned, the answer to the said issues is that the plaintiffs are entitled to the sum of Rs. 1,60,102.55. In so far as interest is concerned, the defendants will be liable to make payment of interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the suit till payment and / or realisation. 12. There shall be decree accordingly in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The suit is decreed accordingly. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2006 (3) TMI 804 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iplinary proceeding is without obtaining liberty of the Administrative Tribunal, the action of the respondents is unauthorised and consequently reissuance of charge memo, conduct of enquiry based on which the impugned show cause notice was issued, are to be treated as unauthorised and the petitioner shall be treated to have been retired from service with effect from 31.1.2003. Petitioner shall be paid his retirement benefits and all service benefits, taking note of her superannuation on 31.1.2003 within a period of one month from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 7. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders of the second respondent dated 31.12.2002 as well as 14.9.2005 are quashed. The respondents are directed to settle the retirement benefits of the petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Petitioner is also entitled to all service benefits. No costs. Connected WPMP No. 39278 of 2005 is closed.
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2006 (3) TMI 803 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... lexander and another (1992 CRI. L.J. 3433) were decided by Kerala High Court either before or unmindful of Division Bench decision of that Court in Lilykutty v. Lawrance (supra) wherein it was held that presumption would still be available, until contrary is proved, when the cheque is signed by the drawer but the amount written is not in his handwriting. So is the case of M/s. Ryam Commerce & Plantation Ltd. v. Motilal Baid and another (2001 ALL MR(Cri.) Journal 14). 14. Considering the evidence led by the Complainant in the light of the defence taken by the accused which even if proved would give no benefit to the accused, refusal to send the said documents namely, the cheques and the A.D. card for the opinion of the Government handwriting expert could not be faulted. 15. In view of the above, I find there is no merit in this application and consequently the same is hereby dismissed. The learned trial Court to decide the case uninfluenced by the observations made herein.
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2006 (3) TMI 802 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n Rao v. State of M.P. 1958CriLJ803 . 14. The inferences culled out from the reading of those judgments can be summed up as follows - (a) Where the contactors were substantially responsible for the main and sole business, they would be treated as workers. (b) One exception is that in such cases flexibility of the contract was at variance with normal worker's contract the contractors would not be treated as workers. (c) Where the contractor is in the nature of supplier of goods and services, they are to be treated as supplier contractors and not workmen. 15. At this juncture the distinction between jewel appraisers and the regular employees of the bank can be noted. Therefore, the jewel appraisers are not employees of the Bank. 16. Above being the position, the judgment of the Division Bench affirming the views of the learned Single Judge and the Tribunal is clearly indefensible, deserves to be set aside which we direct. 17. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
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2006 (3) TMI 801 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cheque on behalf of the account holder is liable to answer the criminal liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and hold that such a mandate holder is not accountable to the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 13. Admittedly in this case, the first petitioner who is the father of the second petitioner was the mandate holder to issue cheque on behalf of the second petitioner. The account is in the name of the second petitioner only. Therefore the first petitioner cannot be prosecuted under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 14. In the result, the criminal proceedings in C.C. No. 26715 of 2004 pending on the file of the learned XIV Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai as regards the first petitioner viz., Surendra Mal Mehta stands quashed and as regards the second petitioner viz., Deepak Mehta, the criminal original petition stands dismissed. Consequently, connected criminal miscellaneous petitions stand closed.
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2006 (3) TMI 800 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ndari, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2006 (3) TMI 799 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... Revenue and others, 1999 RN 401 and Subhash Chandra and others v. Manjula and another 2004 RN 233 2004 (2) MPLJ 557 . Mere mutation of name of Madhav Rao Scindia without following due process of law will not confer any title over the property in question. In the absence of any document on record to demonstrate that the land in question was transferred in favour of the petitioner trust, it is difficult to accept the title of the petitioner trust. 18. As discussed above, mutation in the revenue record will not confer any title to the petitioner trust, unless otherwise proved before the Court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that the lands between the boundary wall of Jai Vilas Palace and the public street as well as on the road leading to the main gate of Jai Vilas Palace is a part of public street and belong to the Government. 19. Petition, therefore, has no merit and is dismissed with costs quantified at ₹ 5,000/- (Rs. five thousand) payable to the respondents-State.
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2006 (3) TMI 798 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nd the Division Bench is that they proceeded under the presumption that the select list was in force. The view is clearly wrong. In paragraph 31 of the earlier judgment it was made clear that it was upto the State to take a decision as to whether any relief can be granted to the persons who were selected in respect of the hill cadre. All the posts advertised for the plain cadre have been filled up. Therefore, the State has rightly taken the stand that there was no scope for appointing non-official respondents. Relaxation was given for a period of three years for applicants, when applications are invited for selection by the U.P. PSC or the Uttaranchal State Public Service Commission. Obviously, relaxation is to be granted when fresh applications are invited. That is not the case here. Therefore, the judgments of the learned Single Judge as well as Division Bench affirming the same cannot be maintained and are set aside. The appeal is allowed but without any order as to costs.
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2006 (3) TMI 797 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... udgment passed by the learned Single Judge and they are keen to implement it, the appeals preferred by the Bar Council of India would be wholly incompetent as it is only on a reference made by the Bar Council of Kerala that the Bar Council of India advised under the provisions of the Statute to reject the application of the petitioners and once, the Bar Council of Kerala itself feels that the petitioners cannot be barred to enter the legal profession, the appeals should be dismissed as not maintainable. We do not propose to go into this question, even though we may hasten to add that the question raised by the though we may hasten to add that the question raised by the counsel for the petitioners is quite debatable and may have some merit in it as well. However, since we have dealt with the appeals on merits and have found them to be devoid of any substance, it may not be necessary to go into the question raised by the counsel for the petitioners. We leave the matter at that.
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2006 (3) TMI 796 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hich suggests the same. Thus the bill of exchange being silent as to the rate of interest the plaintiff is entitled to the interest at the rate of 18 per cent, per annum. 30. Mr. Makhija's reliance upon, unreported judgment of this Court in Dorbyl Eastern Cops Division of Dorbyl Ltd. v. m. v. Navigator in Admiralty Suit No. 60 of 1996, dated October 19, 1995, is not well founded. In that case, the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act were not involved. Further that was an order for the arrest of a vessel in exercise of the Admiralty jurisdiction of this court. The claim though in foreign currency was in respect of necessary repairs carried out to the vessels by the plaintiff. In these circumstances and as the claim was made in US Dollars, the court reduced the rate of interest to 5 per cent. The judgment has no application in the present case. 31. There is thus no defence to the suit. 32. The summons for judgment is made absolute and the suit is decreed as prayed.
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2006 (3) TMI 795 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... d jacks do not form part of the vehicles for the purposes of arriving at the assessable value of vehicles, are unexceptionable and do not call for any interference. The civil appeals are dismissed accordingly.
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2006 (3) TMI 794 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ider that the interests of justice would be subserved by setting aside the finding by the courts below that the suit is barred by limitation, even while upholding the finding that the trial court had the jurisdiction to try the suit and remand the suit to the trial court for a decision of all the issues arising therein, including the issue of limitation, in accordance with law after giving the parties an opportunity to adduce evidence in support of their respective cases. 15. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the finding that the suit is barred by limitation and the consequential dismissal of it are set aside and the suit is remanded to the trial court for a proper trial of all the issues (other than the issue of jurisdiction) arising in the case and for disposal afresh in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear in the trial court on 17.4.2006 so as to receive further orders as to posting. However, in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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2006 (3) TMI 793 - SUPREME COURT
Assignment of the usufructuary mortgage - acknowledgement under Section 18 of Limitation Act, 1963 or not - discharge of mortgage debt under the deed of mortgage dated 7.9.1935.
Whether the assignment of the usufructuary mortgage by Krishna Pillai in favour of Soundararaja Iyenger under deed dated 12.2.1954 amounted to an 'acknowledgement' under Section 18 of Limitation Act, 1963, thereby enabling plaintiffs to compute a fresh period of limitation for the suit for redemption, from the date of such acknowledgement? - HELD THAT:- When the said deed of assignment was executed on 12.2.1954, the mortgage dated 7.9.1935 was subsisting, as the period of limitation at that time, was 60 years. In view of the admission of jural relationship contained in the assignment deed, operating as an acknowledgement of liability, a fresh period of limitation started from 12.2.1954. When the suit was filed on 16.11.1981, the new Limitation Act was in force under which the period of limitation was 30 years. When the 30 years period is computed from 12.2.1954, the suit filed in the year 1981 was clearly within limitation.
Whether the mortgage debt under the deed of mortgage dated 7.9.1935 stood discharged under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act, 1979? - HELD THAT:- When the Debt Relief Act, came into force on 15.7.1978, the mortgage was very much subsisting. Section 9 of the Debt Relief Act contains special provisions in respect of mortgages. Sub-section (1) of Section 9 provides that the provisions of the said section applies to all mortgages executed at any time before 14.7.1978 and by virtue of which the mortgagee is in possession of the property mortgaged to him. Sub-section (5) of Section 9 provides that where the mortgagee has been in possession of the mortgaged property for an aggregate period of 10 years or more, then, the mortgage debt shall be deemed to have been wholly discharged with effect from expiry of the period of ten years or where such period expired before 14.7.1978, with effect from 14.7.1978. The said provision applies as the mortgage transaction does not fall under any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 4 of the said Act. As the mortgagee and his successors were in possession of the mortgaged property ever since 7.9.1935, that is, for more than 10 years as on the date when the Act came into force, the said mortgage debt stood wholly discharged with effect from 14.7.1978.
If the answer to the above two questions is in the affirmative, to what relief plaintiffs are entitled to? - HELD THAT:- When the mortgage debt got statutorily discharged, the mortgagee became liable to deliver back possession to the mortgagor. In such a situation, what the mortgagors-plaintiffs can claim from the mortgagee, is not rendition of accounts, but mesne profits for wrongful possession from the date of discharge of the mortgage debt. There is, therefore, no question of accounting either of the amounts due by the mortgagor to the mortgagee or of any accounting of over-payments or for refund of any over- payments by the mortgagee. In the suit, plaintiffs only sought rendition of accounts but did not claim mesne profits nor paid any court fee in regard to past mesne profits. Plaintiffs cannot, under the guise of a claim for accounts, seek a decree for mesne profits. After obtaining possession, it is open to them to sue for such mesne profits as is permissible in law.
The relief of redemption can be only in regard to the property mortgaged under the deed of mortgage and not in regard to any other property. Therefore, the decree has to be amended so as to bring the description of the mortgaged property in consonance with the description of the property mortgaged under the deed of mortgage dated 7.9.1935 (Ex. A-1)
The judgment of the High Court is set aside and the suit is decreed, holding that the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree for redemption in regard to the suit property. Final decree shall be drawn accordingly - The prayer for rendition of accounts is rejected - The schedule to the decree containing the description of the mortgaged property shall be amended so as to bring it in conformity with the schedule to the mortgage deed dated 7. 9.1935.
Appeal allowed.
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