|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 551 Records
-
2006 (4) TMI 586 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... UR, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
-
2006 (4) TMI 585 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... tion under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 could have been invoked in the facts of this case. The civil appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
-
2006 (4) TMI 584 - ITAT MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... r business purpose but for supplementing the cash diverted by the assessee. In the present case, there is no fresh borrowing after giving interest-free advances and hence this judgment is not applicable here. The judgment in the case of Motor General Finance Ltd. (supra) is also not applicable in the present case because in that case, adverse inference was drawn by the Assessing Officer against the assessee to the effect that borrowed funds were diverted for advances to sister concerns for the reason that the assessee did not furnish bank statements to enable the Assessing Officer to examine as to whether the advances are out of borrowed funds. There is no such allegation in the present case that the assessee did not furnish the bank statement or any other document called for by the Assessing Officer and hence this judgment also is not applicable in the present case. Therefore, this ground of the revenue is rejected. In the result, this appeal of the revenue stands dismissed.
-
2006 (4) TMI 583 - CESTAT NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... nd on a different footing than the services provided by the security agency to procure the security personnel for the client. The impugned order is, therefore, stayed during the pendency of the appeal and there shall be waiver of pre-deposit of the amount payable under the impugned order . 4. We are, therefore, of the view that service tax is to be charged on the gross amount recovered for providing the service as service charges and not on the salaries and other benefits payable to the employees and recovered from the client by the security agency. In this view of the matter, we do not find any reason to ask the applicants to pre-deposit any amount as they have already paid service tax on the 15% service charges they have recovered from the client as stated by the learned Counsel for the applicants. We, therefore, waive the pre-deposit and grant stay of the impugned order. Both the applications are disposed of accordingly. (Dictated pronounced in the open Court on 26-4-2006)
-
2006 (4) TMI 582 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rds, there were two components of the agreement. Second part related to the agreement not to execute the decree which was dependant upon the execution of the sale-deed. Undisputedly, the same has not been executed and on the other hand suit for specific performance of the agreement has been filed, and that matter is pending in appeal. 15. We do not think it necessary to express any opinion on the merits of the said suit. But the facts remain that there was no certificate as needed under Order XXI Rule 2 CPC. The question of conscious waiver, in the circumstances does not arise. Ultimately, it has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of this case as to what was the intention of the parties and to determine as to whether rights on the decree were given up or not. On the facts, the rights had not been surrendered and the decree remained preserved. That being so, the High Court's order is indefensible and set aside. The appeal is allowed but with no order as to costs.
-
2006 (4) TMI 581 - ITAT BANGALORE
... ...
... ... ..... not expired on the date when search was conducted at the premises of K. R. Prabhu on 11-10-1996. The assessee has also paid advance tax. As held in the case of Dr. (Mrs.) Alka Goswami (supra) and in the case of Kumkum Kohli (supra), the income attributable to the extent of advance tax paid cannot be considered as undisclosed income. Accordingly, the income from film "Indian" cannot be brought to tax as undisclosed income. 7.1 As regards addition of unexplained cash credit, we find that such cash credits were appearing in regular books of account maintained by the assessee. No material is found during search, which suggests that such cash credits are either ingenuine or bogus. Since no material is found, accordingly such cash credits cannot be considered as undisclosed income as per provisions of section 158B(b). We accordingly delete the addition in respect of unexplained cash credits also. In the result, the assessment order is set aside and the appeal is allowed.
-
2006 (4) TMI 580 - ITAT AMRITSAR
... ...
... ... ..... cifically asked to cite even a single other case of identical nature where net profit rate of 10 per cent is applied. He could not do so. Under these circumstances, we consider the orders of the authorities below for applying rate of profit at 10 per cent as highly arbitrary, unreasonable and without any basis. 11. In the light of detailed facts and circumstances of the case discussed above and the legal position mentioned above, we are of the considered opinion that orders of authorities below deserve to be set aside. We order accordingly and direct the Assessing Officer to compute the income by applying net profit rate of 3 per cent of the freight receipts, union fee and collection from Truck Operators. The assessee would not be entitled to any deduction for the expenses as the income is directed to be computed by applying net profit rate of 3 per cent. These grounds of appeals are treated as partly allowed. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed.
-
2006 (4) TMI 579 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... he Revenue after verifying states that no appeal has been filed against the earlier order passed by the Tribunal, referred to above. Since the Revenue has accepted the decision rendered by the Tribunal in the earlier proceedings between the parties and the same has become final, the Revenue is precluded from taking a different stand in the present appeals as per law laid down by this Court in a number of cases. See Collector of Central Excise, Pune v. Tata Engineering & Locomotives Co. Ltd. reported in (2003) 11 SCC 193; Berger Paint India Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta reported in (2004) 12 SCC 42 2004 (165) E.L.T. 488 (S.C.); Birla Corporation Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise reported in (2005) 6 SCC 95 2005 (186) E.L.T. 266 (S.C.); and Jayaswals Neco Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur reported in 2006 (195) E.L.T. 142 (S.C.). Hence, without going into the merits of the dispute, we dismiss these appeals with no order as to costs.
-
2006 (4) TMI 578 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... it court interfered with the matter in merit. The Division Bench ultimately held that non-response of U.G.C. or clarification regarding irregularities of a University, if any, do not constitute any offence against the persons, who are running such institute. We are not entertaining the merit herein. Therefore, we have no occasion to accept or reject the proposition of such judgment. If the petitioner/s chooses to proceed with the matter before an appropriate jurisdiction of the Court, then alone he/they can take help of such judgment there for the necessary purpose. 9. Therefore, in totality we are of the view that the writ petition/s can not be sustained, Thus, the writ petition/s stand dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 10. However, no order is passed as to costs. 11. All the aforesaid four writ petitions will be governed by this common judgment passed hereunder and office is directed to keep a copy of this judgment/ order in all the aforesaid writ petitions.
-
2006 (4) TMI 577 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... ions used, in the order passed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice on the one hand, and the Main Order of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Surya Kant, on the other, yet, it has not been possible to conclude that there was any divergence/ difference in the directions recorded in their separate orders. In the aforesaid view of the matter, no occasions whatsoever arises for issuing any order in terms of Rule 31 of Chapter 4(F) of the High Court Rules and Orders, read with Clause 26 of the Letters Patent, in so far as the present issue is concerned. 23. Conclusions For the reasons recorded above, since no point of difference seems to emerge, from the two points agitated on behalf of the applicants, on which separate deliberations have been recorded hereinabove, there is no merit in the prayer made in the instant applications, under Rule 31 of Chapter 4(F) of the High Court Rules and Orders, read with Clause 26 of the Letters Patent. Both the applications are, as such, liable to be dismissed.
-
2006 (4) TMI 576 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... cations of ₹ 60 lakhs will have to be borne by the State Government. He has categorically stated that the revision of pay scales extended to the employees of State Government time and again will also be extended to all the University employees. 17. In our view, the impugned judgment of the High Court in W. A. Nos. 7007-55/1999 dated 8.3.2000 is not legally sustainable. It is, accordingly, quashed and set aside. Consequently, the appeals are allowed and the order of the learned Single Judge dated 29.10.1998 in Writ Petition Nos. 11755/94 CW 3400-3423/93, 37901-37904/92, 35996/92, 3426-3443/93 and 27004/92 is restored and maintained. The respondents-State of Karnataka and University of Mysore, both are directed to extend the pay scales of 1977 and subsequent revisions to the appellants and pay the difference of monetary benefits to them within four months from the date of this order. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
-
2006 (4) TMI 575 - SC ORDER
... ...
... ... ..... see no reason to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal. The Civil Appeal is accordingly dismissed.
-
2006 (4) TMI 574 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... bmits that the entire burden in respect of the liabilities of the Company is shouldered only on the second respondent/second accused. Therefore, the learned Counsel pleaded that the above said mitigating circumstances shall be considered by this Court, while imposing the sentence. 17. I have also heard the learned Counsel for the appellant/complainant in respect of these aspects. 18. Considering the above said mitigating circumstances and also considering the fact that the alleged transaction took place about ten years back, I am of the considered view that ends of justice would be met by directing the second respondent/ second accused to pay an amount of ₹ 5,00,000/- (rupees five lakhs only) as compensation to the appellant/complainant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In default of payment of the above said compensation, the second respondent/second accused, should undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months.
-
2006 (4) TMI 573 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... Amending Act of 1978, it has similarly not qualified the expression "a decree or order" by the requirement that it must be of any Court against the debtor. 14. Sub-section (2) of section 9 allows the creditor to serve an insolvency notice on the debtor under sub-section (3) where the creditor has obtained "a decree or order against him for the payment of money". The Bombay Amendment while being pari materia in so far as this aspect was concerned, required that the execution of the decree or order has not been stayed. Sub-section (2) of section 9 as enacted by Parliament, provides that the decree or order be for the payment of money and be a decree or order which has become final and the execution whereof has not been stayed. Therefore, the two fold test which is required to be met is that there must be a decree or order for the payment of money by the debtor to the creditor and this decree or order must be final and of which execution has not been stayed.
-
2006 (4) TMI 572 - ITAT, MUMBAI
... ...
... ... ..... not so held, the company would be regarded as a closely held company even though fifty per cent, or more of its shares are held by the public generally. 39. In view of these extracts of circulars, notes on clauses and memo explaining the objects and reasons, it is evident that the items enumerated in the definition clause are all those which are widely held companies. But as they were not finding inclusion in the definition, a need was felt to incorporate them specifically. Therefore there is no force in the submission of the assessee that some companies which were not of the nature of widely held companies are also included. In any case even if that were so, it does not help in importing a company in the definition if that does not satisfy the requirements of a company enumerated therein. 40. In view of the above, it is held that the assessee-company is not a company in which public are substantially interested. 41. In the result, the appeal on this point is to be dismissed.
-
2006 (4) TMI 571 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... rt in the case Ashwini Satish Bhat v. Shrijeevan Divakar Lolienkar (supra) and the other two judgments referred to hereinabove. Nevertheless, the Division Bench judgment is relevant to the extent that it holds that a promise to pay in writing as per Section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, matures into an enforceable contract, which can be enforced by filing a Civil Suit. If a suit could be filed pursuant to a promise made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, as contemplated by Clause (3) of Section 25 of the law of Contract, then, in my view, the debt becomes legally enforceable and if a cheque is given in payment of such debt is dishonored and subsequently, the statutory notice is not complied with, then the person making promise in writing and issuing the cheque, would still be liable to be punished under Section 138 of the Act. 10. In view of the above, I find there is no merit in this revision and, consequently the same is hereby dismissed.
-
2006 (4) TMI 570 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... titude. We do not find any substance therein. 42. For the foregoing reasons the impugned judgments cannot be sustained which are set aside accordingly. Although, the consequence of setting aside of the said orders would have been to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority for consideration of the matter afresh on merit, but having regard to the fact that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the appellant as far back in 1976, we refrain ourselves from doing so. He indisputably, have suffered a lot. However, the question which arises is what relief should be granted to the appellant. The appellant shall be reinstated in service. We, however, while directing reinstatement of the appellant, keeping in view of the fact that no work had been taken from him, direct that only 50% of the back wages shall be payable. The appeal is allowed with the abovementioned directions. 43. In the facts and circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.
-
2006 (4) TMI 569 - CESTAT, DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... provisions of the Act as amended by the Finance Act, 2000 and 2003. It was held that the reliance on the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Laghu Udyog Bharti’s case and on L.H. Sugar Factories Pvt. Ltd., in which, relying upon the decision of the Laghu Udyog Bharti, it was held that the show cause notices issued in that case by invoking Section 73 of the Act were not maintainable, was mis-conceived as that ratio was not now applicable and the matter had to be viewed in the context of the amended provisions, the constitutional validity of which was upheld by the Supreme Court in Gujarat Ambuja Cements Ltd.’s case. In this view of the matter, the opponent cannot be allowed to get the refund of the amount paid by way of service tax for the period in question on the strength of the impugned order. The impugned order is, therefore, stayed during the pendency of the hearing. This application is allowed. (Order dictated & pronounced in open Court on 7-4-2006.)
-
2006 (4) TMI 568 - CESTAT, CHENNAI
... ...
... ... ..... ever, that the relevant show-cause notice did not care to claim that, from 01.07.2003 the assessee was availing "Scientific or Technical Consultancy" from their foreign collaborator. It, on the other hand, maintained that the assessee was availing "Consulting Engineer's Service" throughout the period of dispute. It has been consistently held by this Tribunal that providing technical know-how is not to be equated with providing Consulting Engineer's Service. Thus the assessee has prima facie case against the demand of Service Tax and against the penalty. Ld. Commissioner (Appeals) ought to have dispensed with pre-deposit. 5. In the aforesaid circumstances, we set aside the impugned order and allow this appeal by way of remand, directing ld. Commissioner (Appeals) to dispose of the assessee's appeal on merits in accordance with law and the principles of natural justice without insisting on any pre-deposit. (Dictated and pronounced in open Court)
-
2006 (4) TMI 567 - SUPREME COURT
... ...
... ... ..... r having stopped the broadcast would not be liable to pay the charges demanded in these communications. In these circumstances, nothing survives in this application and the same is accordingly disposed of. Having noticed that the Respondent had complied with its interim order by depositing the requisite amount, the High Court allowed the Appellant to withdraw the said sum of ₹ 23 lacs and also encash the bank guarantee furnished by the Appellant for another sum of ₹ 23 lacs, the High Court directed The petitioner shall not be liable for any further amount on account of the FM Broadcast which is the subject matter of the writ petition. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the Tribunal did not exceed its jurisdiction in issuing the impugned directions. 23. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no case has been made out for our interference with the impugned judgment of the Appellate Tribunal. 24. This appeal is dismissed accordingly. No costs.
........
|
