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Showing 1 to 20 of 645 Records
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2007 (5) TMI 693 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n of giving any other or further effect to Clause 6 of the Will may not arise. 45. In view of the findings aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the decision relied upon by Mr. Sundaram on Margaret Goonewardens (supra) cannot be said to have any application in the instant case, as in view of our findings aforementioned, Clause 5 of the will is not hit by Section 113 of the Indian Succession Act. 46. The submission (iv) of the appellant fails in view of the matter that Clause 12 does not attract Section 129 of the Act since both the Clauses, i.e., 5 and 7 are valid as observed hereinbefore. 47. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee is quantified at Rs.50,000/- 48. We would request the High Court to consider the desirability of disposing of the suits filed by the parties hereto, as expeditiously as possible, keeping in view the fact that they are pending for more than 28 years from now.
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2007 (5) TMI 692 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the judgment of the learned Single Judge, which is impugned in this appeal, would show that though the question as to whether the security deposit is not to be treated as an asset or property of the sick company was noted, but without answering this question and discussing as to what would be the character of security deposit for tenanted premises, only on the ground that in the execution the decree holder was seeking to recover money, the learned Single Judge opined that it would be covered by the express language of Section 22 of the SICA. This, to our mind, may not be the correct approach, in view of our discussion above. The order of the learned Single Judge is, Therefore, liable to be set aside on this ground itself. Therefore, we need not go into the other contention raised by the learned Counsel for the decree holder in this appeal based on constructive res judicata. 18. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The execution petition shall proceed on merits. 19. No costs.
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2007 (5) TMI 691 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... such a situation. 20. In a case of this nature, it is very difficult to say at this stage as to whether they are parties to the larger conspiracy or not. In the evidence, it is alleged that one of the appellants had gone for training to Pakistan, another had provided money and he had been in possession of a large quantity of arms. A strong prima facie case has been made out against the appellants herein. Their release at this juncture may hamper the smooth conduct of trial since main witnesses are yet to be examined. One of the appellants hails from a different State. It may be difficult to secure his presence, if released on bail at this crucial juncture. 21. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the interest of justice shall be subserved if the learned Designated Judge is directed to conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible and preferably within six months from the date of communication of this order. With this observation, the appeals are dismissed.
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2007 (5) TMI 690 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he State of Uttar Pradesh in continuation of the investigation made by the Officer-in-charge of the Shakespeare Sarani Police Station. The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Allahabad shall be entitled to pass appropriate orders from time to time in this behalf. (v) The Report on completion of the investigation shall be forwarded to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta who shall determine the question of his own jurisdiction at an appropriate stage. (vi) This order, it is made clear, is being passed in exercise of our extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. All concerned authorities are directed to carry out these directions. 38. For the views we have taken, it is not necessary for us to embark upon the question as to whether directions issued by the Judicial Magistrate by an Order passed under Sub-section (3) of Section 156 is a judicial order or an administrative order. 39. This appeal is disposed of with the aforementioned directions.
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2007 (5) TMI 689 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... et aside the finding of acquittal of accused Suman Sood for an offence under Section 364A read with 120B, IPC. To that extent, therefore, the order of conviction and sentence recorded by the High Court deserves to be set aside. FINAL ORDER 71. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal filed by Daya Singh deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed and the order of conviction and sentence recorded against him by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court is upheld. 72. So far as accused Suman Sood is concerned, an order of conviction and sentence recorded by the trial Court and upheld by the High Court for offences punishable under Sections 365/120B, 343/120B and 346/120B, IPC is confirmed and upheld. Her conviction and order of sentence for offence punishable under Section 364A read with 120B, IPC passed by the High Court, however, is set aside and her acquittal for the said offence recorded by the trial Court is restored. 73. Appeals are accordingly disposed of.
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2007 (5) TMI 688 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... stified in holding that Central Subsidy should not be deducted from the actual cost of assets for the purposes of allowing depreciation 3. The Supreme Court considered the case law in detail and concluded that the expression actual cost needs to be interpreted liberally. The subsidy does not partake of the incidents which attract the conditions for their deductibility from actual cost . It was, Therefore, held that it would not be unreasonable to say that Government subsidy is an incentive, not for the specific purpose of meeting a portion of the cost of the assets, though quantified as or geared to the percentage of such cost. It does not partake the character of a payment intended either directly or indirectly to meet the actual cost . In this view of this, the Supreme Court decided the question in favor of the assessed. 4. Following the decision of the Supreme Court, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favor of the assessed and against the Revenue.
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2007 (5) TMI 687 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cited by Mr. Ghosh are of no avail to his client. 52. We, therefore, dismiss the appeals filed by the Corporation in the above nine matters and so far the writ-application filed by the Asian Leather Private Limited is concerned, we pass the same order by declaring the Circular as ultra vires the Statute and the Constitution of India and at the same time, directing the Corporation to refund the Drainage Development Fees collected from the writ-petitioners within three months from today with interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of acceptance of the fees till repayment by the Corporation. All the matters, thus, are disposed of accordingly. In the facts and circumstances, there will be, however, no order as to costs. Kishore Kumar Prasad, J. 53. I agree. Appeal dismissed filed by the Corporation and the writ-application filed by the Asian Leather Pvt. Ltd. upon passing the same order by declaring the circular as ultra vires the statute and the Constitution of India.
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2007 (5) TMI 686 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... be on the merits of the case. 20. In the instant case, the learned Single Judge has also remarked that the appellant had in fact no defense on the merits of the claim. His only plea was that he was misguided by his younger brother regarding the financial conditions of the company and was persuaded to furnish the guarantee under the belief that the company was doing very well and the guarantee was merely a formality to seek more facilities from the Bank. This plea of the appellant was discussed by the English Court, which passed the decree, in detail and leave to defend was eventually declined. The judgment was rendered after a very detailed discussion and bestowing considerate thought to the defendant's version. 21. We, Therefore, agree with the aforesaid view of the learned Single Judge holding that such a judgment was on the merits of the case. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is upheld. The execution would proceed on merits.
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2007 (5) TMI 685 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... perty of writ petitioner mortgaged to the corporation respondent and impugned public notice for sale of the said mortgaged property is concerned. Hence, taking over of possession of petitioner's land mortgaged vide letter (Annexure-1) is bad in law and the public notice (Annexure-2 to the writ petition) issued by the corporation for selling such land as mortgaged by the petitioner/guarantor is also impermissible under law, as the corporation had failed to discharge its duty before issuing the letter and public notice impugned, therefore both the letter (Annexure-1) and Public notice (Annexure-2) are hereby set aside and quashed. The Corporation respondent No. 1 shall restore the possession of hypothecated property as well as the mortgaged land of the petitioner to him forthwith. 20. In the result, writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs. However, it is made clear that the Corporation respondent can proceed de-novo in accordance with law for realization of its dues.
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2007 (5) TMI 684 - COMPANY LAW BOARD PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... with the ROC on 20.5.2003. Their removal as Directors was illegal. However, since the petitioners husband is dead now, his son in his place is required to be placed as Director besides his mother who continues to be a director as her removal as well was illegal. 16. As regards the sale of Time Shares at the back of the petitioners after reducing them to a minority of 8%, the absence of R-8 despite initially intending to represent before CLB only gives strength to the petitioner's contention in this regard. However, the petitioners when again on the Board are given liberty to review the transaction and take appropriate steps in the interest of the company. 17. In view of the foregoing, the petitioners' prayers at item (a) to (f) and (o) are hereby granted. The respondent company is directed to implement the same forthwith. With the above directions, I dispose of this petition. All CAs in this CP stand disposed off. All interim orders stand vacated. No order as to cost.
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2007 (5) TMI 683 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... . It is not a mere irregularity. Non-payment of the said amount renders the sale proceedings a complete nullity. 6. In Balram v. Ilam Singh and Ors. AIR1996SC2781 , it has been held that the obligation of the purchaser to deposit the full purchase money within time is a mandatory requirement and non-compliance of the rule renders the sale a nullity and not a mere irregularity. 7. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the auction sale of the appellants' property was a nullity, and there was no valid auction sale. 8. In view of the above, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and it is held that there was no valid sale of the appellant's property. 9. We, therefore, direct that the said property be again auction sold after advertising it in at least two well-known newspapers having wide circulation, mentioning therein the date, time and place of the auction sale and after complying with the procedure under Rule 107 of the Rules. No costs.
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2007 (5) TMI 682 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ounsel for the State also pointed out that there was no necessity whatsoever on the part of the Tribunal to review its own judgment. Even after the microscopic examination of the judgment of the Tribunal we could not find a single reason in the whole judgment as to how the review was justified and for what reasons. No apparent error on the face of the record was pointed, nor was it discussed. Thereby the Tribunal sat as an appellate authority over its own judgment. This was completely impermissible and we agree with the High Court (Justice Sinha) that the Tribunal has traveled out of its jurisdiction to write a second order in the name of reviewing its own judgment. In fact the learned counsel for the appellant did not address us on this very vital aspect. 26. Under the circumstances, for the reasons shown above, we are of the clear opinion that the appeals have no merits and must be dismissed. It is accordingly ordered to be dismissed. We, however, pass no order as to costs.
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2007 (5) TMI 681 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... her father, are insufficient to draw an inference of existence of a grave suspicion of such nature as to warrant charges against her. In fact, the chargesheet merely states that the petitioner "at the instance of' Smt. Nandita Bakshi and V.K. Jha was found involved in siphoning of the money." No other link or attendant circumstance, as far as the petitioner's role is shown, or alleged in the chargesheet. 12. In the light of aforementioned observations, no substantiating prima facie case was made out against the petitioner, at least no prima facie case that about the grave suspicion of her involvement was made out. The trial court could not have proceeded to charge the petitioner as it did, on the available materials, and the allegations leveled in the charge sheet. Its order Therefore, cannot be sustained. 13. For the above reasons the petition has to succeed; it is accordingly allowed. The charges framed against the petitioner-accused are hereby set aside.
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2007 (5) TMI 680 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aid contention of Mr. N.D. Singhal cannot be accepted. The question of deduction of income tax under Section 194-A of the Income Tax Act from the amount of compensation to be paid has been considered and decided by Gujarat High Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mitaben Dharmeshbhai Shah and it has been followed by this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sunita Jain W.P. No. 939 of 2005; decided on 16.1.2006 (MP). For the grounds and reasons indicated in the order dated 16.1.2006 passed by this Court in W.P. No. 939 of 2005 (supra), order passed by the learned Claims Tribunal directing the insurance company to pay a further sum of Rs. 12,800 deducted by way of T.D.S. is liable to be quashed. 4. Accordingly, this petition is allowed. Order impugned passed by the Claims Tribunal directing payment of further sum of Rs. 12,800 to the claimants by the insurance company is quashed. 5. Accordingly, petition stands allowed and disposed of with the aforesaid.
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2007 (5) TMI 679 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t it is not enough if notice is put in such time so that receipt within 30 days can be ensured. That would be against the dictum in Madhu v. Omega Pipes Ltd., (1994 (1) KLT 441) where it is clearly held that the date of receipt is not crucial or relevant and it is the date of giving- i.e., despatch of the notice, which is crucial and vital when we consider whether notice has been given in time. 7. I do, in these circumstances, come to the conclusion that notice need be given within 30 days under proviso (b) to Sec. 138 and if notice is despatched before the expiry of 30 days by post/courier or other means, that would be sufficient compliance of proviso (b) to Sec. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 8. That being the answer to the question of law raised, the petitioner does not have any ground to get the prosecution against him quashed by invoking the extraordinary inherent jurisdiction under Sec. 482 of the Cr.P.C. In the result, this writ petition fails and is dismissed.
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2007 (5) TMI 678 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... herwise not binding on the parties. 45. We, however, are of the opinion that it is not necessary for us to go into the said question. 46. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be subserved if it is directed that the respondents herein in filling up of the vacant posts must take into consideration the cases of all those teachers also who have the requisite qualifications, upon relaxation of age, if permissible by law along with other eligible candidates. We may, however, direct that it would be open to the State of Bihar as also the concerned Universities to forthwith terminate the services of those teachers not working against sanctioned posts or who do not fulfill the requisite educational qualifications or whose services are otherwise not required. 47. The appeals and connected interlocutory applications are dismissed with the aforementioned observations. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2007 (5) TMI 677 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... eliable and truthful, the question of corroboration does not arise particularly, when it is found that the witnesses are not inimically disposed towards the accused though related to the deceased and in this case also to the accused. 23. We may notice that the eye-witnesses did not ascribe any role to the two acquitted accused who are the brothers of the appellants. This is indeed indicative of the fact that the eye-witnesses did not intend to falsely implicate innocent persons. 24. We have, therefore., considered the entire evidence on record and the reasoning in the two judgments before us. We find that the reasons recorded by the Trial Court while recording an order of acquittal are unreasonable and perverse. On the basis of the evidence on record it was not possible to take a view in favour of the accused. The High Court was therefore, justified in setting aside the order of acquittal. 25. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly, dismissed.
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2007 (5) TMI 676 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to the file of the High Court. The High Court shall now consider the other contentions raised by the respondent-writ petitioner other than the issue answered by this Court. 16. This Court on 23.8.2004 stayed the operation of the judgment of the High Court subject to the appellant making payment of the amount equivalent to subsistence allowance from the date of the judgment of the High Court within four weeks. This order was passed keeping in view that the order of dismissal was set aside by the High Court. As we have set aside the order of the High Court, the order of dismissal dated 21.1.1997 confirmed by Appellate Authority's order dated 27.9.1997 stands restored subject to the final decision of the writ petition. The respondent-writ petitioner shall not be entitled to any subsistence allowance from today till the writ petition is finally disposed of by the High Court in accordance with law. 17. The appeal is allowed accordingly. Parties to bear their respective costs.
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2007 (5) TMI 675 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... edies are available for the contesting respondent. Apart from that, Section 69 of the Act provides itself that the dispute between the parties has to be resolved by filing appropriate dispute before the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies. Without doing so, the contesting respondent had rushed to this Court. The learned single Judge could not have entertained the Writ Petition and could not have issued any direction. We are of the view that when the main relief itself cannot be granted, interim order/direction could not have been issued by the learned single Judge. Interim order is granted in the aid of main relief, not vice versa. In that view of the matter, the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the following Order Appeal is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned single Judge is set aside. Certain observations made by us in the course of judgment is only for the disposal of the Writ Appeal. Ordered accordingly.
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2007 (5) TMI 674 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ntial control through Central Government having 5 representatives nominated by the Government. Only because the financial aid is not to the extent it was required compared to the expenditure of the company or that its audit is not being conducted by the Comptroller and Auditor General it would not be appropriate for us to exclude this body from the purview of Article 12. From the nature of the work as recognized by the Ministry of Commerce in Clause 2.65.1 it is clear that the Capexil is discharging public duty. Hence, with deepest regard we have for the learned Single Judge, we are unable to accept His Lordship's view. 23. The appeal, thus, succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the learned Single Judge impugned herein is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded back to the learned Single Judge for being decided on merits. There would be no order as to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy would be given to the parties, if applied for. P.K. Deb, J. I agree.
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