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Showing 1 to 20 of 887 Records
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2008 (1) TMI 1005 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he decree for specific performance cannot be granted for any reason, hence there is no infirmity in the alternative plea of refund. 13. In the light of what has been stated above, we set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court and confirm the decree granted by the trial Court. In view of the said conclusion, the appellants/plaintiffs are directed to deposit the balance amount of sale consideration i.e., Rs. 1,92,500/- in the trial Court within a period of eight weeks whereupon the respondent/defendant shall execute the sale deed of the suit lands Block No. 208 admeasuring 0.60 R and Block No. 209 admeasuring 0.40 R of Village Nagaon, Tahsil Hatkanangale as per the agreement dated 31.07.1985. In case of failure of the defendant to execute the sale deed, the plaintiffs shall be entitled to get the sale deed executed through Court. 14. The civil appeal is allowed on the above terms. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2008 (1) TMI 1004 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... age of Rule 7 power is vested in the Court and after the decree is passed Order IX Rule 13 becomes applicable and the party can avail himself of that remedy, it is very difficult to appreciate the ends of justice which are supposed to be served by the Courts being held to have the power which the learned Counsel says must inhere in it. In this view it is unnecessary to consider whether to sustain the present submission the respondent must establish that the court was conscious that it lacked specific statutory power and intended to exercise an inherent power that it believed it possessed to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. 11. Looked at from any angle the orders of the High Court impugned in these appeals cannot be sustained and are set aside. It is to be noted that subsequent two writ petitions were allowed primarily on the ground that first writ petition was allowed. The appeals are allowed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.
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2008 (1) TMI 1003 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... akash, Adv., Mr. B.V. Balaram Das, Adv. For the Respondent None ORDER Delay condoned. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
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2008 (1) TMI 1002 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... this Court finds that the complaint has not approached the Criminal Court with clean hands and the complaint itself is an abuse of the process of law. This is yet another ground warranting interference by this Court under section 482, Cr. P.C. The Court is conscious that the power to quash criminal proceedings must be exercised sparingly and only in rare cases. This is certainly in the category of a rare case in which the Court finds it necessary to interfere to quash the criminal proceedings. 27. For all the aforementioned reasons, this Court quashes Complaint Case Nos. 177/2003, 178/2003, 179/2003, 180/2003 titled Smt. Shikha Batra through her Husband/Attorney v. Smt. Taruna Batra , the summoning order dated 13th November, 2003 passed by the MM, New Delhi and all proceedings consequent thereto. The petitions are allowed with costs of Rs. 5,000 each which will be paid by the respondent to the petitioner within a period of four weeks. The pending applications are disposed of.
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2008 (1) TMI 1001 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ue by virtue of Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF WEST BENGAL ANR. V/s. KESORAM INDUSTRIES LTD. OTHERS, reported in (2004) 266 ITR 721, with special reference to the observations from Page No.762 onwards. 4. Once the Apex Court has categorically recorded that the Royalty is not a tax the provision of Section 43-B of the Act cannot be invoked. The said section requires that an amount of tax, which is otherwise deductible expenditure, is not to be allowed deduction unless and until actually paid. However, royalty not being a tax, the prohibition laid down by Section 43-B of the Act will not apply. 5. Hence, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in holding that in respect of unpaid royalty the provisions of Section 43-B of the Act are not attracted. The question referred for the opinion of this Court is, therefore, answered in affirmative i.e. in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Reference stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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2008 (1) TMI 1000 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... 4 of the Code cannot be exercised ipse dixit in the manner in which it has been done. Only on that ground and without entering into larger issue, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is accordingly, allowed. 18. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law after hearing the parties. On the facts and in circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs. 19. Before parting with the matter, we make it clear that we have not entered into correctness or otherwise of what is stated by the plaintiff or by the defendants and we may not be understood to have expressed any opinion on allegations and counter-allegations. As and when the matter will be placed before the High Court, the Court will take an appropriate decision on its own merits without being inhibited or influenced by the observations made by us in this judgment.
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2008 (1) TMI 999 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hroughout remained on bail. He, therefore, submitted that this Court may pass an appropriate order enlarging the appellant on bail on such terms and conditions as this Court deems fit. 12. In our opinion, however, it would not be appropriate to pass such order when we are remitting the matter to the High Court. We may, however, grant liberty to the appellant to make such prayer before the High Court. Let the High Court consider the same on its own merits and pass an appropriate order. 13. The appeal is accordingly allowed with aforesaid observations. The order of the High Court is set aside. The matter is remitted to the High Court to be decided in accordance with law after hearing the parties. 14. Before parting with the matter, we may clarify that we have not entered into merits of the matter and we may not be understood to have expressed any opinion one way or the other on the issues in the case. The High Court will decide the appeal on its own merits. Ordered accordingly.
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2008 (1) TMI 998 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ty. No evidence is forthcoming to belie the claim of the Plaintiff, which, however, is supported by the documentary evidence Exhibit P-9. Accordingly, Issue No. 2 is answered in favour of the Plaintiff. 24. For the reasons already recorded hereinbefore, I proceed to dispose of the Suit on the following terms (1) The Defendants are ordered and decreed to pay to the Plaintiff sum of Rs. 5,00,000/ (Rupees Five Lakhs) along with the interest accrued thereon at the rate of 24% per annum from 8th May 1996 till payment and/or realisation. The Defendants would however be entitled to adjustment of Rs. 6,20,000/- (Rupees Six Lakhs Twenty Thousand) paid by two demand drafts to the Plaintiff on 29th June 2004. In other words, the Defendants to pay the balance amount after deducting sum of Rs. 6,20,000/-(Rupees Six Lakhs Twenty Thousand) from the amount payable as per this decree. (2) Defendants are ordered to pay cost of this Suit to the Plaintiff. (3) Decree be drawn on the above terms.
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2008 (1) TMI 997 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s out certain legislation where an exclusive or special provision is made for regulating the jural relationship of landlord and tenant or licensor and licensee. The words "or any other law for the time being in force" must be construed in the context in which they occur or else the important public purpose underlying the conferment of exclusive jurisdiction on the Small Causes Court will be defeated. The exception carved out by Sub section (2) of Section 41 will not encompass the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 23. For all these reasons, I am of the view that the objection to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the Petition is well founded. The recourse to arbitration under the terms of the arbitration clause contained in the agreement of leave and licence would be barred by virtue of the exclusive jurisdiction conferred upon the Court of Small Causes by Section 41(1) of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. The Petition shall stand dismissed.
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2008 (1) TMI 996 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ject the case of the respondents. In the above circumstances we allow the writ appeals and the writ petitions holding that on a plain reading of Rule 15(c), the dominant object or the use of the building for educational purposes alone decides the claim for exemption and nothing more or less is required. Rule 15(c) is in an unqualified term. There are no words of restriction attached to the portion dealing with educational purposes. In the above circumstances, we do not agree with the view expressed by Justice P.K.Misra and affirm the view of Justice P.Jyothimani in the decision reported in (2006) 3 MLJ 1068 (Kamaraj College of Engineering And Technology, Managing Board, rep. by its Secretary, Virudhunagar v. President, K.Vellakulam Panchayat, Madurai District), as stated in the preceding paragraph. Hence, we set aside the orders impugned herein dated 30.4.2003 thereby allow the writ appeal and the writ petitions. Connected Miscellaneous Petitions are also dismissed. No costs.
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2008 (1) TMI 994 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... habitation of woman as husband and wife and their treatment as such for a number of years may raise the presumption of marriage, but the presumption which maybe drawn from long co-habitation is rebuttable and if there are circumstances which weaken and destroy that presumption, the Court cannot ignore them. 15. As noted above, the continuous living together of Lolli and Radhika has been established. In fact the evidence of the witnesses examined by the plaintiff also established this fact. The conclusion of the first appellate court that they were living together when Mangal was alive has not been established. The evidence on record clearly shows that Lolli and Radhika were living together after the death of Mangal. 16. Above being the position, the appeal deserves to be allowed which we direct. The judgment and decree of the first appellate court and the High Court are set aside and those of the trial court stand restored. 17. Appeal is allowed but with no order as to costs.
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2008 (1) TMI 993 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... , Bangalore Bench, which has since been allowed giving rise to the appellant to file the instant appeal under section 260-A of the Act. As has been mentioned in the above case that similar question of law has already been answered in favour of the assessee in the matter of Hotel Sreeraj (supra), the facts of this case are identical to the facts of the case of Hotel Sreeraj (Supra). For the same reasons, We ore satisfied that there is no merit of substance in this appeal also. 4 The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance of a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Raja J. Rameshwar Rao Vs. Commissioner Of Income Tax, Hyderabad reported in 42nd I.T.R. p.179. 5. We have categorically gone through the judgment, but find that the facts of the said case are entirely different. The ratio decidendi of the said case do not apply to the facts of the present case. In this view of the matter, we find that there is no substance in this appeal and is accordingly dismissed.
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2008 (1) TMI 992 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... at where there is a complete exoneration on merits in the adjudication proceedings, the continuation of criminal proceedings on the same set of facts cannot be sustained. 16. The conclusion as a result of the above position is that the criminal proceedings against the petitioner in the instant case cannot validly continue. The Respondent has itself exonerated the petitioner in the adjudication proceedings on merits and its order has attained finality. The continuation of criminal proceedings on identical facts and requiring a higher degree of proof cannot be justified. Consequently there is no need for this Court to decide which of the two criminal complaints can be proceeded with. The conclusion is that neither can. 17. Criminal Complaints Nos. 262/1/2002 and 841/1/2002 pending before the ACMM, New Delhi and all proceedings consequent thereto including the impugned order dated 21.1.2006 passed by the MM hereby stand quashed. The petition is allowed with no order as to costs.
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2008 (1) TMI 991 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Dishonor of Cheque - legally enforceable debt or not - signature in the pro-note - determine the age of the ink of the signature - section 138 of NI Act - HELD THAT:- It is found that the age of the ink cannot be determined by an expert with scientific accuracy. Further, the use of old ink manufactured long ago will definitely create a dent in the opinion furnished by an expert. Therefore, there is no necessity for sending the disputed cheque admittedly signed by the petitioner to an expert for his opinion. Therefore, there is no warrant for interference with the well considered order passed by the Trial Court.
Thus, the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate is confirmed. The criminal revision case stands dismissed. The connected Miscellaneous Petition also stands dismissed.
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2008 (1) TMI 990 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... and in this connection the Registrar General of Allahabad High Court will circulate letters to all the District Judges in U.P. along with a copy of will circulate letters to all the District Judges in U.P. along with a copy of this judgment to ensure faithful compliance of the decision of the Full Bench decision of the High Court in Amarawati's case (supra). 58. The Secretary General of this Court shall send a copy of my judgment to the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and Law Secretary of U.P. as well as to the Registrar General of Allahabad High Court and also to the President/Secretary of Allahabad Bar Association and the Allahabad High Court Advocates' Association as well as Oudh Bar Association, Lucknow forthwith. A copy shall also be sent to the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and Law Secretary of all State Governments/Union Territories in India who shall direct all officials to strictly comply with the judgment of this Court in Joginder Kumar's case (supra).
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2008 (1) TMI 989 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rs of the company at the relevant time, can only be judged during the course of trial and the complaint cannot be quashed under Section 482 CrPC. 29. As already stated above, in the present case, specific averments have been made against the petitioner that petitioner was in charge of, and/or was responsible for the company for the conduct of the business of the company and admittedly as per petitioner's own reply he was whole time Director of the accused company. 30. So, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in N.Rangachari (supra) when specific averments have been made against the petitioner and since it can be adjudged only during the course of trial whether the present petitioner was in charge of or responsible to the affairs of the company or not, the present petitions are wholly misconceived and are not maintainable. 31. Under these circumstance, in view of the discussion held above, the present petitions are not maintainable and the same are, hereby, dismissed.
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2008 (1) TMI 988 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... filed three complaints against respondent but was not able to serve him as he is based in Kolkata. He could not even find details of his property after the respondent was declared as proclaimed offender. However, merely because of his non appearance on one date, his complaints were dismissed. The net effect of the entire proceedings is that it is the petitioner/complainant who has been punished as against respondent, who had been successfully evading service of summons and appearance before the Court to face trial. 8. In the above factual matrix, I find that the non-appearance of the petitioner/complainant on the date fixed was not intentional accordingly the order dated January 23, 2002 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sirsa is set aside and the complaint filed by the petitioner is restored to its original number. The petitioner is directed to appear before the Court below on February 29, 2008 for further proceedings. 9. Accordingly, the petitions are allowed.
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2008 (1) TMI 987 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as per Section 141 was prosecuted. P.W.1, in her evidence, during cross-examination, gave an evasive answer as to whom the statutory notice was given. She also pleaded ignorance as to how many persons were partners of Daltan Ceramics Industries. Therefore, even the prosecution of the accused partnership firm is not proper as there was no proper statutory notice issued to either the said firm or to its partner. The notice issued to the R.P. Subramanian as an individual describing him to be the proprietor of Dalton Ceramics Industries shall not be taken as a proper statutory notice to the accused partnership firm. 19. For all the reasons stated above, this Court comes to the conclusion that, though not for the reasons assigned by the lower appellate court, but for the reasons stated supra, the judgment of the lower appellate court setting aside the conviction of R.P. Subramanian and acquitting the respondent/accused deserves to be confirmed. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed.
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2008 (1) TMI 986 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nd any scope to interfere with the impugned orders. Moreover, so long as the directions issued by the Registrar, dated 16.10.1997, under Section 181 of the Act 1983 remains in force, the subsequent directions and the impugned orders issued by the first respondent by invoking Section 166 of the Act 1983 were well within the powers and jurisdiction of the first respondent. 15. It will have to be stated that the appellant not having challenged the directions of the Registrar, dated 16.10.1997 issued under Section 181 of the Act 1983, cannot be permitted to challenge the consequential orders passed under Section 166 of the Act 1983 impugned in the writ petitions. 16. Looked at from any angle, we do not find any scope to interfere with the orders impugned in the writ petitions and therefore, the order of the learned single Judge impugned in these appeals cannot also be interfered with. The Writ Appeals fail and the same are dismissed. No costs. Connected M. Ps. are also dismissed.
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2008 (1) TMI 985 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aid letter cannot be treated as a return to be filed under Income Tax Act, the same cannot be treated as an admission since the Assessing Officer was required to look into the revised return filed by the assessee and scrutinize the same and thereafter to pass an order on merits in accordance with law. 16. It is to be observed by us that letter dated 25.01.1995 was not submitted by a partner of the assessee either at the time of hearing the parties while scrutinizing the revised return or along with the revised return. The letter dated 25.01.1995 clearly show that the assessee firm is going to file a revised return in accordance with law. Therefore what was required to be considered by the Assessing Officer was not the letter dated 25.01.1995, but the revised return filed by the assessee. 17. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the question of law framed by the revenue has to be answered against it and in favour of the assessee. Accordingly we dismiss this appeal.
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