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Showing 1 to 20 of 978 Records
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2009 (7) TMI 1395 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... already noticed above, the disputes pertain to a transaction of the year 1997. The petitions have been pending in this Court for the last eight years. Claims were made against respondents as guarantors. The claims against principal debtor had already been allowed. Upon setting aside of the award in so far as holding the respondents not liable, the liability of the respondents is the same as that of the principal debtor M/s Ganga Automobiles Ltd., as already determined in the award. It is clarified accordingly. The petitioners shall be entitled to execute the award for the amounts awarded against M/s Ganga Automobiles Ltd., against the respondents Sh. Ashwini Suri, Sh. G. Sagar Suri and M/s. Delhi Auto General Finance Pvt. Ltd. also. 39. Resultantly the petitions are allowed with the modifications/clarifications aforesaid in the arbitral award. Petitioners shall also be entitled to costs from the respondents of Rs. 50,000 in each petition for the proceedings before this Court.
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2009 (7) TMI 1394 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Nature of expenditure - expenses has been incurred on advertisement
... ... ... ... ..... this Court in the case of CIT Vs. M/s.Star India Pvt. Ltd. in ITXA No.165 of 2009 decided on 24th March, 2009 . In this view of the matter, appeal stands dismissed for want of substantial question of law. No order as to costs.
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2009 (7) TMI 1393 - ITAT DELHI
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... ... ..... the persons produced and that no returns were filed by them and no account books were produced, the affidavits were filed before the CIT (Appeals) which should, in our opinion, have been admitted and examined to decide the matter instead of throwing them out on the ground that they were fresh evidence containing certain facts not stated before the Assessing Officer. Even though the situation warranted, the affidavits should be admitted and examined to take a final view of the matter. We accordingly set aside the matter of CIT (Appeals) as well as of the Assessing Officer and remit the matter back to the file of the Assessing Officer to examine the matter afresh after affording an opportunity of being heard to the assessee and take a final view after taking into consideration the material produced by the assessee and brought on record. 5. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in open court on this 10th day of July 2009.
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2009 (7) TMI 1392 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ere is no reason to say that the first respondent took any action or decision, or that it has a Kolkata office at the address given in the cause title. In my opinion, this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition. 22. For these reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. There shall be no order for costs. 23. Counsel for the petitioners prays for stay of operation of my judgment. I am unable to see what is to be stayed. I have dismissed the writ petition. I have not given any direction to any of the parties to the case. Hence there is nothing to stay. What Counsel seeks in an interim order from me. In my opinion, after dismissing the writ petition for lack of jurisdiction, I should not make an interim order restraining the respondents from pursuing the pending arbitral proceedings. 24. Urgent certified xerox of this order, if applied for, shall be supplied to the parties within three days from the date of receipt of the file by the section concerned.
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2009 (7) TMI 1391 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... applications and the present appeals are filed against said orders of dismissal. Since, plea of the appellants was that there is an apparent error in the orders passed by the Tribunal, which orders are already subject matter of appeal before this Court, it would be open to the appellants to urge those grounds while arguing the said appeals. 2. The Tribunal, application of appellants under section 254 of the Income Tax Act, has inter alia observed that it is not open to go into merits of case again and come to a finding different from the one already arrived at and if view taken by, Tribunal erroneous, remedy lies in filing an appeal against impugned orders passed by the Tribunal and those orders are already subject matter of appeal, as mentioned above. In these circumstances, while reserving the right of the appellants to urge the grounds pointing out the purported errors apparent on face of record in impugned orders while arguing those appeals, these appeals are disposed of.
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2009 (7) TMI 1390 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... lam, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2009 (7) TMI 1389 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... es merely for the reason that the language found in Section 14 refers to the secured creditor and secured asset. Further more, as contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in W.P. No. 10228 of 2009, that under sectio1n 13(10) even after sale, the bank can approach the Debts recovery Tribunal by filing application having jurisdiction or a competent court, for recovery of the balance amount. Further, the contention of the learned Counsel for the banks that the character of the secured creditor cannot be said to be ceased by executing the sale certificate also cannot be ignored. 22. In view of the above discussions, we hereby hold that the respondents banks are entitled to take possession under Section 14(2) of the SARFAESI Act and the issuance of sale certificate is not a bar to take physical possession and the writ petitioners are not entitled for the reliefs sought for. Consequently all the writ petitions fail and are dismissed. No costs. Connected M.Ps. are closed.
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2009 (7) TMI 1388 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n or objection from them and even while withdrawing the aforesaid amount, the respondent did not intimate either the appellant or the court that it would be applying the same towards payment of interest. 17. For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs, we set aside the order dated 19.11.2008 passed by Learned Single Judge. A sum of Rs. 50.54 crores has been deposited by the appellant during the pendency of this appeal. The Ld. Single Judge will decide in the light of this judgment, whether any further amount is payable by the appellant to the respondent in terms of this judgment or not. If he finds any amount payable to the respondent, that amount would be paid to the respondent out of the amount deposited by the appellant during the pendency of the appeal and the remaining amount, if any, shall be refunded to the appellant. If no amount is found due to the respondent, the entire amount deposited by the appellant during the pendency of the appeal will be refunded to it.
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2009 (7) TMI 1387 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t any unlawful demand or any property. 25. In that view of the matter neither explanation (a) nor explanation (b) of Section 498A of IPC is attracted in the present case. It is crystal clear that neither in the FIR nor in the charge sheet there is any ingredient of Section 498A IPC, which could prima facie constitute a case of cruelty as defined in that Section. 26. It is thus established that on a reading of the FIR as also the charge sheet filed against the appellant no case under Section 498A is made out on the face of the record, and therefore, both the FIR as also the charge sheet are liable to be quashed in exercise of the powers under Section 482 of the CrPC. Clearly, the High Court failed to appreciate the facts in proper perspective, and therefore, committed an error on the face of the record. 27. We, therefore, allow this appeal and quash the proceedings initiated against the appellant under Section 498A of the IPC. 28. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
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2009 (7) TMI 1386 - SECURITIES APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI
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... ... ..... 11) of the takeover code. The same is accordingly set aside. The appellants are directed to re-calculate the offer price by reckoning 26-1-2008 as the date in terms of Explanation (ii) as discussed hereinabove and offer the revised price to all the shareholders. 9. Before parting, we may refer to our order in Sohel Malik v. SEBI 2009 90 SCL 238 (Mum.) which was cited by the learned senior counsel for the Board. It is on similar facts and involves an identical question of law. The learned Counsel for the appellant tried to distinguish it on facts but we do not find any material difference. In that case, the convertible warrants were converted into equity shares by the board of directors in their meeting on 28-6-2008 and we held this date to be date for computing the offer price and we did not agree with the Board that the price had to be re-calculated with reference to the date of public announcement. In the result, the appeal is disposed of as above with no order as to costs.
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2009 (7) TMI 1385 - CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ortunity to explain the above discrepancy. The explanation forwarded by the appellant for the aforesaid discrepancy was again forwarded to the assessing officer and remand report was obtained. On receiving the remand report, the Commissioner (Appeals) forwarded copy of the same along with annexures to the appellant for giving his response, however, he failed to give his response. In these circumstances, the suppressed receipt amount of Rs. 2,97,839 has been added in income of the appellant. In our considered opinion, the reasoning assigned by the assessing officer, which has been subsequently confirmed in Commissioner (Appeals) and Tribunal, is proper and addition of the aforesaid amount in income of the assessee has been rightly made. No substantial question of law, as proposed by the appellant, arises for adjudication of this appeal. 12. In the result, the appeal being devoid of substance deserves to be dismissed at the admission stage itself and is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2009 (7) TMI 1384 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... titioners only approval for initiating major penalty proceedings was taken. We have before us three situations (a) Approval for initiating major penalty proceedings taken from the disciplinary authority. (b) Approval for issuing a charge sheet not taken from the disciplinary authority. (c) Approval of the charge sheet not in issue before us. 10. This being the factual position, we do not find any error having been committed by the Tribunal in coming to the conclusion that the charge sheet was issued without jurisdiction since approval of the disciplinary authority for issuing it was not taken, as required. 11. Under the circumstances, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. However, we may note that the Tribunal has given liberty to the Petitioners to take appropriate action against the Respondent in accordance with law. The liberty granted by the Tribunal is not being disturbed. 12. The writ petition is disposed of in terms of the above.
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2009 (7) TMI 1383 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r notice from which it could be inferred that the appellants have not co-operated in the investigations or have, in any manner, abused the concession of bail granted to them. As a matter of fact, Mr. Naphade, learned senior counsel representing the State, stated that after grant of anticipatory bail to the appellants, no investigation in the case has been conducted. 22. For the foregoing reasons, in our judgment, the impugned order setting aside the anticipatory bail granted to the appellants by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed; impugned order is set aside and the order dated 18th December, 2007 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge confirming the ad-interim anticipatory bail to the appellants, is restored. It goes without saying that nothing said by the High Court or by us hereinabove shall be construed as expression of any opinion on the merits of the case. 23. Both the appeals stand disposed of, accordingly.
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2009 (7) TMI 1382 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the considered opinion that whether the parties to a litigation get their dispute settled by invoking Section 89 CPC or they get the same settled between themselves without invoking Section 89 CPC, the party paying Court Pees in respect thereof should be entitled to the refund of full Court Fees as provided under Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870. Therefore, the contention of the learned Government Pleader that the principles laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the said case cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case does not deserve acceptance. 7. For the reasons aforesaid, the present Misc. Cvl. 2716/2009 is hereby allowed. The appellants in RSA No. 1374/2005 shall be entitled to the refund of the entire amount of court fees paid by them in the said RSA which has been dismissed by order of this Court dated 30.1.2009 'as settled out of Court. Accordingly, the office is directed to refund the full Court Fees to the appellants therein.
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2009 (7) TMI 1381 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... us owner to UPSRTC under the contract, this Court held that at no point of time the possession of the Bus was transferred for use to UPSRTC and the effective control over the Bus was always with the Bus owner and Bus was only provided for the transportation of the passengers for which the payment was made on kilometer basis. 13. I have gone through the aforesaid decision of this Court. The said decision is based on the terms and conditions of the contract between the bus owners and UPSRTC referred in the order itself. In the said agreement there was no clause that the possession and the effective control over the Bus shall be with UPSRTC. Therefore, the said decision is not applicable to the present case. In this view of the matter, the order of the Tribunal is erroneous and is liable to be set aside. In the result, all the revisions are allowed and the orders of the Tribunal and the First Appellate Authority are set aside and the order of the Assessing Authority is restored.
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2009 (7) TMI 1380 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... lam, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2009 (7) TMI 1379 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s therein the male died before the Act came into force. As would appear from the following “(5) It is clear from the express language of the section that it applies only to coparcenary property of the male Hindu holder who dies after the commencement o the Act. It is manifest that the language of S. 8 must be construed in the context of S. 6 of the Act. WE accordingly hold that the provisions of S.8 of the Hindu Succession Act are ;not retrospective in operation and where a male Hindu died before the Act came into force i.e. where succession opened before the Act. S.8 of the Act will have no application.” For the aforementioned reasons, we are of the opinion that the learned trial judge as also of the High Court were not correct in opining that Dinesh would be a coparcener and the appellants would inherit only 1/10th share in the said properties. The shares of the plaintiffs would be 1/3 rd therein. These appeals are allowed but in the circumstances with no costs.
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2009 (7) TMI 1378 - SUPREME COURT
Commission of an offence u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act - Pronote as also the cheque were forged and fabricated - filed an application for examination of the said pronote as also the cheque - application was dismissed by ACJM - HELD THAT:- Indisputably, an accused is entitled to a fair trial which is a part of his fundamental right as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The concept, however, cannot be put to a straight jacket formula. A court of law will have to consider each application filed by an accused praying for comparison of his signature on a disputed document with his admitted signature on its own merits. No hard and fast rule can be laid down therefor.
In this case, the pronote was issued in the year 2002. The cheque was issued in the year 2004. The complaint petition was filed in the year 2004. The complainant examined his witnesses in between the period September 2006 and February 2007. Appellant examined his own witnesses. They had been cross-examined. The learned Magistrate noticed that even the legal notice served upon him was not accepted by the appellant. The court, in the aforementioned situation, held that the gap between execution of two signatures is such where some variance is possible. Rightly or wrongly, his application was dismissed by an order dated 07th April 2007. Immediately thereafter another application was filed on 20th June 2007 which was not maintainable as allowing the same would have amounted to recall of an order passed by the learned Magistrate himself being impermissible in law. In the latter application only the document which was to be sent for comparison was changed.
Evidently, he had filed two successive applications; the second application was, thus, not maintainable. This itself goes to show that he intended to delay the disposal of the matter. He could have examined his own expert. He may still do so for which, we are sure, the court shall grant him reasonable opportunity. Even now, the court will be entitled to exercise its jurisdiction, if it so thinks fit and proper in terms of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the interest of justice would be subserved if an opportunity is granted to the appellant to examine an expert at his own costs. If he requisitions the services of an expert, the learned Judge would grant him an opportunity to examine the disputed documents, submit a report and examine himself as a witness in the case preferably on the same date. Such a step, however, must be taken by the appellant within six weeks from date.
With the aforementioned observations and directions, these appeals are dismissed.
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2009 (7) TMI 1377 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ublic interest as also the general administration must, therefore, be kept in mind while granting equitable relief. 20. We understand that there would be a heart burning in so far as the petitioner is concerned, but then he is to thank himself therefor. If those five persons, who were seniors to Hamiddulah Dar filed writ petitions immediately, the High Court might have directed cancellation of his illegal promotion. This Court in Maharaj Krishan Bhatt (supra) did not take into consideration all these aspects of the matter and the binding decision of a three Judge Bench of this Court in Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy (supra). The Division Bench of the High Court, therefore, in our opinion was right in opining that it was not necessary for it to follow Maharaj Krishan Bhatt (supra). 21. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the Division Bench cannot be said either to be arbitrary or illegal. This Special Leave Petition is dismissed summarily.
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2009 (7) TMI 1376 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... vestigating officer under a special statute like the NDPS Act, but, this Court has held that they cannot file chargesheet and to that extent they would not be police officers. See Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. The State of West Bengal 1970CriLJ863 , Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India 1991CriLJ97 29. In this case, however, the respondent having specially been empowered both under the 1946 Act as also under the Code to carry out investigation and file a chargesheet is precluded from doing so only by reason of Section 22 of TOHO. It is doubtful as to whether in the event of authorization of an officer of the department to carry out investigation on a complaint made by a third party, he would be entitled to arrest the accused and carry on investigation as if he is police officer. We hope that the Parliament would take appropriate measures to suitably amend the law in the near future. 30. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in these appeals which are dismissed accordingly.
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