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2012 (1) TMI 412 - SUPREME COURTArbitration Proceedings - application u/s 34 for setting aside an award made after lapse of three months - District Court had Christmas vacation - benefit of that period over and above the cap of thirty days as provided in Section 34(3) - Whether the Appellants are entitled to extension of time u/s 4 of the 1963 Act - Two contracts were entered into between the Appellants and the Respondents -(i) for construction of Tezpur Town Water Supply Scheme and (ii) for construction of Tinsukia Town Water Supply Scheme - disputes arose between the parties - resolve such disputes, sole arbitrator was appointed u/s 11 - Appellants filed application u/s 16 questioning the jurisdiction of the sole arbitrator - no arbitration clause in the agreement - application rejected by the sole arbitrator and passed two awards - Appellants made two applications for setting aside the awards. HELD THAT:- Section 4, enables a party to institute a suit, prefer an appeal or make an application on the day court reopens where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on the day when the court is closed. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines 'period of limitation' which means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and 'prescribed period' means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act when read in the context of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, it becomes amply clear that the prescribed period for making an application for setting aside arbitral award is three months. The period of 30 days mentioned in proviso that follows Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is not the 'period of limitation' and, therefore, not 'prescribed period' for the purposes of making the application for setting aside the arbitral award. The period of 30 days beyond three months which the court may extend on sufficient cause being shown under the proviso appended to Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act being not the 'period of limitation' or, in other words, 'prescribed period', in our opinion, Section 4 of the 1963 Act is not, at all, attracted to the facts of the present case. Seen thus, the applications made by the Appellants, for setting aside the arbitral award were liable to be dismissed and have rightly been dismissed by the District Judge, as time barred.
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