2000 (8) TMI 981 - HC - Companies Law

Summary

Issues:
1. Interpretation of the period of limitation for filing an appeal under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.
2. Determining the starting point of limitation for filing an appeal before the Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR).

Analysis:

Issue 1:
The primary issue in this case revolves around the interpretation of the period of limitation for filing an appeal under the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. The Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR) held that the petitioner's appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. The petitioner contended that the AAIFR's conclusion was incorrect and challenged the starting point of the limitation period.

Issue 2:
The central point of contention in this case was determining the starting point of the limitation period for filing an appeal. The petitioner argued that the date on which the certified copy of the order was handed over should be considered as the starting point, i.e., 9-9-1998. On the other hand, the respondent argued that the date on which the Chairman of the Central Board of Direct Taxes received the copy of the order should be the starting point.

Legal Analysis:
The statutory provision under section 25 of the Act stipulates that an appeal can be filed within forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order is issued. The Act allows for an extension of up to sixty days if sufficient cause is shown. The Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) is responsible for issuing the order, as per the regulation 15 of the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction Regulations, 1987.

The Court emphasized that the term "issued" in the statute implies sending out the order officially, putting it into circulation, and delivering it with authority. The Court rejected the respondent's argument that knowledge from any source other than BIFR would suffice for the starting point of limitation. The Court clarified that for the computation of the limitation period, the effective date should be the date of service, not just the date of issuance.

Conclusion:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, stating that the starting point of limitation should be considered as the date on which the certified copy of the order was handed over, i.e., 9-9-1998. Consequently, the appeal was within the permissible extended time limit. The matter was remitted back to the AAIFR to consider the question of admitting the appeal on condonation of delay, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case. The parties were allowed to present relevant materials for the AAIFR's adjudication.