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Indian Laws - Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 27441 Records
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2025 (3) TMI 1396
Modification of National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission's (NCDRC) order by awarding an increased interest rate of 15% per annum on the refund amount - delay on the part of the respondent in not completing the construction within the agreed period - HELD THAT:- The NCDRC having taken note of the relevant aspects including the factum of delay and the fact that petitioner had opted for refund of money deposited, rightly held that as a home buyer, petitioner cannot be compelled to take possession of the flat after such long time, and as such ordered for refund of entire amount deposited with interest of 9% p.a.
Placing reliance on the law laid down by this Court in Bangalore Development Authority v. Syndicate Bank, [2007 (5) TMI 565 - SUPREME COURT] wherein a coordinate Bench of this Court dealing with the question of grant of relief to a consumer in cases of delay of delivery of possession held that when possession of the allotted plot/flat/house is not delivered within the specified time, the allottee is entitled to a refund of the amount paid with reasonable interest thereon from the date of payment till the date of refund.
In the present case, the High Court by the impugned order modified the finding of NCDRC and awarded interest @ 15% p.a. primarily relying upon the judgment of this Court in ‘Rohit Chaudhary and another v. Vipul Ltd. [2023 (9) TMI 1569 - SUPREME COURT], wherein this Court in order to balance the equities and to compensate the loss caused to the purchaser/complainant who had booked an office premise for his use, directed the refund of the amount paid along with interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of complaint till the date of payment. However, the issue in the instant case relates to allotment of a 3 BHK flat after payment of sale consideration and delay in delivery of same. As such, the NCDRC considering the entirety of the facts and circumstances of the case, had awarded interest @ 9% p.a., which in our view was fair and reasonable. The interest @ 15% p.a. awarded by High Court is excessive. Therefore, the impugned order hereby is setaside and the order dated 27.07.2022 passed by NCDRC in so far as it relates to award of interest @ 9% on the respective deposit till the date of actual payment is restored.
Conclusion - i) The NCDRC's award of 9% interest per annum is deemed fair and reasonable, considering the complainant's choice for a refund and the delay in possession. ii) The High Court's enhancement of interest to 15% per annum is excessive and not justified under the circumstances. iii) The compensation amount is reduced from Rs. 10,00,000 to Rs. 7,50,000 to balance the interests of justice, considering the appellant's status as a state instrumentality.
The appeal stands partly allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1339
Dishonour of Cheque - presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act in favor of the cheque holder could be rebutted at the stage of issuing process by the Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) or not - HELD THAT:- In the present case, a statutory notice under Section 138 of the NI Act was issued by the advocate for the respondent on 11th November 2016 to the appellant. The notice proceeds on the footing that the respondent, a Co-operative Credit Society, is providing financial assistance to its members and is also carrying on banking business. The allegation in the notice served to the appellant is that the appellant was a member of the credit society and had taken an overdraft facility from the respondent in the sum of Rs.11,97,000/-. Paragraph 1 of the notice specifically relies upon the fact that the appellant has executed necessary documents and that the appellant has agreed and acknowledged to make repayment of the amount advanced with interest. Thereafter, the notice proceeds to describe how the cheque issued by the appellant in the sum of Rs.27,27,460/- was returned unpaid.
It is pertinent to note that in the notice under Section 138 of the NI Act, in paragraph 1, the respondent specifically relied upon documents executed by the appellant and the acknowledgment of the loan made by the appellant. By a reply dated 28th November 2016, the appellant informed the respondent that by filing a written application, the appellant had demanded certain documents, which had not been provided. What is pertinent to note is that the respondent does not deny the receipt of the reply dated 28th November 2016. No reply was sent by the respondent pointing out that the documents were supplied. Even in the letter dated 13th December 2016, the appellant made the same grievance regarding the non-supply of the documents relied upon in the demand notice. Before filing the complaint, the respondent failed to respond to the said letter.
The fact remains that in the complaint, the respondent has suppressed the reply dated 28th November 2016 and the letter dated 13th December 2016 sent by the appellant’s advocate. These two documents have also been suppressed in the statement on oath. The respondent made out a false case that the appellant did not reply to the demand notice. Moreover, the case that the documents as demanded were supplied is not pleaded in the complaint and statement under Section 200 of CrPC.
While filing a complaint under Section 200 of CrPC and recording his statement on oath in support of the complaint, as the complainant suppresses material facts and documents, he cannot be allowed to set criminal law in motion based on the complaint. Setting criminal law in motion by suppressing material facts and documents is nothing but an abuse of the process of law.
Conclusion - The complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act is held invalid due to the suppression of material facts and the non-supply of requested documents.
The impugned order of the High Court is set aside - Appeal allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1338
Dismissal of petition on the ground that the appellants/petitioners has got the statutory remedy available to them by way of invoking Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act and filing an appeal before the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal - HELD THAT:- It is true that there is no bar for this Court to entertain a writ petition, however, in case of availability of efficacious and alternative statutory remedy, this Court can interfere in a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in very rare cases. The SARFAESI Act is a code, scheme of which provides for various statutory remedies available to the parties at various stages of the proceedings drawn and conducted under the said Act.
Merely, because the appellants/petitioners will be required to deposit certain amount to avail the remedy of the appeal under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act, it cannot be said that this Court would necessarily invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Reference made to a judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of PHR Invent Educational Society v. UCO Bank and others [2024 (4) TMI 466 - SUPREME COURT (LB)], wherein it has clearly been held that the High Court would ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person.
Conclusion - The requirement to make a deposit under Section 18 of the SARFAESI Act does not justify bypassing the statutory remedy in favor of a writ petition. The principle of exhausting alternative remedies is upheld.
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2025 (3) TMI 1239
Removal of word ‘settlement’ used in the loan account statement as it may affect future loan facilities being availed by the appellant - apartments purchased by the appellants are ready and some minor work remains which the builder may complete forthwith and hand over possession to the appellants - builder has not issued acknowledgment of the payments made by the appellants - HELD THAT:- Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that upfront payment has been made by the borrower/appellants under orders of this Court, the loan account should be closed treating it as repaid or fully paid up.
The learned counsel appearing for the builder, upon instruction, stated that the possession would be handed over on or before 31.03.2025. This takes care of the second issue raised.
Conclusion - i) The Bank will accordingly make the necessary incorporations in their records. ii) As stated by Mr. Kadam, learned counsel for the builder, let possession of the apartments, fully completed in all respects as required under law, be handed over to the appellants on or before 31.03.2025. iii) With respect to the third issue, the amount having been paid by the appellants to the builder by way of Bank transfer, even if no receipt is issued, the proof of payment is certified by the Bank, but still, the builder is directed to issue acknowledgment in writing to have received the entire due amount. iv) One last thing which remains is that the Bank, which had initiated recovery proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal or before any other Forum with respect to the loan in question of the four appellants, shall forthwith withdraw the same, in view of the loan having been satisfied in all the four cases. v) Further, appellant Ravi Agrawal or any other appellant who had initiated proceedings before the Real Estate Regulatory Authority shall withdraw such cases.
Appeal disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 1179
Scope of 'consumer' under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - liability on the appellant to disburse the remaining consideration amount for sale of the flat payable to the complainant-respondent by the borrower.
Whether the appellant was liable to disburse the remaining consideration amount of Rs.31,00,000/- for the sale of the flat to the respondent? - HELD THAT:- The appellant, assuming any liability in this regard existed at all, taking the respondent’s case at the highest, could not have been saddled with having to pay more than what was envisaged under the Home Loan Agreement between the borrower and the appellant. In any event, the appellant’s liability under the Agreement for sale was restricted only to satisfying the dues of the complainant-respondent with ICICI Bank which sum was in fact quantified at Rs.17, 87, 763/- and, in any view of the matter, could not have exceeded Rs.23, 40, 000/-. Thus, the NCDRC could not have, under any circumstance, taken a view that the appellant was liable to pay Rs.31, 00, 000/- both to ICICI Bank as well as to the complainant-respondent, who was not a party to the ultimate sanction of the loan by the Home Loan Agreement, which was between the appellant and the borrower. Hence, the question is answered in the negative.
Whether the respondent qualifies as a 'consumer' under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986? - HELD THAT:- The complainantrespondent cannot be said to be a ‘consumer’ under the Act as it had no privity of contract with the appellant, due regard being had to the totality of the factual matrix.
Condonation of delay in filing complaint - HELD THAT:- The purported Tripartite Agreement is dated 09.02.2008. The cause of action statedly had arisen in/by April/May, 2008. The respondent filed a complaint under the Act on 16.04.2018 - While the NCDRC is competent to condone any period of delay in filing a complaint beyond two years from the date when the cause of action arises, the discretion is circumscribed by twin conditions: (i) that the complainant satisfy the NCDRC that he had sufficient cause for not filing his complaint within such period, and; (ii) that the NCDRC record the reasons for condoning such delay. We have perused the ordersheets of the NCDRC pertaining to the complaint at hand. Neither reasons nor a formal order condoning delay is forthcoming, either in the ordersheets or in the Impugned Order - Delay cannot be condoned.
As vivid from Emaar MGF Land Ltd. v Aftab Singh, [2018 (12) TMI 1940 - SUPREME COURT] and M Hemalatha Devi [[2023 (10) TMI 1510 - SUPREME COURT], even in a consumer dispute under the Act, or for that matter, the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, arbitration, if provided for under the relevant agreement/document, can be opted for/resorted to, however, at the exclusive choice of the ‘consumer’ alone. As the appellant is not a ‘consumer’ in terms of the Act and the existence of the Tripartite Agreement is doubtful, we need not dwell further hereon.
Conclusion - i) The respondent is not a 'consumer' under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, due to the lack of privity of contract with the appellant. ii) The appellant Is not liable to pay the full sale consideration of Rs.31,00,000/-, as the purported Tripartite Agreement did not establish such an obligation.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1093
Condonation of delay of around 292 days in preferring the instant appeal - sufficient cause for delay or not - procedural delays within a government enterprise - Dishonor of cheque - HELD THAT:- Any party to an application even if it is a government organization should strictly adhere to the rules of limitation and therefore no relaxation should automatically be granted to a party for being a government organization due to procedural delay. Having regard to the aforesaid principle, the power of the Court to condone a delay varies from case to case and strictly on the basis of sufficiency of cause.
In the case at hand, the appellant/petitioner has given plausible and acceptable explanation regarding the delay in filing the special leave petition. Moreover, the dismissal of the case by the Learned Trial Judge was not on merit but only due to non- prosecution. Therefore, it cannot be said that the fate of the plea raised by the petitioner is decided beyond reasonable doubt.
It cannot be abstained from providing a leeway to the petitioner with regard to delay in filing special leave petition as sufficiency of cause has to be judged in pragmatic manner so as to advance the cause of justice. In the given facts and circumstances and after due consideration of all the available materials on record, it is deemed appropriate to condone the delay of 292 days as it cannot be ignored that if appeals brought by the Government are lost for such defaults, it is the public interest which gets severely affected.
Conclusion - The condonation of the 292-day delay allowed, granting the appellant leave to file the memorandum of appeal within the statutory period.
Application allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1056
Acquisition of land for Public Purpose - Valid agreement or not - Whether the Board, for whose benefit the land was acquired, could have achieved the equivalent of such withdrawal by entering into an agreement with Bhagwan Devi for returning part of the acquired land? - whether the Board could exercise such power when there was no document of conveyance in its favour in respect of this land? - HELD THAT:- he statutory scheme of the laws applicable to the Board at different points of time, set out speaks to the contrary as it manifests that there must be a document of conveyance for the Board to acquire and hold such land. Admittedly, no such document was ever issued by the Government actually transferring the subject land to the Board, whereby it could claim absolute rights over it.
When the State uses its sovereign power of eminent domain and acquires land for a public purpose, as in the case on hand, i.e., for establishment of a grain market under the control of a statutory Board, such an exercise cannot be set at naught by the beneficiary of such acquisition, viz., the statutory Board, by entering into a private agreement shortly after the acquisition so as to reverse the usage of the power of eminent domain by the State. Validating this dubious enterprise by a statutory beneficiary of a compulsory acquisition would be nothing short of permitting a fraud on the exercise of such sovereign power by the State. Viewed thus, the agreement dated 30.09.1988 was clearly in contravention of the fundamental policy of Indian law and the Arbitral Award dated 10.07.2007, upholding the said agreement, was equally so.
Further, the fact that the preparation of the agreement dated 30.09.1988, by purchase of stamp papers for the same and the drafting thereof, took place even before the matter was considered by the Board in the meeting held on 29.09.1988 clearly revealed that there was something suspect about the transaction. Given the further fact that the only objective of the said agreement was to thwart the compulsory acquisition of the subject land by returning a portion thereof to Bhagwan Devi, the agreement was patently opposed to all tenets of law.
Conclusion - There are no hesitation in holding that the Courts exercising jurisdiction under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, erred grievously in not setting aside the Arbitral Award dated 10.07.2007 that had upheld the agreement dated 30.09.1988.
Appeal allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1055
Time limit for taking action by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate under Section 14 of the Act is mandatory or not - Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate can proceed to dispose of the application under Section 14 of the Act after expiry of the statutory time period - HELD THAT:- The District Magistrate / Chief Metropolitan Magistrate does not become functus officio if steps under Section 14 of the Act cannot be conclusively taken within the stipulated time period of thirty days or the extended time period of sixty days. The aforesaid authorities will still have jurisdiction to take steps under Section 14 and they do not become functus officio as pleaded by the borrower.
The primary object of the Act being recovery of debts owing to banks and financial institutions in a timely manner, a time limit was inserted in the Act by way of an amendment with effect from 1st September, 2016. The secured creditor will be left remediless if the District Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, for any reason whatsoever, fails to act within the aforesaid time period. The secured creditor will be required to restart the process under Section 14 all over again which, in turn, will lead to further delay in recovery of the loan amount.
There is no reason as to why a secured creditor will be made to suffer financially due to inaction or non-action or delayed action on the part of the statutory authorities. The very purpose and object of the Act will be frustrated if the recovery process fails. The same will aid in unjust enrichment of the borrower and financial loss to the secured creditor.
The Act prescribes a remedy to the secured creditor to recover the unpaid loan amount by taking possession of the secured asset. If the secured creditor is not able to take possession of the mortgaged asset, then the lender will not be in a position to recover the dues. Merely holding the documents of the mortgaged asset, will not serve the purpose. It is only when the mortgaged property is sold, that the lender will get an opportunity to recover the dues unpaid by the borrower - There cannot be two opinions that the Section 14 authorities ought to have taken steps within the stipulated time period, but in the same breath it has to be held that, failure to take steps within the prescribed timeline, cannot be said to be a fatal one. The right of the secured creditor will be severely impacted if any other interpretation is given to the said provision. A borrower is liable to repay the loan taken from the financial institution and he does not have any right to object to any step taken by the lender to recover its dues.
To uphold the sanctity and object of the Act, the writ petition is liable to be allowed and is, accordingly, allowed. The District Magistrate is directed to dispose of the application of the bank made under Section 14 of the Act in accordance with law, at the earliest, but positively within four weeks from the date of communication of this order.
Conclusion - i) The time limit under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act is directory, not mandatory. Failure to act within the prescribed period does not render the District Magistrate functus officio. ii) The primary objective of the SARFAESI Act is the timely recovery of debts, and this objective should guide the interpretation of procedural timelines. iii) The secured creditor should not suffer due to the inaction of statutory authorities, and the recovery process should not be unduly delayed.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 1054
Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) was justified in remanding the matter to the DRT for fresh consideration of jurisdiction and other issues or not - claim made by HDFC Bank constitutes a "debt" under Section 2(g) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 - HELD THAT:- The issue whether the questions like whether the issue of jurisdiction stood concluded either by earlier orders of DRAT or by the order of Gujarata High Court in an appeal against the order disposed of on 28 February 2014, were legal issues that the DRAT was duty bound to address and decide upon. Similarly, even the issue whether HDFC’s claim constituted a “debt” under Section 2(g) of the said Act, was a legal issue squarely raised before the DRAT and which, the DRAT should have itself decided. The DRAT also had sufficient factual material before it to decide the issue of entitlement of HDFC to claim against Ashima and BBK.
The DRAT was not at all justified in simply remanding the matter to DRT for deciding the issue of jurisdiction and all other issues in the original application “afresh”. The DRAT, without discharging its of an first appellate authority, has simply chosen to remand the matter to DRT without recording any cogent reasons for adopting this easy course of action.
This was admittedly not a case where the DRT had decided on a preliminary point without recording findings on other issues. In such a case if the appellate court reverses the decree on a preliminary point, the appellate court may remand the matter to the trial court to decide other issues and determine the suit. This is what is provided under Order 41 Rule 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Order 41 Rule 23-A the appellate court can order a remand even in other cases not covered by Order 41 Rule 23. However, by a catena of decisions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clarified that the remand cannot be ordered lightly. In a case where the provisions of Order 41 Rule 23 do not apply, the remand can be ordered if considered necessary by the Appellate Court in the interest of justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that as far as possible the Appeal Court should dispose of the appeal finally unless remand is imperative.
In Ashwinkumar K Patel [1999 (3) TMI 654 - SUPREME COURT], the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court should not ordinarily remand a case under Order 41 Rule 23 CPC to the lower court merely because it considered that the reasoning of the lower court in some respects was wrong. Such remand orders lead to unnecessary delays and cause prejudice to the parties to the case. When the material was available before the High Court, it should have itself decided the appeal one way or the other. It could have considered the various aspects of the case mentioned in the order of the trial court and considered whether the order of the trial court ought to be confirmed reversed or modified.
The DRAT also failed to appreciate that the original application was filed by HDFC in 2005. The DRT rejected the Respondents’ objection to maintainability on 26 October 2005. The Respondents’s appeals instituted in 2006 and 2007 were disposed of only on 11 July 2014. The DRT allowed HDFC’s original application on 30 June 2017. The impugned common order has been made on 26 April 2024. Thus, the matter is lingering for last almost 20 years. Still, the DRAT has remanded the matter to DRT without recording any cogent reasons to justify such remand.
Conclusion - i) An order of remand prolongs and delays the litigation and hence, should not be passed unless the appellate court finds that a re-trial is required, or the evidence on record is not sufficient to dispose of the matter. ii) The DRAT must now decide the appeals in accordance with law, without remanding them back to the DRT, and all parties' contentions remain open for consideration.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 1053
Principles of natural justice - rule of audi alteram partem - whether the principle of audi alteram partem which has been read to have not been excluded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Agarwal [2023 (3) TMI 1205 - SUPREME COURT] in respect of the proceedings drawn under the RBI Directions would mean providing right of personal hearing as well or it would only mean permitting the borrower to file reply to the show cause notice and making representation in writing without any personal hearing thereupon? - HELD THAT:- The nature of procedure to be adopted under the RBI Directions and the consequences of passing final order under the said Directions classifying account of a borrower as fraud, as also the extent of application of principle of audi alteram partem in such proceedings have been discussed at length by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Agarwal.
Underlying the fact that classification of account of a borrower as fraud results in civil consequences against the borrower, it has thus, been concluded in Rajesh Agarwal, that application of principle of audi alteram partem cannot be excluded under the RBI Directions on fraud and that it is reasonably practicable for lender banks to provide for an opportunity of hearing to the borrowers before classifying their accounts as fraud.
The impugned direction by the learned Single Judge, which is under challenge herein, does not warrant any interference in this Letters Patent Appeal.
Conclusion - The rule of audi alteram partem, including the provision of a personal hearing, applies to proceedings under the RBI Directions on fraud classification due to their civil consequences.
The Letters Patent Appeal is hereby dismissed.
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2025 (3) TMI 950
Massive illegal mining and sale of “Beach Sand Minerals” (BSM) by various private lessees/mining companies in the three southern districts of Tamil Nadu namely Thoothukudi, Tirunelveli and Kanniyakumari during the period of 2000-2001 till 2016-2017 - PIL converted to suo moto case, in view of environmental damages caused.
Illegal Mining, Storage, Transportation and Exports of BSMs - Extent and Quantum of Illegal Beach Sand Mining - HELD THAT:- The Respondents are trying to use the judicial process to wriggle away from the consequences arising out of their illegal actions. Committee after committee formed and re-agitating on the same point of issue will not pave any way to the ends to justice. In the eyes of this Court, the Bedi Committee, Sahoo Committee, Reassessment Committee and the learned Amicus Curiae have carried out a fair and impartial task in inspecting and evaluating the extent and quantum of illegal beach sand mining carried out.
An examination of the various committee reports and the Amicus Curiae reports prove the case of illegal beach sand mining. The methodology adopted by the committee on careful examination by this Court is free from bias and is not in transgression of natural justice principles. And the reports have been elaborately made after inspection. The Amicus Curiae appointed by this Court also based on a separate and detailed report has uncovered the presence of Monazite in the mined minerals, which is prescribed substance under the Atomic Energy Act and the mining companies have no right to deal with the same - The committees have outlined various other illegalities and irregularities in transport, storage and dealing of these illegally mined beach sand minerals, thereby causing a grave danger to the environment.
It is to be noted that there are a plethora of judgements on the issue of illegal sand mining, guidelines to be followed, measures to be taken, enforcement mechanisms so on and so forth. But it would be an understatement to say that this has not been effectively adopted or followed by the implementing officials at the ground level. There are many ways prescribed by various agencies, departments and the Government to curb illegal beach sand mining including legal frameworks such as the MMDR Act, various other environmental legislations, Sustainable Sand Mining Management Guidelines (SSMG) 2020, Enforcement and Monitoring Guidelines for Sand Mining (EMGSM) 2020. But the core question for consideration is why can’t the illegal sand mining be stopped inspite of the humongous Government resources, funds and time spent to draft these legislations, measures and guidelines. The simple answer that can be deduced through the careful examination of the records and reports before us reveals the large scale corruption and collusion across departments, officials and bureaucracy. A systemic implementation failure has paved way for the huge loss to the National and State exchequer, which ought to be remedied at the earliest. Stringent and strict actions are the need of the hour to curb the illegalities and irregularities proliferating from illegal beach sand mining.
Illegal transport - HELD THAT:- The Amicus Curiae report on study of primary documents and records pertaining to transport permits clearly discerns the circumstances which constitute ‘Unlawful transport’. i. Transporting quantities in excess of approved quantities; ii. Transporting minerals not approved to be mined or transported for a specific lease and; iii. Transporting minerals during years/periods when there was no approved ‘scheme of mining’.
Of the total quantum of 1, 51, 27, 070 MTs of raw sand for which transport permits were obtained, the total quantum unlawfully transported works out to 86, 35, 151 MTs in terms of the 62 mining leases owned by M/s.V.V.Mineral and M/s.Transworld Garnet India Private Limited.
A shocking finding in the Amicus Curiae report is the total failure of the District Mines officials to check as to whether the transport permit that have been issued by them for years are according to the approved Mining plan/scheme and whether it is the approved quantities permitted to be transported. Another finding that is surprising is that the District collectors also failed to check on these mismatches in the transport permits when they prepared the annual reconciliation of royalty payments. These failures on the part of the officials paved way for a huge financial loss to the Government considering the enormous amount of BSMs unlawfully transported throughout several years.
Illegal Exports - HELD THAT:- The scale and magnitude of the lorries unlawfully transporting illegally mined raw sand and minerals across districts without any lawful obstruction in place, to stop this crime, is mind boggling and disheartening. Natural resources being exploited is one thing, but when done beyond legally permissible limit to benefit a handful of people at the expense of the National economic interest and affecting the Country’s overall growth and at the cost of people’s livelihood has shaken the conscience of this Court. These are issues which need to be dealt with at the earliest and the way in which our Judicial process has been used to thwart the law from taking the right course of action is discernible from the endless litigations filed across different courts. Litigating and re-litigating on the same issues and trying to weave knot after knot till nobody knows how to unknot it. This modus seldom paves any benefit. It eventually itself becomes a point of accusation against the law breakers. Law can be bent. True. But it bends only for Justice. Our Nation is great in a way that Laws cannot be a mute spectator for long. Conscience and Spirit of our Courts cannot be doused easily and our Constitution keeps the heartbeat alive to ensure that People of this Country can never be wronged.
The Amicus Curiae report highlighted illegal transport of minerals, including discrepancies in transport permits and unauthorized exports. There are illegal transportation was rampant, with significant quantities of BSMs exported without proper permits, violating Section 4(1-A) of the MMDR Act.
Presence of Monazite and Handling Licenses - HELD THAT:- IMonazite being a prescribed substance under Atomic Energy Act and private parties are prohibited from mining, processing, selling or exporting the mineral, there is no valid or justifiable reason to add the Monazite to the existing leases of the private parties. Moreover when the mineral Monazite is related to the issues concerning National security, this cannot be viewed lightly. Such violations ought to be viewed seriously and the State Government by approving the proposals of the private parties to mine four atomic minerals including Monazite by adding these minerals to the pre-existing leases for mining Garnet, Rutile and Ilmenite only has paved way for the illegality. This necessitates serious actions against the officials involved and a probe into the events leading to such grant of illegal approvals ought to be carried out to cull out any instances of corruption and collusion between the officials and the private mining lessees and appropriate legal action including criminal prosecution needs to be instituted against such Government officials and private mining parties involved.
Royalty Settlement, calculations and payments - HELD THAT:- There is a wrongful application of Rule 64-B(2) for computing royalty on raw sand instead of ad valorem basis as per Rule 64-D.
The royalty accounts as settled by the District Collectors of Tirunelveli, Thoothukudi and Kanniyakumari computing the royalty for the quantum of raw sand transport by arbitrarily applying Rule 64-B(2), MCR in favour of M/s.V.V.Mineral (R8), M/s.Transworld Garnet India Private Limited (R9) and M/s.Industrial Mineral India Private limited (R13) is held legally invalid - The royalty accounts wrongfully settled by the District Collector of Tirunelveli, Thoothukudi and Kanniyakumari by computing royalty for raw sand transported by wrongful application of Rule 64-B(2) of MCR, 1960 in respect of M/s.V.V.Mineral (R8), M/s.Transworld Garnet India Private Limited (R9) and M/s.Industrial Mineral India Private Limited (R13), unsettled by the State Government is held valid.
The computation of royalty on ad valorem basis for the actual quantum of minerals sold/ exported under the provisions of Section 9(2) read with Second Schedule of the MMDR Act and Rule 64-D of MCR, 1960 in the light of third report of the Amicus, is held legally valid.
The State Government is directed to initiate all necessary actions to recover the cost of minerals and royalty as per the findings in the Amicus Report relating to post ban period which held the 1.5 crore MTs of BSMs found by Sahoo Committee in 2018 and the stock of 1.40 Crore MTs of BSM stocks found by the RR-2023 as illegally mined and processed and hence all legal consequence to that effect shall follow.
Role of Officials and accountability - HELD THAT:- Corruption in mining has become a norm and has been standardised by the officials involved. A pattern can be drawn from these illicit sand mining operations. The triangular link is undeniable here between the political, executive and the mining lessees. It has become a systemic corruption.
It is also undeniably established that Right from the grant of mining lease/approval/license to grant of transport permits to illegal inclusion of monazite in mining lease to lack of efficient monitoring to arbitrary and legally questionable royalty settlement proceedings to lack of initiation of appropriate action when required and complete shedding of accountability on the part of the officials concerned, top to bottom, across departments and executive spectrum, there appears on the face of it a scheme of collusion, corruption and connivance among political, executive and the private mining lessees. The involvement of Government officials and illegalities perpetrated by them including political nexus in support of this scam should be investigated thoroughly. This is an imminent necessity to prevent corrosion of public trust in the system.
The political nexus to the massive scam cannot be ruled out. Hence the the CBI is directed to investigate into the alleged political nexus and the role of the policy making authorities in conspiring with the private mining companies shall be investigated.
Conclusion - This Court finds it a fit case to refer the matter to CBI. Hence based on the findings in the Committee reports and based on all other materials available on record, the CBI is directed to register criminal cases and launch investigations. Also any pending cases relating to the issues discussed in this judgment registered by the Tamil Nadu Police is directed to be transferred to the CBI for enabling effective investigation.
Petition disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 894
Jurisdiction of Indian Courts to appoint an arbitral panel under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, given the conflicting clauses in the Distributor Agreement regarding jurisdiction and arbitration - HELD THAT:- The law governing the arbitration agreement, being Indian law, means that its validity, scope, and interpretation will be determined in accordance with Indian law. But which national courts—those in India or Colombia—exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings? Does the A&C Act apply to these arbitration proceedings? Upon a consistent reading of the Distributor Agreement, it is clear that only the courts in Gujarat, India, are referenced. While it is acknowledged that the venue for arbitration is Bogota, Colombia, and that the procedural rules of the Arbitration and Conciliation Centre at the Chambers of Commerce in Bogota are to apply, this does not diminish the supervisory powers of Indian courts, as explicitly outlined in Clause 16.5.
The use of the premises at the Centre, or any other location designated by the Director of the Centre in Bogota, does not imply that Colombian law governs the arbitration agreement. Although Clause 18 specifies that the award shall conform to Colombian law, this provision pertains solely to the arbitration proceedings or the award matters. It does not override or diminish the effect of Clause 16.5, which clearly stipulates that Indian law shall govern the agreement and the related disputes. The legal implications of this would include the applicability of the A&C Act, and the appointment jurisdiction of Indian courts. We do not interpret the final portion of Clause 18 as undermining the legal impact of Clause 16.5. Therefore, the applicability of the A&C Act under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act affirmed.
In accordance with Clause 16.5 and 18, the procedural rules of the arbitration would be the rules of the Conciliation and Arbitration Centre of the Chamber of Commerce of Bogota DC, with Bogota DC as the venue of arbitration.
Conclusion - Indian law governs the arbitration agreement, and Indian courts have jurisdiction to appoint arbitrators under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act.
The arbitration petition is allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 893
Dishonour of cheque - cheques were issued under coercion or not - Dismissal of application of the appellant seeking leave to defend the suit - Order XXXVII of CPC - HELD THAT:- So far as drawing of the cheques in question is concerned, there is clear admission on the part of the appellant that the same were drawn by him. As regards the allegation that the cheques were obtained after abducting the appellant and illegally detaining him, admittedly no police complaint was lodged, nor even any notice was issued by the appellant to the respondent or the bank, alleging the issuance of cheques under force. Nothing prevented the appellant from instructing his bank to stop payment of the said cheques on the ground that the same were not issued voluntarily, but that also was not done. That being so, pushing the parties to undergo rigmaroles of trial would be travesty of justice, since there is no triable issue in this regard.
As regards the liability argument, the issuance of the cheques in question in itself would raise a presumption of legally enforceable debt. As mentioned above, it is not in dispute that the present respondent paid a total sum of Rs.14,04,000/- to the appellant towards investments. And as regards the cheques in question, admittedly drawn by the appellant were towards repayment of the money invested by the respondent. As mentioned above, there is not even shred of material to show that the said cheques were not voluntarily issued by the appellant. Merely because the appellant opted not to initiate proceedings under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act, his right to claim recovery of money through this suit cannot get defeated.
Conclusion - The appellant has no substantial defence and raises no genuine triable issues; rather, the defence raised by the appellant is completely frivolous and vexatious.
Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (3) TMI 892
Dishonour of Cheque - complainant was unable to prove that there existed any legally enforceable debt in respect of the impugned cheque - HELD THAT:- The entire events as deposed by the Respondent which is fully corroborated by the testimony of DW3-Smt. Gurmeet Kaur, establishes that the missing of the cheque got reported on 05.09.2007. The cheque has been admittedly presented for encashment thereafter, and has been dishonoured on 13.09.2007. It is difficult to believe that this entire event of missing of the cheque and repayment to Smt. Gurmeet Kaur could have been pre- planned by Respondent in connivance with DW3-Smt. Gurmeet Kaur, only to disprove the claim of the Revisionist of having given loan of Rs. 2 lakhs to the Respondent.
It is also pertinent to note that Smt. Gurmeet Kaur was an employee with the Complainant, which does not rule out the possibility of he having found the blank signed cheque of Respondent. Therefore, the cheque which got misplaced from Smt. Gurmeet Kaur may have landed in the possession of the Complainant as they both were working in the same office, a defence which cannot be completely discarded.
Conclusion - The learned ASJ has thus, rightly concluded that there is no evidence to establish the legally enforceable liability for which the impugned cheque could have been issued by the Respondent.
The present Revision Petition is without merit and is hereby, dismissed.
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2025 (3) TMI 891
Entitlement to the decree for the claimed amount with interest - Jurisdiction of District Court, Cuddalore to try the suit.
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for money as prayed for? - HELD THAT:- The defendants have never complained about the breakdown of the machinery at any point of time during the subsistence of the contract. It is also pointed out that there is no plea in the written statement regarding break down or un-utilization or under-utilization of the machinery hired. The defendants in fact claim no knowledge regarding the fact as to whether the machinery was put in use in Nagpur or not. Such an ambiguous and nebulous plea without support of documentary evidence cannot be accepted by the plaintiff.
Whether the District Court, Cuddalore had the jurisdiction to try the suit? - HELD THAT:- The offer under Ex.A1 was made from Neyveli and it was accepted, of course from the Head Office of the defendant at Mumbai. The payments were made by the cheques and the cheques were en-cashed at Neyveli. In order to invoke Clause (c) of Sub Section 1 of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is sufficient if the plaintiff is able to demonstrate that at least part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Trial Court, the fact that the offer was made from Neyveli and it was accepted without any reservation coupled with the fact that the Cheques were encashed at Neyveli would definitely amount to part of the cause of action arising at Neyveli within the jurisdiction of the Trial Court.
Conclusion - Jurisdiction can be established where part of the cause of action arises, and that a valid contract and acknowledgment of liability are sufficient grounds for awarding a decree for unpaid dues.
Appeal dismissed.
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2025 (3) TMI 839
Dishonour of Cheque - case of the appellant is that the corporate debtor is presently facing insolvency proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and a moratorium order was issued u/s 14 of the IBC - HELD THAT:- Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of NI Act makes it clear that cause of action arises only when demand notice is served and payment is not made pursuant to such demand notice within the stipulated fifteen-day period. This Court in Jugesh Sehgal v. Shamsher Singh Gogi [2009 (7) TMI 1143 - SUPREME COURT] has explained the ingredients of Section 138 of NI Act offence has held that the cause of action arises only when the amount remains unpaid even after the expiry of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the demand notice.
The bare reading of the provision shows that the appellant did not have the capacity to fulfil the demand raised by the respondent by way of the notice issued under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 NI Act. When the notice was issued to the appellant, he was not in charge of the corporate debtor as he was suspended from his position as the director of the corporate debtor as soon as IRP was appointed on 25.07.2018. Therefore, the powers vested with the board of directors were to be exercised by the IRP in accordance with the provisions of IBC. All the bank accounts of the corporate debtor were operating under the instructions of the IRP, hence, it was not possible for the appellant to repay the amount in light of section 17 of the IBC.
Conclusion - The High Court should have exercised its power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the proceedings against the appellant, as the cause of action arose after the moratorium, and the appellant was not in charge of the corporate debtor's affairs.
The impugned order dated 21.12.2021 and the summoning order dated 07.09.2018 set aside - appeal allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 838
Dishonour of Cheque - post dated cheque as an advance payment or cheque was given as security for completing the work - absence of the partnership firm as a party to the proceedings affects the liability of the accused/respondent under Section 138 of the N.I. Act - HELD THAT:- In the present case though the respondent has taken a specific plea that the other partner of Kishan Construction namely Ganesh had handed over the cheque to the complainant but in the complaint neither Ganesh has been made an accused nor any specific role has been attributed against the present respondent Kishan Bouri.
Accordingly it is apparent that the company who have committed offence under section 138 of N.I. Act, if any, has not been made a party and the respondent/partner only has been made as an accused. In Sarad Kumar Sanghi Vs. Sangita Raney [2015 (2) TMI 1117 - SUPREME COURT] the supreme Court has specifically held relying upon Aneeta Hada Vs. Godfather Travels and Tours (p) Ltd [2012 (5) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT] that, when a company has not been arraigned as a party, no proceeding can be initiated against it, even where vicarious liability is fastened under certain statute.
In Aneeta Hada’s Case [2012 (5) TMI 83 - SUPREME COURT] the Court held that the words ‘ as well as the company’ appearing in the section make it absolutely un mistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof.
Needles to say that in terms of explanation to section 141, “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals and “director” in relation to a firm means a partner of a firm and as such the present case clearly attracts the rigour of section 141 of the N.I. Act.
The question of remanding the case back to the trial court giving opportunity to the complainant to amend the complaint and to continue the proceeding after adding the partnership firm as an accused, also does not arise in the present context as the defect made in the complaint is an incurable defect, in view of the fact that no notice under section 138 of N.I. Act was served upon the partnership firm within the statutory period of 30 days.
Conclusion - The requirement under Section 141 of the N.I. Act that a company or firm must be made a party to proceedings when an offense is committed by such an entity. The absence of the firm as a party is a fatal procedural defect. The absence of the firm as a party rendered the proceedings invalid.
Application dismissed.
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2025 (3) TMI 825
Dishonour of cheque - interpretation of Section 148 of the NI Act - whether the petitioner has been able to make out any exception for not to deposit 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the learned MM before the learned ASJ as also whether the learned ASJ has exercised the discretion after taking into consideration the various factors?
HELD THAT:- Since the petitioner has sought to challenge the reasonings in the two impugned orders passed by the learned ASJ, the issue of non-challenge to any of the two earlier orders dated 07.08.2024 and 23.09.2024 and/ or their non-compliance by the petitioner as also the other contentions raised by the learned counsel for the respondent(s) need not be gone into by this Court. Likewise, the contention of the learned counsel for respondent(s) herein that the petitioner had acquiesced with either of those two earlier orders dated 07.08.2024 and 23.09.2024 passed in the very same two appeals by the very same learned ASJ is of no significance. Therefore, in such a scenario wherein the reasonings given by the learned ASJ in the impugned orders are in question, the present petitions challenging them are per se maintainable.
In the considered opinion of this Court, neither of the aforesaid factors spelt out as ought to be for the learned ASJ to direct the petitioner to deposit 20% of compensation amount as awarded by the learned MM vide order(s) dated 08.07.2024. It is said so, since neither the presumptions of/ in the NI Act nor the appellant being pronounced as “guilty”, per se, can be held sufficient for calling upon any such “guilty” like the appellant thereto/ petitioner herein to deposit the 20% of compensation amount as awarded by the learned MM at the very threshold of the appeal itself. Similarly, since vide a detailed judgment passed by the learned MM, has convicted the appellant (like the petitioner herein) and is pronounced as “guilty” cannot qualify to be a reason, necessarily not a sufficient one, since the appeal thereagainst is already pending adjudication/ disposal before the very same learned ASJ and doing so will tantamount to pre-judging the case of the appellant.
Conclusion - This Court finds that there is no clear finding as it is not spelt out in any of the impugned orders as to whether the petitioner has been able to make out any exception for waiver of depositing 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the learned MM before it as also the aforesaid factors considered by the learned ASJ and the reasons spelt out therein, and instead calling upon the petitioner to deposit 20% of the compensation amount as awarded by the learned MM in the two impugned orders, are insufficient.
Petition allowed.
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2025 (3) TMI 775
Challenge to involvement of the second respondent in an arbitration agreement - HELD THAT:- Under the agreement containing an arbitration clause, M/s Pratibha Industries Limited was appointed as a contractor by the appellant for construction of a hospital consisting of 200 beds. M/s Pratibha Industries Limited has appointed the second respondent to do the electric work. Only because certain payment was directly made by the appellant to the second respondent, it cannot be said that the second respondent becomes a beneficiary under the contract in which arbitration clause was provided. Therefore, the High Court has committed an error.
If the 2 second respondent has deposited any amount towards the cost of arbitration with the Delhi International Arbitration Centre, on the second respondent furnishing proof of the payment, the Delhi International Arbitration Centre shall refund the same to the second respondent - Application disposed off.
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2025 (3) TMI 736
Dishonour of cheque - vicarious liability of Petitioner, as a signatory to the cheques and a former director of the company - framing of notice under Section 251 CrPC against the Petitioner - HELD THAT:- The incontrovertible facts emerging from this case are that the Petitioner was serving as a whole-time director of Accused No. 1 at the time these cheques were issued, and was also one of the signatories of the cheques. Further, the Petitioner concededly resigned from Accused No. 1 subsequent to the issuance of the cheques. In fact, the Petitioner’s resignation is just one day after the issuance of cheques dated 14th May, 2012.
The Petitioner’s argument that his resignation on 15th May 2012, prior to the presentation of the cheques, is sufficient for quashing the summoning order, is wholly untenable. In this regard, the Petitioner’s reliance on Kamal Goyal is misplaced, as in that case, the petitioner had resigned from the accused company prior to the issuance of the cheques, and had also filed Form No. 32 with the Registrar of Companies prior to the issuance. Based on these facts, this Court had concluded that since the petitioner had resigned well in advance of the cheques being issued, he could not be held liable under Section 138 of the NI Act. However, in the present case, it is undisputed that the Petitioner’s resignation occurred after the cheques in question were issued, with both his resignation and Form No. 32 bearing the date of 15th May, 2012, which is subsequent to the issuance of the cheques dated 12th May, 2012 and 14th May, 2012.
The Petitioner, who is concededly the signatory of the disputed cheques, is liable for the actions of Accused No. 1 under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act.
Conclusion - The Petitioner is admittedly a signatory to the cheques issued to the Respondent for the discharge of Accused No. 1’s liability. He was serving as a full-time director of Accused No. 1 at the time of issuance of the cheques in question; and resigned from the company only subsequent to the date of the cheques. There are specific averments regarding the Petitioner’s role as the director of Accused No. 1 in the complaint lodged by the Respondent. Therefore, there is indeed sufficient basis to proceed with the prosecution of the Petitioner under Section 138 of the NI Act.
The Court finds no infirmity in the impugned order - petition disposed off.
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