2002 (2) TMI 1280 - SC - Indian Laws

Condonation of delay - Held that - Appeal allowed. On the facts of present case, Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in upholding order passed by the learned Single Judge whereby prayers for condonation of delay and setting aside abatement were refused and accordingly the delay in filing the petition for setting aside abatement is condoned, abatement is set aside and prayer for substitution is granted.

Issues Involved:
1. Competence of the appeal due to non-substitution of deceased appellants.
2. Condonation of delay and setting aside abatement.
3. Interpretation of "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Competence of the Appeal Due to Non-Substitution of Deceased Appellants:
The appeal in question arose from a partition suit involving approximately 116 acres of land. During the pendency of the appeal, several appellants (Appellant No. 2, 3, 22, and 41) passed away. The learned Single Judge held that the appeal had become incompetent because the appellants did not take timely steps to substitute the deceased parties with their heirs and legal representatives. The Division Bench of the Jharkhand High Court upheld this decision, leading to the current appeal before the Supreme Court.

2. Condonation of Delay and Setting Aside Abatement:
The appellants argued that they were rustic and illiterate villagers from different families and villages. Upon learning of the deaths, they promptly sought to obtain the necessary Vakalatnamas and filed substitution applications. However, the learned Single Judge refused the substitution of heirs for Appellant Nos. 3, 22, and 41 due to delays of 130 days, five years, and three years, respectively. The appellants contended that there was no mala fide intent or dilatory tactics involved, and the delay should be condoned to advance substantial justice.

3. Interpretation of "Sufficient Cause":
The Supreme Court extensively discussed the interpretation of "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It cited several precedents, including:
- The State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality: The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction is imputable to a party.
- Sital Prasad Saxena v. Union of India: The Court emphasized that rules of procedure are designed to advance justice and should not be interpreted as penal statutes.
- Rama Ravalu Gavade v. Sataba Gavadu Gavade: The Court condoned the delay for an illiterate farmer, setting aside abatement and directing the appeal to be heard on merits.
- N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy: The Court held that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion, and the length of the delay is immaterial if the explanation is acceptable. It emphasized that rules of limitation are meant to prevent dilatory tactics but should not destroy the rights of parties.

The Supreme Court concluded that the expression "sufficient cause" should be liberally construed to advance substantial justice. It noted that the appellants were rustic and illiterate villagers, and there was no evidence of mala fide intent or dilatory tactics. Therefore, the delay in filing the substitution applications should be condoned.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned orders of the High Court, and remitted the matter back to the learned Single Judge for a decision on the First Appeal on merits. The Court directed that the parties bear their own costs, emphasizing the need to balance procedural rules with substantial justice.

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