2000 (4) TMI 15 - HC - Income Tax

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the order dated December 28, 1989, passed under section 269UJ.
2. Limitation period for passing the order under section 269UD.
3. Legal authority and right of the appropriate authority to purchase a specific portion of the property.
4. Legal basis of the second statement filed on September 8, 1989.
5. Validity of the valuation determined by the appropriate authority.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the Order Dated December 28, 1989, Passed Under Section 269UJ:
The court examined whether the order under section 269UJ, which amended the schedule of the property by specifying boundaries, was within the power conferred on the appropriate authority. The court concluded that the amendment order was beyond the scope of section 269UJ as it did not rectify a mistake apparent from the record. The affidavit obtained from the GPA holder after the initial order was not part of the original record and thus could not justify the amendment. The court stated, "The order under section 269UJ cannot therefore be sustained in law."

2. Limitation Period for Passing the Order Under Section 269UD:
The court addressed whether the limitation period should be computed from the date of the initial order or the amendment order. It was emphasized that the fresh order passed after the remand by the High Court is the one subject to judicial scrutiny. The court noted, "The fresh start of limitation on account of deeming fiction improvised by this court... was only to enable the appropriate authority to pass a fresh order in conformity with the principles of natural justice."

3. Legal Authority and Right of the Appropriate Authority to Purchase a Specific Portion of the Property:
The court examined whether the appropriate authority could purchase a specific portion of the property that was allegedly allotted to the share of the co-owner, Leila D. Lein. The court found that the identification of the property representing the share and interest of Leila D. Lein had become a fait accompli by the time the second section 269UD order was passed. The court stated, "The description of the property given by the appropriate authority in the impugned order dated May 20, 1994, cannot be said to be at material variance with the agreement or Form No. 37-I statement."

4. Legal Basis of the Second Statement Filed on September 8, 1989:
The court considered whether the second statement filed was valid given that the first statement was deemed "premature and invalid" by the appropriate authority. The court held that the petitioners, by their conduct, waived their right to question the action of the appropriate authority and are estopped from raising this issue. The court stated, "Having acted on the communication sent by the appropriate authority and filed the second statement voluntarily... it is not open to the petitioners to raise the bogey of the invalidity of the second statement."

5. Validity of the Valuation Determined by the Appropriate Authority:
The court reviewed the contention that the valuation determined by the appropriate authority was flawed. The court found that the appropriate authority had considered comparable sales and the instances furnished by the petitioners, and the valuation process was not vitiated by non-application of mind or irrelevant considerations. The court stated, "We are unable to say that the finding is vitiated on account of non-application of mind to the relevant factors or by reason of taking into account any irrelevant considerations."

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the validity of the order passed under section 269UD and the valuation determined by the appropriate authority. The court found that the petitioners' arguments regarding the invalidity of the second statement and the amendment order under section 269UJ were not sustainable. The court concluded, "For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition fails and it is dismissed. No costs."