2004 (3) TMI 713 - SC - VAT and Sales Tax

Whether kattha and cutch are forest produce within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Act? whether confiscation proceeding can be initiated under Section 52 of the Act only after launching of criminal prosecution or it is open to the Forest Authorities upon seizure of forest produce to initiate both or either? Held that - Appeal dismissed. The stock of cutch was seized in the year 1991, but no confiscation proceeding has been initiated as yet, the revision application arising out of the confiscation proceeding relating to the kattha seized was withdrawn more than eight years ago on 1.11.1995, the same having become infructuous in view of the impugned judgment and criminal prosecution has not been launched so far pursuant to seizure of the stock of kattha and cutch.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether 'kattha' and 'cutch' are forest produce within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927.
2. Whether confiscation proceedings under Section 52 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 can be initiated without launching a criminal prosecution.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether 'kattha' and 'cutch' are forest produce within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927:

The main question for consideration was whether 'kattha' and 'cutch' fall under the definition of forest produce as per Section 2(4) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Section 2(4) defines forest produce to include "catechu" among other items. The appellant's counsel argued that 'kattha' and 'cutch' are forms of catechu, referencing various dictionaries and encyclopedias. For instance, Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines 'catechu' as an extract from the heartwood of an East Indian acacia, used for dyeing, tanning, and other purposes. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary also define 'catechu' similarly.

The court referred to the process of manufacturing 'kattha' and 'cutch' from khair wood, which involves several steps including boiling, fermentation, and crystallization. Based on these definitions and processes, the court concluded that 'kattha' and 'cutch' are indeed types of catechu. Consequently, they fall within the definition of forest produce under Section 2(4) of the Act. The High Court's contrary view was thus held to be incorrect.

2. Whether confiscation proceedings under Section 52 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 can be initiated without launching a criminal prosecution:

The next issue was whether confiscation proceedings could be initiated under Section 52 of the Act without a criminal prosecution. Section 52 allows for the seizure and confiscation of forest produce if a forest offence is believed to have been committed. A forest offence is defined under Section 2(3) as an offence punishable under the Act or any rule framed thereunder. Rule 3 of the Madhya Pradesh Transit (Forest Produce) Rules, 1961, requires a transit pass for moving forest produce, and its breach constitutes a forest offence.

The court observed that the Act provides for two independent actions for contravention of Rule 3: criminal prosecution and confiscation proceedings. The power of confiscation under Section 52 is not dependent on the initiation of criminal prosecution. This was supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Divisional Forest Officer & Anr. vs. G.V. Sudhakar Rao and others, which held that confiscation proceedings are separate and distinct from criminal prosecution. The court reiterated this position in State of W.B. vs. Gopal Sarkar.

Given that the condition precedent for initiating confiscation proceedings is the commission of a forest offence, which was alleged in this case, the High Court erred in holding that confiscation proceedings could not be initiated without a criminal prosecution.

Conclusion:

The Supreme Court concluded that 'kattha' and 'cutch' are forest produce within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the Act, and that confiscation proceedings under Section 52 can be initiated independently of criminal prosecution. However, considering the significant lapse of time since the seizures and the lack of subsequent legal actions, the court decided not to interfere with the High Court's judgment. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.