1998 (6) TMI 25 - HC - Income Tax

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Scope of the proviso to section 269G of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Whether the Appellate Tribunal is considered a court under section 269G.
3. Applicability of the Limitation Act to proceedings under section 269G.
4. Interpretation of the proviso to section 269G in the context of legislative intent and justice.

Summary:

1. Scope of the Proviso to Section 269G:
The proviso to section 269G(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, specifies the period of limitation for filing an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal against an order for the acquisition of immovable property. The Tribunal can extend the time for filing the appeal only if an application is made before the expiry of the said period of 45 days or 30 days, as applicable. The Tribunal does not have the power to extend the time suo motu and can only do so if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that there was sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the specified period.

2. Whether the Appellate Tribunal is a Court:
The Appellate Tribunal is not considered a court. The Supreme Court has held that the Tribunal exercises judicial powers but is not a court. The distinction between the Tribunal and a court is that the Tribunal is not part of the ordinary hierarchy of courts constituted by the State. The term "court" as defined in section 269A(c) of the Act refers to a principal civil court of original jurisdiction, which the Appellate Tribunal is not.

3. Applicability of the Limitation Act:
The Limitation Act is applicable only to proceedings before courts. The Appellate Tribunal, not being a court, is not subject to the provisions of the Limitation Act. Therefore, the appellant cannot invoke the Limitation Act, including section 5, to extend the period for filing an appeal before the Tribunal under section 269G.

4. Interpretation of the Proviso to Section 269G:
The proviso requires the intending appellant to approach the Tribunal before the expiry of the period of limitation and obtain an extension. The Tribunal does not have the power to condone delays after the period of limitation has expired. The court emphasized the necessity of adhering to the clear and unambiguous language of the proviso, which does not provide for condonation of delay but only for an extension of time when applied for within the specified period. The legislative intent is to ensure that the period of limitation is strictly followed, and considerations of equity do not justify extending this period.

Conclusion:
The appeal is dismissed as the appellant did not file the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation, and the Tribunal does not have the power to condone the delay. The court upheld the legislative intent and the clear language of the proviso to section 269G, emphasizing the importance of adhering to statutory time limits.