1959 (1) TMI 22 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act (100 of 1956) passed by Parliament was wholly repugnant to the provisions of the U. P. Act and therefore the law became void under the provisions of Art. 254(1) of the Constitution, with the result that at the present time there is no valid law where under the State can prohibit the appellants exercising their fundamental right under the Constitution, namely, carrying on the business of motor transport? Held that - The express words used in clause (b)certainly take in the scheme framed under the -repealed Act. It was a thing duly done under the repealed Act. Section 24 deals with the continuation of orders, schemes, rules, forms or bye-laws. made or issued under the repealed Act. But that section applies only to the repeal of a Central Act but not a State Act. But the exclusion of the scheme is sought to be supported on the basis of the argument that in the case of a repeal of a Central Act, both the sections apply and, in that context, a reasonable interpretation would be to exclude what is specifically provided for from the general words used in s. 6. Whatever justification there may be in that context, there is none when we are concerned with the repeal of a State Act to which s. 24 does not apply. In that situation, we have to look to the plain words of s. 6 and ascertain whether those words are comprehensive enough to take in a scheme already framed. We have no doubt that a scheme framed is a thing done under the repealed Act. The provisions starting from s. 68C only contemplate a scheme initiated after the Amending Act came into force and therefore they cannot obviously be inconsistent with a scheme already framed under the State Act before the Amending Act came into force. We, therefore, hold that s. 6 of the General Clauses Act saves the scheme framed under the U. P. Act. In all the circumstances, we cannot hold that the said appellants accepted the alternative routes. If they or some of them choose to accept any alternative routes, they are at liberty to do so, in which event they will not be entitled to any compensation. It appears that the Regional Transport Authority renewed his permit on October 11, 1956 with effect from November 1, 1953 to October 31, 1956. In the circumstances, as the petitioner was not a permit-holder when the Government made the order, no relief can be given to him in this appeal. Appeal dismissed.

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the U.P. Transport Services (Development) Act, 1955 (U.P. Act) post the enactment of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 (Central Act).
2. Repugnancy between the U.P. Act and the Central Act under Article 254(1) of the Constitution.
3. Applicability of the doctrine of eclipse to post-Constitution laws.
4. Whether the U.P. Act infringes Article 31 of the Constitution regarding compensation for deprivation of property.
5. Procedural fairness and the right to be heard in the context of the nationalization scheme.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the U.P. Transport Services (Development) Act, 1955 (U.P. Act) Post the Enactment of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1956 (Central Act):
The judgment concluded that the U.P. Act did not become wholly void under Article 254(1) of the Constitution after the enactment of the Central Act. The U.P. Act continued to be a valid and subsisting law supporting the scheme already framed under it. The court held that even if the Central Act amounted to a repeal of the U.P. Act under Article 254(2), such repeal did not destroy or efface the scheme already framed under the U.P. Act, as the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act saved the same.

2. Repugnancy Between the U.P. Act and the Central Act Under Article 254(1) of the Constitution:
The court examined whether the provisions of the Central Act were repugnant to the U.P. Act. It was held that the Central Act occupied the same field in respect of schemes initiated after its enactment, thus making the U.P. Act void to that extent. However, the U.P. Act continued to be effective for schemes already framed before the Central Act came into force. The judgment emphasized that the repugnancy under Article 254(1) only rendered the State law void to the extent of the repugnancy, not in its entirety.

3. Applicability of the Doctrine of Eclipse to Post-Constitution Laws:
The court reserved its opinion on whether the doctrine of eclipse could apply to post-Constitution laws. It acknowledged that a post-Constitution law infringing a fundamental right conferred on citizens would be ineffective against citizens but valid against non-citizens. The court referenced the doctrine of eclipse as explained in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, indicating that it could apply to certain post-Constitution laws.

4. Whether the U.P. Act Infringes Article 31 of the Constitution Regarding Compensation for Deprivation of Property:
The court held that the U.P. Act did not offend Article 31 as it stood before the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955. The Act provided for adequate compensation for the deprivation of property. The compensation scheme under the U.P. Act was deemed sufficient, as it allowed for judicial determination of compensation by a District Judge if the amount offered by the Transport Commissioner was not acceptable to the permit-holder.

5. Procedural Fairness and the Right to be Heard in the Context of the Nationalization Scheme:
The court addressed the procedural fairness concerns raised by the appellants. It was noted that the appellants were given notice and an opportunity to file objections to the scheme. The objections were considered by a Board, and the scheme was finalized after due process. In the specific case of Civil Appeal No. 429 of 1958, the court found that the appellant was not a permit-holder during the crucial period when the scheme was finalized, and thus no relief could be granted to him.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed all the appeals with costs, holding that the U.P. Act continued to be valid for schemes framed before the Central Act and that the compensation provisions under the U.P. Act were adequate and in compliance with Article 31 of the Constitution. The court also reserved its opinion on the applicability of the doctrine of eclipse to post-Constitution laws and upheld the procedural fairness of the nationalization scheme.

← Previous Next →