1967 (8) TMI 117 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether the petitioner was entitled, as of right, to be promoted as Deputy Inspector General of Police in 1955 or as Inspector General of Police in 1966 merely on the ground that his name stood first in the Gradation List prepared under Rule 6 of the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954? Held that - As a matter of long administrative practice promotion to selection grade posts in the Indian Police Service has been based on merit and seniority has been taken into consideration only when merit of the candidates is otherwise equal and we are unable to accept the argument of Mr. N. C. Chatterjee that this procedure violates, in any way, the guarantee under Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. For the reasons expressed we hold that the petitioner has been unable to make out a case for the grant of a writ under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Entitlement to Promotion Based on Seniority
2. Validity of Administrative Instructions in the Absence of Statutory Rules
3. Alleged Violation of Fundamental Rights under Articles 14 and 16

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Entitlement to Promotion Based on Seniority:
The petitioner contended that he was entitled to be promoted to the posts of Deputy Inspector General of Police in 1955 and Inspector General of Police in 1966 based on his seniority in the Gradation List prepared under Rule 6 of the Indian Police Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954. The petitioner argued that his seniority in the Gradation List should have guaranteed his promotion over respondents who were junior to him. However, the court found that the posts of Inspector General of Police, Additional Inspector General of Police, and Deputy Inspector General of Police are selection posts, which are based on merit and not on seniority alone. The court emphasized that promotion to these selection posts is not automatic and seniority is only considered when the merit of the officers is judged to be equal. Thus, the petitioner's claim for promotion based solely on seniority was not upheld.

2. Validity of Administrative Instructions in the Absence of Statutory Rules:
The petitioner argued that in the absence of specific statutory rules governing promotions to selection grade posts, the Government could not issue administrative instructions and that such instructions cannot impose restrictions not found in the rules. The court rejected this argument, stating that while the Government cannot amend or supersede statutory rules by administrative instructions, it can fill gaps and supplement the rules with instructions not inconsistent with existing rules. The court cited precedents where it was held that the executive has the power to make appointments and lay down conditions of service even without specific statutory rules, provided such actions do not violate the Constitution.

3. Alleged Violation of Fundamental Rights under Articles 14 and 16:
The petitioner claimed that his fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 16 were violated as his case was not considered for promotion, and the promotions were made arbitrarily. The court found no specific allegation by the petitioner that his case was not considered along with other eligible candidates. The court noted that the respondents had asserted that the petitioner's case was considered based on merit, efficiency, and experience. The court held that as long as the petitioner's case was considered along with others, there was no violation of Articles 14 and 16. The court also addressed the petitioner's concern about the potential for nepotism and favoritism in merit-based promotions, stating that a balance between seniority and merit is essential for an effective promotion policy and does not inherently violate constitutional guarantees.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that the petitioner had not made a case for the grant of a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution. The petition was dismissed, and there was no order as to costs.