1983 (2) TMI 321 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether in a case where after the sentence of death is given, the accused person is made to undergo inhuman and degrading punishment or where the execution of the sentence is endlessly delayed and the accused is made to suffer the most excruciating agony and anguish, is it not open to a court of appeal or a court exercising writ jurisdiction, in an appropriate proceeding, to take note of the circumstance when it is brought to its notice and give relief where necessary? Held that - The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a sentence of death imposed by a court of Session must be confirmed by the High Court. The practice, to our knowledge, has always been to give top priority to the hearing of such cases by the High Courts. So, also in this Court. There are provisions in the Constitution (Arts. 72 and 161) which invest the President and the Governor with power to suspend, remit or commute a sentence of death. Making all reasonable allowance for the time necessary for appeal and considered of reprieve, we think that delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to invoke Art. 21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of death. We therefore accept the special leave petition, allow the appeal as also the Writ Petition and quash the sentence of death. In the place of the sentence of death, we substitute the sentence of imprisonment for life. Appeal allowed.

Issues Involved:
1. Legality of executing a death sentence after prolonged delay.
2. Impact of solitary confinement on the legality of the death sentence.
3. Constitutional implications of prolonged delay in the execution of a death sentence.
4. Right to a speedy trial and its relevance to death row inmates.
5. Application of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution to death row inmates.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality of Executing a Death Sentence After Prolonged Delay:
The primary issue is whether it is lawful to execute a death sentence after a prolonged delay. The appellant was sentenced to death in January 1975 and has been in solitary confinement for over eight years. The court examined whether this delay constitutes a violation of the Fundamental Right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. The judgment references various cases, such as Piaradusadh v. Emperor and Ediga Annamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, where prolonged delay was considered a mitigating factor leading to the commutation of the death sentence. The court concluded that prolonged delay in executing a death sentence can render the punishment inhuman and degrading, thus violating Article 21.

2. Impact of Solitary Confinement on the Legality of the Death Sentence:
The appellant had been kept in solitary confinement, contrary to the ruling in Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration. The court noted that solitary confinement for such an extended period is a gross violation of human rights and contributes to the dehumanizing experience of awaiting execution. This solitary confinement, coupled with the prolonged delay, was deemed to exacerbate the inhumanity of the punishment, further justifying the commutation of the death sentence.

3. Constitutional Implications of Prolonged Delay in the Execution of a Death Sentence:
The judgment delves into the constitutional implications of prolonged delay under Article 21, which guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. The court referred to the expanded interpretation of Article 21 post-Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, emphasizing that the procedure must be fair, just, and reasonable. The court held that prolonged detention awaiting execution is an unjust, unfair, and unreasonable procedure, violating Article 21. The court cited various precedents, including Furman v. State of Georgia and Noel Riley v. The Attorney General, to support its view that prolonged delay in executing a death sentence is inhuman and degrading.

4. Right to a Speedy Trial and Its Relevance to Death Row Inmates:
The court affirmed that the right to a speedy trial is implicit in Article 21. It referenced Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, which established that a speedy trial is an integral part of the right to life and liberty. The court noted that the delay in executing the death sentence effectively denied the appellant a speedy trial, further violating his fundamental rights. The judgment emphasized that any procedure depriving a person of life or liberty must ensure a reasonably expeditious trial.

5. Application of Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution to Death Row Inmates:
The judgment reiterated that Articles 14, 19, and 21 are not mutually exclusive but sustain and nourish each other. These rights are available to prisoners as well as free men, and prison walls do not exclude Fundamental Rights. The court held that a person under sentence of death could claim these rights, and any procedure depriving a person of life or liberty must be just, fair, and reasonable. The court concluded that prolonged detention awaiting execution violates these principles, and the only remedy is to quash the death sentence.

Conclusion:
The court allowed the appeal and the writ petition, quashing the death sentence and substituting it with life imprisonment. The judgment emphasized that a delay exceeding two years in the execution of a death sentence should be considered sufficient to invoke Article 21 and demand the quashing of the death sentence. The court's decision underscores the importance of humane and just procedures in the execution of death sentences, aligning with constitutional protections.

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