1984 (3) TMI 387 - AT - Central Excise

Summary

Issues:
Interpretation of Notification No. 201/79-C.E. dated 4-6-1979 and its amendment by Notification No. 105/82-C.E.
Entitlement to exemption for duty paid on graphite rods used in manufacturing diamond drill bits before and after the amendment dated 28-2-1982.

Analysis:
The judgment revolves around the interpretation of Notification No. 201/79-C.E. dated 4-6-1979 and its subsequent amendment by Notification No. 105/82-C.E. The primary issue in this appeal is whether the appellants were entitled to an exemption for the duty paid on graphite rods used in the manufacturing process of diamond drill bits, both before and after the amendment dated 28-2-1982.

The Order-in-Original in the case outlined the process of manufacture by the appellants, emphasizing that graphite rods were used to create graphite moulds, which were then utilized as a piece of manufacturing equipment and apparatus, not as raw material or component parts. The amendment on 28-2-82 specified that the exemption was only applicable when Item 68 goods were used as raw material and component parts in the manufacturing of finished excisable goods.

The Tribunal determined that post the amendment on 28-2-82, the appellants were not entitled to the exemption as the graphite moulds were not considered raw material or component parts. However, for the period before the amendment, the Tribunal held that the earlier exemption did not require Item 68 goods to be used as constituent parts of finished goods, allowing the appellants to benefit from the exemption.

The Tribunal dismissed the argument that the graphite rods/moulds were not used in the manufacture of diamond drill bits, emphasizing that the drill bits could not be produced without the use of graphite rods/moulds. Additionally, the Tribunal rejected the contention that the scrap graphite had economic value, as the exemption notification did not impose such a condition.

Conclusively, the Tribunal allowed the appeal for the period up to 27-2-82, setting aside the demand for duty during that period, while rejecting the appeal for the period post the mentioned date.