1985 (1) TMI 334 - SC - Indian Laws

Termination of service - Held that - We have considered the matter carefully and find no sufficient reason to differ from the finding of the High Court that the allegation of mala fides is not established. We think it desirable to observe that where a finding of fact has been rendered by a learned Single Judge of the High Court as a Court of first instance and thereafter affirmed in appeal by an Appellate Bench of the High Court, this Court should be reluctant to interfere with the finding unless there is very strong reason to do so. It appears from the record that the appellant s services were terminated because on an overall appreciation of his record of service he was found unsuitable for being absorbed in the service. We are of opinion that when the order of appointment recited that the petitioner would be on probation for a period of two years, it conformed to Rule 5 of the Recruitment Rules which prescribes such period of probation. The period of two years does not represent the maximum period of probation. The power to extend the period of probation must not be confused with the manner in which the extension may be effected. The one relates to power, the other to mere procedure. Merely because procedural rules have not been framed does not imply a negation of the power. In the absence of such rules, it is sufficient that the power is exercised fairly and reasonably, having regard to the context in which the power has been granted. Appeal dismissed.

Summary

Issues:
1. Allegation of mala fide in termination of services
2. Deemed confirmation of appointment after probation period
3. Violation of principles of natural justice in termination process

Analysis:

Allegation of Mala Fide:
The appellant alleged mala fide in the termination of services, claiming it was due to actions against a politically influential assessee. The High Court found no foundation for these allegations, supported by the State Government's denial and assertion of unsatisfactory performance as the reason for termination. The Supreme Court upheld this finding, emphasizing reluctance to interfere with concurrent findings unless strong reasons exist.

Deemed Confirmation after Probation:
The appellant argued that continued service post the probation period amounted to confirmation. The Court clarified that the initial probation period of two years could be extended as per rules, rejecting the argument that the absence of specific extension rules nullified the power to extend probation. The Court emphasized the State's discretion to confirm based on overall performance, not just completion of probationary period.

Violation of Natural Justice:
The appellant contended that he should have been heard before termination, citing lack of misconduct charges in the termination order. The Court noted that termination was based on overall performance assessment, not specific misconduct related to a case. It rejected the distinction between termination at the end of probation and later, emphasizing the authority's right to assess suitability for confirmation.

In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the contentions raised by the appellant. The judgment highlighted the importance of overall performance assessment for confirmation and the discretion of the confirming authority in such matters.