1975 (1) TMI 90 - SC - Indian Laws

Order of detention - there was no proximity between the incidents leading to the detention and the order of detention as 'there was a gap of about 4 months in between - Held that - We are not inclined to dismiss as untrue the oral explanation offered on behalf of the District Magistrate that he could not make the report on the 14th due to administrative difficulties. As it cannot be said that the District Magistrate had slept over the order or was lounging supinely over it and since the explanation of one day's delay may be accepted as reasonable, there is no violation of the requirement that the report to the State Government shall be made forthwith. The explanation of the interval is that the petitioner was being prosecuted and an order of discharge had to be obtained on June 17, 1972. The order of detention was passed 4 days before the order of discharge was passed. We do not suppose that the length of time which a decision takes necessarily reflects the care or openness brought to bear upon it. The answer to yet another contention that the entire material which influenced the subjective satisfaction of the Magistrate in passing the order of detention was not supplied to the petitioner is that according to the countered affidavit of the District Magistrate, nothing apart from what is stated in the grounds and the particulars was taken into account while passing the order of detention. Thus validity of the detention confirmed.

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the detention order under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971.
2. Compliance with Section 3(3) of the Act regarding the prompt reporting of the detention order.
3. Alleged violation of Section 3(4) concerning the reporting to the Central Government.
4. Proximity between incidents leading to detention and the order of detention.
5. State Government's consideration of the petitioner's representation.
6. Sufficiency of material provided to the petitioner.
7. Availability of prosecution as an alternative remedy.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of the detention order under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971:
The petitioner challenged the detention order passed by the District Magistrate under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. The order was dated June 13, 1972, and aimed to prevent the petitioner from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of essential supplies and services. The particulars of the order referred to incidents of theft of underground copper cables and A.C.S.R. Conductors on January 31 and February 23, 1972, respectively. The petitioner was found in possession of stolen A.C.S.R. Conductors on February 24, 1972.

2. Compliance with Section 3(3) of the Act regarding the prompt reporting of the detention order:
Section 3(3) mandates that the District Magistrate must report the fact of the detention order to the State Government "forthwith." In this case, the District Magistrate reported the order on June 15, 1972, two days after it was made. The Court emphasized that laws of preventive detention should be construed with strictness, and the term "forthwith" implies immediate action without undue delay. However, the Court acknowledged that reasonable allowances must be made for unavoidable delays due to administrative exigencies. The Court found that the delay of one day in reporting the order was reasonable and did not violate Section 3(3).

3. Alleged violation of Section 3(4) concerning the reporting to the Central Government:
The petitioner contended that Section 3(4) was violated as the State Government did not report to the Central Government within seven days of the detention order. The Court clarified that the seven-day period begins from the date the State Government approves the order, not from the date the District Magistrate passes it. Since the State Government approved the order on June 21, 1972, and reported it within the stipulated time, there was no violation of Section 3(4).

4. Proximity between incidents leading to detention and the order of detention:
The petitioner argued that there was no proximity between the incidents and the detention order, with a gap of about four months. The Court accepted the explanation that the petitioner was being prosecuted, and an order of discharge was obtained on June 17, 1972. The detention order was passed four days before the discharge order, justifying the timing.

5. State Government's consideration of the petitioner's representation:
The petitioner claimed that the State Government did not adequately consider his representation, as it was rejected the day after it was received. The Court held that the length of time taken to decide does not necessarily reflect the care or openness of the consideration. Therefore, the prompt rejection did not imply a lack of due consideration.

6. Sufficiency of material provided to the petitioner:
The petitioner argued that the entire material influencing the District Magistrate's subjective satisfaction was not supplied to him. The Court referred to the District Magistrate's counter-affidavit, which stated that nothing apart from the grounds and particulars mentioned was considered while passing the detention order. Hence, the material provided was deemed sufficient.

7. Availability of prosecution as an alternative remedy:
The petitioner suggested that he could have been prosecuted for the acts attributed to him instead of being detained. The Court reiterated its stance from previous cases that the availability of an alternative remedy does not invalidate the detention order.

Conclusion:
The petition was dismissed, and the rule was discharged, upholding the validity of the detention order and finding no substantial merit in the petitioner's contentions.

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