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Issues Involved:
1. Whether mens rea is necessary to constitute an offence under section 81 of the Defence of India Rules. 2. Liability of the appellant for the acts committed by his employees. 3. Interpretation of relevant clauses of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941. Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether mens rea is necessary to constitute an offence under section 81 of the Defence of India Rules: The core question in this appeal is whether mens rea (guilty mind) is necessary to constitute an offence under section 81 of the Defence of India Rules. The lower courts held that mens rea was not relevant to the offences with which the appellant was charged. They followed the view that if any breach of the rules is committed by either the proprietor or his servant, both are guilty irrespective of their knowledge of the breach. This view was challenged, and reference was made to the Privy Council's decision in Srinivas Mall Bairolia v. King Emperor, which stated that offences against the Defence of India Rules are not within the limited and exceptional class of offences that can be committed without a guilty mind. The Supreme Court agreed with this view, emphasizing that unless the statute clearly or by necessary implication rules out mens rea as a constituent part of a crime, a defendant should not be found guilty of an offence unless he has a guilty mind. 2. Liability of the appellant for the acts committed by his employees: The appellant argued that he could not be held liable for the transgressions committed by his employees as he had issued strict instructions to them not to deviate from the rules. The lower courts, however, held him liable, stating that both the proprietor and his servant are guilty whether they had knowledge of the breach or not. The Supreme Court, referring to the Privy Council's decision, disagreed with this view. The Court held that the language of clause 22 of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order does not support the contention that an innocent master will be criminally liable for the acts of his servant. Therefore, the appellant could not be held guilty of the offence under clause 22 read with clause 5 of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941, as the clause is general in its language and is aimed at the individual person who contravenes the provision. 3. Interpretation of relevant clauses of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941: The relevant clauses of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941, including clauses 5, 22, 27, and 27A, were analyzed. Clause 5 requires motor spirit to be furnished or acquired only against the surrender of valid coupons. Clause 22 prohibits furnishing or acquiring motor spirit otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Order. Clause 27 prohibits the surrender or acceptance of coupons at a time other than when the supply of motor spirit is furnished. Clause 27A mandates that the supplier must endorse the registration or other identifying mark of the vehicle on the coupons. The Supreme Court held that the language of these clauses does not impose criminal liability on an innocent master for the acts of his servants. However, the Court upheld the conviction of the appellant for the third charge in the second case, which related to the infringement of clause 27A. The Court reasoned that clause 27A specifically throws the responsibility for making the necessary endorsements on the supplier, and if this clause is contravened, the supplier must be held guilty of the contravention. Conclusion: The appeal was allowed in part. The Supreme Court quashed the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant on the first charge in both cases, as mens rea was deemed necessary for these offences. However, the conviction and sentence on the third charge in the second case were affirmed, as the responsibility for making necessary endorsements under clause 27A falls directly on the supplier.
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