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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Government has the power under Section 14(1) of the Madras Sugar Factories Control Act, 1949 to issue notifications imposing a cess on sugarcane brought and crushed in the petitioner's factory for a period prior to the date of the notifications. 2. Whether the notifications issued under the said section impose cess for the period prior to the dates of such notifications. 3. Whether the Government could issue orders upon the Tahsildar directing him to effect attachment for non-payment of the cess without first asking for a return, investigating the same, and making a demand for such dues. Detailed Analysis: 1. Power to Impose Cess Retrospectively: The primary contention was whether Section 14(1) of the Madras Sugar Factories Control Act, 1949, allows the Government to levy cess retrospectively. The petitioner argued that the section is prospective and not retroactive. The Government, on the other hand, contended that the power to legislate retrospectively is inherent unless expressly prohibited. The court held that the power conferred by Section 14 does not include the power to impose cess retrospectively. It was emphasized that unless the power to legislate retrospectively is expressly stated, it can only be exercised prospectively. The court drew a distinction between the powers of a legislative body, which can legislate retrospectively, and those of an executive government exercising delegated legislative powers, which cannot unless expressly authorized. The court cited various precedents to support this view, including decisions from the Supreme Court and the Allahabad High Court, which emphasized that delegated legislative powers do not include the authority to legislate retrospectively unless explicitly stated. 2. Interpretation of Notifications: The second issue was whether the notifications in question imposed cess for the period subsequent to the dates of such notifications but limited to the respective crushing seasons mentioned. The petitioner argued that the notifications did not specify that the levy was for the entire crushing season and should be interpreted to apply only from the date of the notification. The court rejected this contention, stating that the notifications were clearly retrospective in their operation. The court noted that the term "crushing season" is defined in the Act and includes the entire period from November 1st to June 30th. Therefore, the notifications should be interpreted to apply to the entire crushing season mentioned, not just from the date of the notification. The court also dismissed the argument based on punctuation, emphasizing that punctuation should not control the plain meaning of the text. 3. Orders for Attachment and Demand for Dues: The final issue was whether the Government could issue orders to the Tahsildar for attachment without first making a demand for the dues. The petitioner argued that there was no computation or assessment of the amount payable as cess, and no demand was made before issuing the attachment order. The court found that under Rule 11(3) of the Madras Sugar Factories Control Act, 1949, it is the duty of the occupier of every factory to submit a return showing the quantity of sugarcane and the amount of cess paid. The cess becomes payable within a fortnight of the close of each month, and no demand is necessary before it becomes due. Therefore, the court held that the Government's actions were in accordance with the Act and dismissed this contention. Conclusion: The court concluded that the power conferred on the Government under Section 14 of the Act to levy cess did not include the power to impose such cess retrospectively. Consequently, the petitions were allowed, and the notifications dated April 9, 1956, October 15, 1957, and February 12/13, 1958, were quashed to the extent they related to periods prior to their issuance. The petitioner was awarded costs.
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