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Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of the Thirty-ninth Constitutional Amendment. 2. Validity of the 1970 notification under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. 3. Authority of the Central Government under Section 9(3) of the Act to issue notifications. 4. Legislative competence concerning Section 9 of the Act. 5. Excessive delegation of power to the Central Government. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: I. Constitutionality of the Thirty-ninth Constitutional Amendment: The petitioner contended that the Thirty-ninth Constitutional Amendment, which inserted the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 into the Ninth Schedule, was violative of the rule of law as laid down in Kesavananda Bharati's case (AIR 1973 SC 1461). The court rejected this contention, stating that the protection under Article 31B given to the Act does not violate the concept of the basic structure of the Constitution. The court found no merit in the argument and rejected the first contention. II. Validity of the 1970 Notification: The petitioner argued that the 1970 notification was ineffective and void as it was published within four years from the earlier notification issued in 1968, violating proviso (b) to Section 9 of the Act. The court agreed, noting that the 1970 notification was issued within four years of the 1968 notification, making it unlawful. Previous judgments from various High Courts, including the Gujarat High Court, had also struck down the 1970 notification on similar grounds. Consequently, the 1970 notification was declared void and unenforceable. III. Authority of the Central Government under Section 9(3) of the Act to Issue Notifications: The petitioner raised several points under this issue: - Revision of Rates Before Four Years: The court found that only the 1970 notification violated the four-year rule, not the 1962 and 1968 notifications. - Exceeding 20% of Sale Price as Royalty: The court clarified that proviso (a) to Section 9 limits the Central Government's power to fix the rate of royalty to not exceed 20% of the sale price at the pit's head. The court concluded that the rate fixed by the Central Government did not exceed this limit. - Fixed Royalty and Classification: The court held that the Central Government could adopt one of the two methods prescribed by Parliament (percentage of sale price or fixed rate per tonne) and that splitting limestone into different grades for royalty purposes was within its power. The court found no violation of legislative policy in the 1962 and 1968 notifications. - Rebate: The court upheld the Central Government's authority to grant rebates on specific types of limestone, viewing it as an aspect of the power to fix royalty rates. The court found this within the scope of Section 9(3). IV. Legislative Competence Concerning Section 9 of the Act: The petitioner argued that Section 9 of the Act was unconstitutional as it fell under Entry 50 of the State List, not Entry 54 of the Union List. The court disagreed, stating that the Act was enacted under Entry 54, which pertains to the regulation of mines and mineral development in the public interest. The court explained that royalty is a payment for minerals removed or consumed and is not a tax. Therefore, Section 9 falls under the Union List, making it within the legislative competence of Parliament. The court rejected the petitioner's contention. V. Excessive Delegation of Power to the Central Government: The petitioner argued that the Act conferred excessive power on the Central Government without providing objective standards or norms, leading to arbitrary exercise of power. The court found that the power to amend royalty rates implicitly included the power to classify minerals and grant rebates. The court assumed that the Central Government would exercise its power reasonably and in public interest, as ensured by Section 28, which subjects notifications to parliamentary review. The court rejected the contention of excessive delegation of power. Conclusion: Except for the 1970 notification, which was declared ultra vires Section 9(3) and void, all other contentions raised by the petitioner were rejected. The petition was partly allowed, and the rule was made absolute to the extent of declaring the 1970 notification void, with no order as to costs.
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