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Issues Involved:
1. Whether sections 15(1) and 18(1) read with the definitions contained in sections 2(6) and 2(10) of the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, were inconsistent with Article 19(1)(a) read with clause (2) of that article. 2. Assuming they were inconsistent, whether the proceedings commenced under section 18(1) of that Act before the commencement of the Constitution could nevertheless be proceeded with. Detailed Analysis: 1. Inconsistency with Article 19(1)(a): The High Court did not find it necessary to address this issue directly. However, the Supreme Court discussed the matter extensively. The appellant argued that the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, was inconsistent with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression. The appellant contended that the Act, being repressive and enacted by an alien government, should be considered void under Article 13(1) of the Constitution, which declares laws inconsistent with fundamental rights to be void. The Supreme Court clarified that Article 13(1) does not make inconsistent laws void ab initio but rather void to the extent of their inconsistency with the fundamental rights from the date the Constitution came into force. The Court emphasized that the Constitution's language should be interpreted prospectively, meaning that the fundamental rights and the voidness of inconsistent laws apply only from January 26, 1950, onwards. 2. Continuation of Proceedings Commenced Before the Constitution: The High Court had concluded that the word "void" in Article 13(1) was used in the sense of "repealed" and thus attracted Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, which saves pending proceedings from being affected by the repeal of a statute. The Supreme Court agreed with this conclusion, stating that the Constitution did not intend to retrospectively invalidate past transactions or proceedings initiated under laws that were valid before the Constitution came into force. The Supreme Court held that Article 13(1) is prospective and does not affect pending prosecutions for acts committed before the commencement of the Constitution. The Court reasoned that the Constitution does not obliterate the entire operation of inconsistent laws but only nullifies their effect concerning the exercise of fundamental rights after January 26, 1950. Thus, prosecutions under such laws for acts committed before this date could continue. Separate Judgments: - Fazl Ali J. (Dissenting): Fazl Ali J. disagreed with the majority view, arguing that the word "void" in Article 13(1) should be given its full effect, meaning that laws inconsistent with fundamental rights should be treated as if they never existed. He contended that pending prosecutions under such laws should be terminated, as continuing them would be contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. - Mahajan J.: Mahajan J. concurred with the majority, emphasizing that the Constitution's provisions should not be given retrospective effect. He argued that the Constitution did not intend to disturb vested rights or pending proceedings initiated under laws valid before January 26, 1950. He also highlighted that the remedy for such situations lies with the legislature or executive, not the courts. - Mukherjea J.: Mukherjea J. agreed with Fazl Ali J.'s dissenting view, concurring with his reasoning and conclusion that the appellant should not be prosecuted under a law declared void by the Constitution. Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the proceedings initiated under the Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act, 1931, before the commencement of the Constitution could continue. The Court interpreted Article 13(1) prospectively, ensuring that inconsistent laws were void only concerning the exercise of fundamental rights from January 26, 1950, onwards, without affecting past transactions or pending prosecutions.
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