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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the decree made against the defendant based on a compromise signed by counsel but not by the parties in person. 2. Interpretation of Order XXIII rule 3, C.P.C. as amended by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976. 3. The authority of counsel to enter into a compromise on behalf of the parties. Summary: 1. Validity of the Decree: The appellant challenged the Bombay High Court's judgment that upheld the decree made against the defendant based on a compromise signed by counsel but not by the parties in person. The High Court found the decree valid and in accordance with the provisions of Order XXIII rule 3, as amended by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976. 2. Interpretation of Order XXIII Rule 3, C.P.C.: The primary issue was the construction of Order XXIII rule 3, C.P.C., specifically whether the requirement of the compromise being "in writing and signed by the parties" included signatures by counsel representing the parties. The appellant argued that the amendment intended that only the parties in person could sign the compromise, while the respondent contended that counsel had implied authority to sign on behalf of the parties. 3. Authority of Counsel: The judgment extensively discussed the traditional role and implied authority of counsel in both English and Indian legal systems. It was noted that counsel in India, like their counterparts in England, have the implied authority to compromise a case unless expressly limited by the client. The court emphasized that the legislative intent behind the 1976 amendment was to avoid delays and uncertainties associated with oral agreements, not to curtail the authority of counsel. The judgment concluded that the words "in writing and signed by the parties" in the amended rule should be interpreted to include signatures by counsel or duly authorized agents. This interpretation aligns with the legislative intent of ensuring quick and certain disposal of cases without causing undue delay or inconvenience to the parties. The court also noted that the consent decree passed on 18.6.1984 was valid and constituted res judicata, as it was not challenged for six years and no allegations of fraud or misrepresentation were made against it. Consequently, the appellant's challenge was dismissed due to delay, estoppel, and res judicata. The appeal was dismissed, and no order as to costs was made.
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