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Issues Involved:
1. Competency of appeals from the High Court to the Federal Court and subsequently to His Majesty in Council. 2. Validity of Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules. 3. Interpretation of Section 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935. 4. Personal satisfaction of the Governor under Rule 26. 5. Routine orders and their impact on the validity of detention orders. Detailed Analysis: 1. Competency of Appeals: The primary issue was the competency of the appeals from the High Court to the Federal Court and subsequently to His Majesty in Council. The judgment emphasized the principle of English law that a discharge under a writ of habeas corpus is final and not subject to appeal. However, the appeals proceeded under Sections 205 and 208 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The High Court granted certificates under Section 205(1) for leave to appeal to the Federal Court, and leave was subsequently given under Section 208(b) to appeal to His Majesty in Council. The judgment concluded that the appeals were competent based on the special terms of Section 205. 2. Validity of Rule 26: The validity of Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules was challenged based on the decision in Talpade's case, where it was held that Rule 26 was ultra vires. The judgment disagreed with the Federal Court's decision in Talpade's case, stating that the rule-making power is conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Defence of India Act, and the provisions of Sub-section (2) are illustrative, not restrictive. Therefore, Rule 26 was made in conformity with the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Defence of India Act. 3. Interpretation of Section 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935: The judgment interpreted Section 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935, as relating to both civil and criminal jurisdiction of the High Courts. The purpose of the provision is to confer a right of appeal in every case that involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Act or any Order in Council made thereunder. The judgment emphasized that the securing of uniformity of decision is as important in habeas corpus cases as in other cases, and there is no express exception for habeas corpus cases in Section 205. 4. Personal Satisfaction of the Governor under Rule 26: The Federal Court held that the Governor must be personally satisfied as to the matters set out in Rule 26, and the orders for detention were not in conformity with the rule as the Governor had not considered the cases personally. The judgment disagreed, stating that the Governor could act through the normal executive machinery of the Provincial Government under Chapter II of Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935. The judgment concluded that the Governor's satisfaction could be achieved through the established procedures and rules of business. 5. Routine Orders and Their Impact on the Validity of Detention Orders: The judgment addressed the impact of routine orders on the validity of detention orders. It was found that the routine order of October 1, 1942, directed that detention orders should be issued as a matter of course based on police recommendations. This substitution of police recommendations for the Governor's satisfaction rendered the orders ab initio void and invalid. The judgment upheld the Federal Court's decision that the orders of detention in the cases of respondents Nos. 1 and 5 were invalid due to the routine order. However, for respondents Nos. 3, 6, 7, and 8, there was no evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity, and their detention orders were deemed valid. Conclusion: The appeals were found competent, and Rule 26 was held valid under the Defence of India Act. The Governor's satisfaction under Rule 26 could be achieved through the normal executive procedures. The routine order of October 1, 1942, invalidated the detention orders for respondents Nos. 1 and 5, while the orders for respondents Nos. 3, 6, 7, and 8 were upheld as valid. The judgment advised that the appeal be allowed for respondents Nos. 3, 6, 7, and 8, and dismissed for respondents Nos. 1 and 5.
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