2001 (4) TMI 908 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Legality of the termination of service under Section 19 of the Army Act read with Rule 14 of the Army Rules.
2. Applicability of the period of limitation for trial by court-martial under Section 122 of the Army Act.
3. Interpretation of the term "impracticable" in Rule 14(2) of the Army Rules.

Summary:

1. Legality of the termination of service under Section 19 of the Army Act read with Rule 14 of the Army Rules:
The respondents, Harjeet Singh Sandhu and Harminder Kumar, were dismissed from service by the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) under Section 19 of the Army Act read with Rule 14 of the Army Rules after their respective General Court Martial (GCM) proceedings were annulled or stayed. The High Courts quashed these dismissals, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Major Radha Krishan Vs. Union of India, which held that once court-martial proceedings become time-barred, Section 19 cannot be invoked.

2. Applicability of the period of limitation for trial by court-martial under Section 122 of the Army Act:
Section 122 of the Army Act prescribes a three-year limitation period for commencing a trial by court-martial. The respondents argued that since the court-martial proceedings against them became time-barred, the COAS could not invoke Section 19. The Supreme Court, however, clarified that the expiry of the limitation period does not ipso facto preclude the exercise of power under Section 19 read with Rule 14. The Court emphasized that Section 19 and Rule 14 are independent provisions and the bar of limitation under Section 122 does not automatically exclude the invocation of Section 19.

3. Interpretation of the term "impracticable" in Rule 14(2) of the Army Rules:
The term "impracticable" in Rule 14(2) was a key point of contention. The Supreme Court disagreed with the narrow interpretation of "impracticable" in Major Radha Krishan's case, which distinguished it from "impossible." The Court held that "impracticable" should be given a broader meaning, encompassing situations where a trial by court-martial is not feasible due to practical difficulties, including the expiry of the limitation period under Section 122. The Court provided several illustrations where the trial by court-martial could be rendered impracticable, thus justifying the invocation of Section 19 read with Rule 14.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the High Courts and dismissed the writ petitions filed by the respondents, holding that the COAS's exercise of power under Section 19 read with Rule 14 was not vitiated by the bar of limitation under Section 122. The Court emphasized the need for a broader interpretation of "impracticable" and highlighted that the power under Section 19 remains available even after the expiry of the limitation period for court-martial proceedings. The Court also advised the COAS and the Central Government to consider the respondents' conduct over the intervening years before deciding on further disciplinary action.