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Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Railway Rates Tribunal to entertain complaints regarding the reasonableness of rates prior to the institution of the complaint. 2. Jurisdiction of the Railway Rates Tribunal to grant any refund. Detailed Analysis: 1. Jurisdiction to Entertain Complaints Regarding Reasonableness of Rates Prior to the Institution of the Complaint The appellant, Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd., filed a complaint against the Railway Company regarding the station-to-station rates on sugarcane imposed by the Railway Company's Circular No. 8 of 1953 and Local Rate Advice No. 2A of 1960, alleging these rates were unreasonable. The Railway Company contended that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint regarding the reasonableness of rates prior to the institution of the complaint. The Tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain or try the complaint as regards the reasonableness or otherwise of rates and charges made prior to the institution of the complaint on May 6, 1960. The Tribunal's decision was based on the interpretation of the words "is charging" in clause (b) and "is levying" in clause (c) of the first sub-section of section 42 of the Railways Act. The use of the present progressive tense was construed to mean something that is taking place at the present time. The Tribunal concluded that the words "is charging" and "is levying" do not include charges made in the past. The Tribunal's jurisdiction was limited to complaints about current charges and did not extend to past charges. 2. Jurisdiction to Grant Any Refund The Tribunal also held that it had no jurisdiction to grant any refund. This decision was based on the interpretation of the Tribunal's powers under section 41 and section 39 of the Railways Act. Section 41(1) only authorized the Tribunal to hear and decide complaints about the reasonableness of rates or charges and to fix such rates or charges as it considers reasonable. The Tribunal could only provide declaratory relief and had no power to order any consequential relief, such as a refund. The appellant argued that section 39, which allows the Tribunal to pass interim and final orders, should include the power to order refunds. However, the Tribunal and the Court concluded that an order for refund is not "necessary for the purpose of exercising the jurisdiction" conferred on the Tribunal. Section 39 did not confer any jurisdiction but only provided means for the Tribunal to exercise its existing jurisdiction. The appellant also contended that the Tribunal's lack of power to order refunds would deprive them of relief against unreasonable charges already paid, especially in light of section 26 of the Act, which restricts suits against Railway Administrations. The Court clarified that section 26 does not apply to claims for refunds of unreasonable charges, as such claims are not for anything done in violation or contravention of Chapter V of the Act. Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decisions on both issues, confirming that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain complaints regarding the reasonableness of rates prior to the institution of the complaint and no jurisdiction to grant any refund. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
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