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Issues Involved:
1. Possession and dispossession of the disputed land. 2. Applicability of Article 142 or 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908. 3. Adverse possession claimed by the defendants. 4. Application of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (doctrine of lis pendens). 5. Exclusion of time under the Limitation Act. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Possession and Dispossession of the Disputed Land: The plaintiffs-appellants filed a suit on 20-4-1959 for possession of 331 Kanals and 11 Marlas of land, claiming that the defendants-respondents had taken illegal and forcible possession after the High Court's decision on 21-11-1958. The defendants-respondents, however, contended that they had taken possession after the death of Smt. Khemi in 1944 and had been in continuous and exclusive possession since then. The Court found that the plaintiffs' suit fell squarely within the ambit of Art. 142 of the Limitation Act of 1908, and the burden of proof for possession and dispossession was rightly placed on the plaintiffs. 2. Applicability of Article 142 or 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908: The Trial Court framed three issues directly bearing on whether Art. 142 or 144 would be applicable. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs' suit was barred by Art. 142. The first Appellate Court also rejected the plaintiffs' case of acquisition of possession on 13-12-1946 and dispossession after 21-11-1958, accepting the defendants' version of continuous possession since 1946. The Court held that the findings of fact recorded by the lower courts supported the applicability of Article 144 as well, given the defendants' adverse possession for over 12 years. 3. Adverse Possession Claimed by the Defendants: The defendants-respondents claimed adverse possession since 1944. The Court observed that the oral evidence and revenue records conclusively established the defendants' possession over the suit land from 1946 up to the present time. The Court found that all elements of open, adverse, hostile, continuous, and exclusive possession for over 12 years were present, thus supporting the defendants' claim of adverse possession. 4. Application of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Doctrine of Lis Pendens): The first Appellate Court had used Section 52 to prevent the defendants' rights from maturing by adverse possession during the pendency of the earlier suit. However, the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court held that adverse possession, once commenced, could not stop running merely because of the pendency of the defendants' suit. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that Section 52 was not meant to serve as a provision for excluding time under the Limitation Act. The Court emphasized that taking illegal possession or its continuance does not resemble a transfer or dealing with property under Section 52. 5. Exclusion of Time Under the Limitation Act: The Court discussed the policy underlying statutes of limitation, emphasizing that they are meant to prevent disturbance of what may have been acquired by long enjoyment or lost by a party's inaction. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act could be used to exclude time spent in litigation. The Court held that the only provision for exclusion of time in the Limitation Act is Section 14, which was not applicable in this case. The plaintiffs failed to institute their suit within the prescribed period of limitation, and thus, their suit was barred. Conclusion: The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and decree of the Punjab High Court, dismissing the plaintiffs' suit as barred by limitation. The Court also dismissed an application seeking permission to introduce additional questions regarding Banjar land. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs throughout. The appeal was dismissed.
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