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Issues:
Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing petition for Special leave to appeal under Section 417 (3), Cr. P. C. Maintainability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in petitions for leave under Section 417 (3), Cr. P. C. Interpretation of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act in relation to special or local laws. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act being "expressly excluded" by special laws like Section 417 (4), Cr. P. C. Analysis: The judgment addresses an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in filing a petition for Special leave to appeal under Section 417 (3), Cr. P. C. The opposing counsel argued that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to such petitions, rendering the application not maintainable. The judgment delves into the historical context of differing interpretations of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act of 1908 by various High Courts, which was resolved by the Supreme Court in Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh, AIR 1964 SC 260, affirming the special nature of Section 417 (3) and (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Another contentious issue addressed in the judgment is the interpretation of the term "different" in Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which pertains to situations where the Limitation Act and special or local laws prescribe varying periods of limitation. The Supreme Court's decision in Vidyacharan v. Khubchand, AIR 1964 SC 1099, clarified that even when the Limitation Act does not specify a time limit but the special law does, it constitutes a "different" period under Section 29(2). The judgment further examines the argument that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is "expressly excluded" by special laws like Section 417 (4), Cr. P. C. The counsel contended that condoning the delay under Section 5 would contravene the prescribed period in Section 417 (4). However, relying on precedents and legislative intent, the court rejected this argument, emphasizing that the phrase "expressly excluded" requires explicit exclusion by words, not by construction or reasoning. Moreover, the judgment distinguishes cases where special laws are self-contained in matters of limitation, like the Provincial Insolvency Act, from Section 417, Cr. P. C., which does not provide for the applicability of Limitation Act sections. It concludes that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to determine the period of limitation under special laws like Section 417 (3), Cr. P. C. In the final analysis, the court overruled the preliminary objection, ruling in favor of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. The decision was based on the uncontroversial facts presented in the affidavit accompanying the petition, which established sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the application for special leave under Section 417 (3), Cr. P. C.
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