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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of Section 33(1)(o) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951. 2. Validity of Rules 7 to 11, 14, and 15 framed under Section 33(1) of the Bombay Police Act. 3. Fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. 4. Alleged excessive delegation of legislative powers. 5. Alleged arbitrary and unreasonable restrictions on fundamental rights. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of Section 33(1)(o) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951: The appellant argued that Section 33(1)(o) does not empower the Commissioner of Police to require prior permission for holding public meetings and that it suffers from excessive delegation of legislative powers. The High Court held that the word 'regulating' includes prohibition and thus falls within the ambit of clause (o). The Supreme Court agreed, stating that the word 'regulate' means "to control, govern, or direct by rule or regulations to subject to guidance or restrictions." The section was deemed to be in aid of the rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(d). 2. Validity of Rules 7 to 11, 14, and 15 framed under Section 33(1) of the Bombay Police Act: The appellant contended that these rules were ultra vires the Act and violated fundamental rights. The Supreme Court found Rule 7, which required prior permission for holding public meetings, to be arbitrary and lacking guidance, thus conferring unreasonable discretionary power on the officer. Consequently, Rule 7 was struck down. The other rules, which merely laid down the procedure for obtaining permission, could not operate without Rule 7 and were thus rendered ineffective. 3. Fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution: The appellant claimed that the rules violated Articles 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech) and 19(1)(b) (right to assemble peaceably). The Supreme Court held that while the State could regulate these rights in the interest of public order, it could not impose unreasonable restrictions. The requirement of prior permission was deemed a reasonable regulation, but the arbitrary nature of Rule 7 made it an unreasonable restriction. 4. Alleged excessive delegation of legislative powers: The appellant argued that Section 33(1)(o) conferred uncontrolled, naked, and arbitrary powers on the Commissioner of Police. The High Court and the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the Act provided clear guidance and policy for the exercise of these powers. However, the arbitrary nature of Rule 7 was found to be problematic. 5. Alleged arbitrary and unreasonable restrictions on fundamental rights: The Supreme Court emphasized that any regulation of fundamental rights must be reasonable and not arbitrary. Rule 7 was found to confer arbitrary powers on the officer, allowing for potential misuse and discrimination. This lack of clear guidelines and the potential for arbitrary decision-making rendered Rule 7 invalid. Separate Judgments: - MATHEW, J.: Agreed with the conclusion but provided different reasons. He emphasized that a power to regulate does not normally include a power to prohibit and that Rule 7 was ultra vires the sub-section. He also highlighted the importance of public meetings in a democratic society and the need for precise regulation. - BEG, J.: Also agreed with the conclusion but highlighted the difficulties in recognizing a right to hold public meetings on public streets. He emphasized the need for sufficient safeguards against misuse of power and preferred to strike down Rule 7 for contravening Article 14 of the Constitution. Conclusion: The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court, declared Rule 7 of the Rules framed by the Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad, as void for infringing Article 19(1)(b) of the Constitution, and emphasized the need for proper rules to regulate public meetings on public streets.
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