2007 (5) TMI 613 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether a particular employee comes within the definition of workman has to be decided factually? Whether it affects the legal rights of individual workers in the context that if they fall within the definition then they would be entitled to claim several benefits conferred by the Act?

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Determination of whether the appellant was a "workman" under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. Legality of the appellant's termination under Clause 17 of the appointment letter.
3. Applicability and interpretation of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1984.
4. Jurisdiction of the Labour Court in adjudicating the dispute.
5. Entitlement to relief including reinstatement, back wages, and compensation.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Determination of whether the appellant was a "workman" under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
The primary contention was whether the appellant's role as "Industrial Relations Executive" classified him as a workman. The appellant argued that his duties were technical, thus fitting within the definition under the amended Section 2(s) of the Act. However, the High Court and the Division Bench concluded that the appellant's duties were managerial, not technical. The evidence showed that his responsibilities included advising management, representing the company in legal matters, and conducting domestic inquiries, which overwhelmingly fell within the managerial cadre. Consequently, the appellant was not considered a workman under the Act.

2. Legality of the appellant's termination under Clause 17 of the appointment letter:
Clause 17 allowed the company to terminate the appellant's employment without assigning any reason, provided three months' notice or salary in lieu thereof was given. The appellant's services were terminated under this clause, and the High Court upheld the termination, stating that the company had ample reason to invoke Clause 17. The termination was deemed valid and not in contravention of any legal provisions.

3. Applicability and interpretation of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1984:
The appellant argued that the amendment to the definition of "workman" under Section 2(s) of the Act, which included "operational" work, should apply retrospectively. However, the court held that the amendment was prospective, as there was no clear provision or necessary implication indicating retrospectivity. The court emphasized that the definition of "workman" at the time of dismissal should be considered, and retrospective application would violate Article 20(1) of the Constitution, which prohibits ex post facto laws.

4. Jurisdiction of the Labour Court in adjudicating the dispute:
The High Court determined that since the appellant was not a workman, the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. Despite this, the High Court addressed the merits of the case and upheld the company's decision to terminate the appellant's employment under Clause 17 of the appointment letter.

5. Entitlement to relief including reinstatement, back wages, and compensation:
The Labour Court initially ordered the appellant's reinstatement with continuity of service and compensation but denied back wages from 30.11.1989 to the date of the award. The High Court quashed this award, stating that the appellant was not entitled to reinstatement or back wages as he was not a workman. The High Court's decision was based on the managerial nature of the appellant's duties and the validity of his termination under Clause 17.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment, affirming that the appellant was not a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that his termination under Clause 17 of the appointment letter was valid. The amendment to the definition of "workman" was deemed prospective, and the Labour Court's jurisdiction was negated. Consequently, the appellant was not entitled to reinstatement, back wages, or additional compensation. The appeals were dismissed.