1951 (3) TMI 30 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal.
2. Fair trial and right to counsel.
3. Misjoinder of charges.
4. Legality of the death sentence by hanging.
5. Necessity of assent from H.E.H. the Nizam for the execution of the death sentence.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal:
The petitioners contended that the trial by the Special Tribunal was without jurisdiction. The Military Governor of Hyderabad enacted the Special Tribunals Regulation, which allowed the constitution of Special Tribunals to try any offense. The Civil Administrator of Nalgonda directed the Tribunal to try the petitioners' cases based on charge sheets submitted by a senior police officer. The High Court confirmed the convictions and sentences, and the petitioners' applications for leave to appeal were unsuccessful. The Supreme Court held that even if there was a defect in the procedure, it did not mean the trial court acted without jurisdiction. The appellate court had already pronounced its judgment, and the matter was final.

2. Fair Trial and Right to Counsel:
The petitioners argued that there was no fair trial in Criminal Cases Nos. 17 and 18 as they were not afforded the opportunity to instruct counsel. The affidavits indicated that the accused were not allowed to communicate with their relations or friends and were not offered legal aid. The Supreme Court noted that while the assignment of counsel is desirable, non-assignment does not necessarily vitiate the trial. The court found that the accused in Case No. 14 were defended by a pleader, but those in Cases Nos. 17 and 18 were not. The High Court had previously concluded that the accused did not avail themselves of the opportunity to engage lawyers. The Supreme Court suggested that the Special Tribunal should have taken steps to assign a lawyer to aid the accused.

3. Misjoinder of Charges:
The petitioners contended that the trials were illegal due to the misjoinder of charges, specifically that the offense of carrying unlicensed firearms was unconnected with other offenses. The High Court had previously rejected this argument, stating that there was no misjoinder of charges and no prejudice caused. The Supreme Court held that even if there was a defect in the procedure, it did not mean the trial court acted without jurisdiction, and the matter was finally decided by the appellate court.

4. Legality of the Death Sentence by Hanging:
The petitioners argued that the death sentence by hanging was illegal as the Hyderabad Penal Code did not specify the mode of execution. The Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code also did not mention the mode of execution, but the warrant form prescribed decapitation. However, an amendment to the Special Tribunals Regulation made hanging the mode of execution for sentences passed by the Special Tribunal. The Supreme Court held that the amendment had retrospective effect and that the High Court had the power to inflict the sentence of death by hanging under the amended Regulation.

5. Necessity of Assent from H.E.H. the Nizam:
The petitioners argued that the death sentence could not be executed without the assent of H.E.H. the Nizam. The Hyderabad Criminal Procedure Code required manzuri (assent) for sentences of death, life imprisonment, and imprisonment of ten years or more. The Special Tribunals Regulation, however, stated that no sentence of a Special Tribunal required confirmation. The Supreme Court held that the word manzuri in the context of the Regulation meant confirmation and that the new word tausiq used in the Regulation conveyed the same sense. The court concluded that the assent of H.E.H. the Nizam was not necessary under the amended Regulation.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed all six petitions, holding that the Special Tribunal had jurisdiction, the trial was fair despite the lack of legal representation, there was no misjoinder of charges, the death sentence by hanging was legal, and the assent of H.E.H. the Nizam was not required for the execution of the death sentence. The court also noted that the judgment of the High Court had acquired finality before the Constitution came into force, and the present detention of the petitioners could not be held invalid.