2008 (10) TMI 651 - SC - Indian Laws

Removed of the appellant from service - Application filled u/s 55 of the Madhya Pradesh Co- operative Societies Act, 1960 (Act) - barred by limitation - Power of the Registrar, authority or jurisdiction to entertain such dispute - Manager of a Co-operative Bank involved in Financial irregularities - Principle of Res Judicata - concession made on behalf of the Bank - It was also submitted that had it been contended before the Registrar that the application was not within the period of limitation prescribed by law, the appellant could have satisfied the authority or would have taken other steps, but he was deprived by the concession on behalf of the Bank. It has caused serious prejudice to the appellant and the Bank cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold' by taking inconsistent pleas and by raising technical' defence of limitation. HELD THAT - Admittedly, the order of removal was passed by the Bank against the appellant on April 29, 1982. Even the first petition u/s 55 of the Act was filed by the appellant/applicant on June 30, 1982, i.e. after two months which was time- barred. The High Court considered the first petition filed by the appellant herein before the Registrar, but even that petition was barred by time. The High Court was, therefore, right in dismissing the writ petition holding that the application filed by the applicant was not within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 55 of the Act. The ld counsel for the respondent-Bank rightly submitted that the plea raised by the appellant has no force. It was submitted that there was no concession by the Bank. Relying on Zimni, the counsel submitted that on July 06, 1993, i.e. the day on which the concession was said to have been made, the Presiding Officer was not present as he was on a tour. No proceeding took place on that day. It was, therefore, factually incorrect to state that a concession was made on behalf of the Bank and it did not object that the application was barred by time. But even otherwise, according to the counsel, if the application was not within the period of limitation, the so-called concession would neither bind the Bank nor invest jurisdiction or power in the authority to entertain such application which was barred by limitation. In other words, according to the counsel, the concession was against the provision of law, which would not bind the Bank. In our opinion, the appellant is right in submitting that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the application filed by the appellant was barred by res judicata . It is clear from the facts that the application was filed by the appellant to Joint Registrar, Raipur. It was pending. Meanwhile, however, District Bastar had its own Registry and hence, an application was submitted to District Registrar, Bastar. The application preferred by the appellant to the Joint Registrar, Raipur, in the circumstances, became infructuous. It was not decided on merits. Section 55 allows an aggrieved party to approach the Registrar within a period of thirty days. There is no provision analogous to Section 5 of the Limitation act, 1963 allowing the Registrar to condone delay if sufficient cause is shown. In view of this fact, in our opinion, the contention of the ld counsel for the Bank is well founded that the application submitted by the appellant was barred by time. To us, the High Court was right in observing that the Tribunal was in error in allowing the appeal and dismissing the claim of the appellant on the ground of res judicata. The High Court, therefore, considered the said question independently and held that the Bank was right in submitting that the appellant had not approached the Registrar within the period prescribed by law and his application was liable to be dismissed. So far as the prayer by the appellant that he has sufficiently suffered and should be re-instated in service without back wages also cannot be accepted. The appellant was holding position of trust and was Manager of a Bank. The charges leveled against him were serious in nature concerning misappropriation of money. It is true that the amount was not big and it was also repaid and the Bank has not suffered. But even then the Manager of a Co-operative Bank was involved in financial irregularities. The Bank was satisfied that he should not be retained in service and passed an order of removal. We, therefore, see no infirmity even in the final decision taken by the Bank which deserves interference by this Court. Appeal deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed, however, without any order as to costs.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Res judicata
2. Limitation
3. Merits of the disciplinary action and punishment

Detailed Analysis:

Res Judicata:
The Tribunal initially dismissed the appellant's application on the grounds of res judicata, asserting that the matter had already been decided by the Joint Registrar, Jagdalpur, and confirmed by the Board of Revenue, Gwalior. The Supreme Court, however, found this reasoning flawed. The appellant had filed an application to the Joint Registrar, Raipur, which became infructuous when a separate Registrar was appointed for District Bastar. This application was not decided on merits, and thus, as per settled law, such a decision does not operate as res judicata. The High Court correctly concluded that the Tribunal erred in dismissing the application on these grounds.

Limitation:
The appellant's application under Section 55 of the Madhya Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, was filed after the prescribed period of thirty days from the date of the order of removal, making it time-barred. The Supreme Court emphasized that the statute does not allow for condonation of delay beyond this period. Despite the appellant's argument that the Bank's counsel conceded the application was within time, the Court held that such a concession would not bind the Bank if it contravened statutory provisions. The High Court, therefore, rightly dismissed the writ petition on the grounds of limitation.

Merits of the Disciplinary Action and Punishment:
The appellant contended that even if the allegations of financial irregularities were true, the punishment of removal was excessively harsh, especially since no financial loss was caused to the respondent-Bank. However, the Supreme Court held that the appellant, as a Manager of a Co-operative Bank, held a position of trust, and the charges of financial irregularities justified the removal. The Court stated that the punishment was not grossly disproportionate or excessively high, and it did not fall into categories that would warrant judicial interference. The appellant's plea for reinstatement without back wages was also rejected, as the Court found no reason to substitute its judgment for that of the disciplinary authority.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision that the application was time-barred and that the punishment of removal was justified given the appellant's position and the nature of the charges. The Court found no error of law or grounds for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.