1927 (7) TMI 2 - HC - Income Tax

Summary

Issues:
Appeal to Privy Council under Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 - Interpretation of statutory appeal requirements - Retrospective application of statutory provisions affecting existing rights.

Analysis:
1. The judgment pertains to petitions seeking special leave to appeal from orders made by the High Court of Judicature at Lahore under Section 66(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, where the sum in dispute exceeds Rs. 10,000. The High Court refused to certify the cases as fit for appeal to His Majesty in Council, leading to a challenge on the nature of the statutory appeal. The argument focused on whether the cases met the requirements of Section 109(o) of the Code of Civil Procedure for a statutory appeal.

2. The High Court held that the petitioners could appeal to His Majesty in Council if they met the Section 109(o) requirements. The petitioners contended that compliance with Section 110 of the Code was sufficient, while the respondents argued that there was no statutory right of appeal for the petitioners. The case raised significant questions regarding the statutory appeal process and the conditions for appeal certification.

3. The legislative history revealed that until the Indian Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1928, there was no express provision for appeals to His Majesty in Council from High Court orders. The amendment introduced Section 66A, which outlined the appeal process, including the requirement for the High Court to certify a case as fit for appeal. The judgment analyzed the specific language of the sub-sections to determine the scope of appeal rights under the new provision.

4. The critical issue revolved around whether the appeal provision applied retrospectively to orders made before the Act of 1926 came into force. The judgment referenced the principle established in Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irving, emphasizing that provisions affecting existing rights should not be applied retrospectively without clear indication. The court concluded that the petitioners had no statutory right of appeal and that an appeal would only be admissible through the Prerogative.

5. Ultimately, the Privy Council advised His Majesty to dismiss both petitions with costs, as there was no statutory right of appeal for the petitioners. Despite the unique circumstances and the probable intent of the 1926 Act to rectify legislative omissions, the court found no sufficient grounds to exercise the Prerogative in favor of the petitioners.