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Issues Involved:
1. Constitutional validity of Sec. 12 of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development (Amendment) Act, 1999. 2. Legislative competence of the State Legislature under Entry 18 of State List and Entry 20 of the Concurrent List. 3. Interpretation and correlation of Secs. 20 and 40 of the Parent Act. 4. Validity of Sec. 40(3)(jj)(a)(iv) regarding the reservation of land for sale by the Appropriate Authority. Detailed Analysis: I. Legislative Competence: The petitioners challenged the legislative competence of the impugned legislation. The court upheld the legislative competence of the State Legislature under Entry 18 of List II (State List) and Entry 20 of List III (Concurrent List). The court emphasized that the legislative entries should be given the widest possible construction. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Maneklal Chhotalal & Ors. v. M. G. Makwana & Ors., which upheld the legislative competence of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954. The court concluded that the impugned legislation, including the provisions for allotment of land for sale by the Appropriate Authority, fell within the legislative competence of the State Legislature as it pertained to land and economic and social planning. II. Constitutional Validity under Art. 300-A and Art. 14 of the Constitution of India: The petitioners argued that the impugned legislation was arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of Art. 300-A and Art. 14 of the Constitution. The court held that the preparation and implementation of town planning inherently involved reconstitution and exchange of lands for public use and facilities. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decisions in State of Gujarat v. Shri Shantilal Mangaldas & Ors. and Prakash Amichand Shah v. State of Gujarat & Ors., which upheld the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1955. The court concluded that the compensation payable under the Parent Act was not illusory or unrealistic and that the impugned legislation was not arbitrary or unreasonable, thus not violating Art. 300-A or Art. 14 of the Constitution. III. Interpretation of Secs. 20 and 40 of the Act and Their Co-relation and Conjoint Operation: The court examined the interpretation of Secs. 20 and 40 of the Parent Act. Sec. 20 permits the acquisition of land for specified public purposes within a specified period, and if not acquired, the reservation lapses. The court held that land which was designated and reserved under Sec. 12(2) and not acquired within the specified period could not be re-reserved under a Town Planning Scheme under Sec. 40. The court emphasized that any town planning scheme prepared under Sec. 40 must be consistent with the final development plan prepared under Sec. 20. The court concluded that the impugned clause (jj)(a) of Sec. 40(3) was valid but could not be used to re-reserve land that had lapsed under Sec. 20(2). IV. Challenge to Validity of Sec. 40(3)(jj)(a)(iv): The petitioners challenged the validity of Sec. 40(3)(jj)(a)(iv), which allowed the reservation of 15% of land for sale by the Appropriate Authority. The court held that the reservation of land for sale by the Appropriate Authority was not merely a revenue-raising provision but was necessary for providing public facilities as part of town planning. The court concluded that the provision was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature and did not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. Conclusion: The court upheld the constitutional validity of the impugned legislation and rejected the challenges based on Art. 14 and Art. 300-A of the Constitution. The court, however, held that the impugned clause (jj)(a) of Sec. 40(3) could not be used to re-reserve land that had lapsed under Sec. 20(2). The petitions were disposed of accordingly.
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