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2009 (8) TMI 1176 - SC - Indian LawsConstitutional validity of reservation - Interpretation and/ or application of the notifications and/or the circulars - Presidential Notification, issued under Article 341 of the Constitution of India specifying Scheduled Castes - whether in the absence of a Presidential Notification, listing any group of persons as a Scheduled Tribe in Delhi, can by policy, the benefit of reservation in services be accorded to migrant Scheduled Tribes in the Union Territory of Delhi? - HELD THAT - We are unable to accept the contention that the members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes notified as such in other States would come within the purview of the backward classes within the meaning of clause (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. If a caste or tribe is notified in terms of the Scheduled Caste Order or Scheduled Tribe Order, the same must be done in terms of clause (1) of Article 341 as also that of 342 of the Constitution of India, as the case may be. No deviation from the procedure laid down therein is permissible in law. If any amendment/alteration thereto is required to be made, recourse to the procedure laid down under clause (2) thereof must be resorted to. Reservations have been made in terms of the policy decision of the Central Government, namely, 7.5% for the members of scheduled tribes, 15% for the members of scheduled castes and 27% for the members of backward classes. If the members of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in other States are to be treated as backward classes for Delhi; intensive studies were required to be made in regard to the question whether they would come within the purview of the definition of backward classes so as to answer the description of socially and educationally backward . When reservation for scheduled castes or scheduled tribes had been earmarked, persons answering the description thereto only can be appointed. No recruitment is permissible for a backward class against a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe quota. That itself would be violative of clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. Furthermore, if a person is to be treated as scheduled caste or scheduled tribe in terms of Article 341 of the Constitution of India, the benefit attached thereto in all other areas must be conferred on him. A person cannot be treated to be a member of scheduled caste for one purpose and not for another purpose. By judicial process or otherwise, the said executive instructions which are consistent with the constitutional scheme could not have brought about an altogether different situation as a result whereof those who are residents of Delhi being belonging to the members of the Scheduled Castes and, thus, entitled to be regarded within the framework of the quota provided for by the Government could not have been deprived therefrom by way of bringing in another class of persons within the purview of the said category of Scheduled Castes who are not entitled to the said benefit. By reason of such an Act, those who are entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of protective discrimination contained in Clause (4) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India had been deprived of their constitutional right. Once it is found that the constitutional violation of this nature has been committed, in our opinion, the Courts would be entitled to apply the principle of strict scrutiny test or closer scrutiny test or higher level of scrutiny. It is commonly believed amongst a section of Academicians that strict scrutiny test in view of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Ashok Kumar Thakur 2008 (4) TMI 775 - SUPREME COURT is not applicable in India at all. We are of the opinion that in respect of the following categories of cases, the said test may be applied - 1. Where a statute or an action is patently unreasonable or arbitrary. 2. Where a statute is contrary to the constitutional scheme. 3. Where the general presumption as regards the constitutionality of the statute or action cannot be invoked. 4. Where a statute or execution action causes reverse discrimination. 5. Where a statute has been enacted restricting the rights of a citizen under Article 14 or Article 19 as for example clauses (1) to (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution of India as in those cases, it would be for the State to justify the reasonableness thereof. 6. Where a statute seeks to take away a person s life and liberty which is protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India or otherwise infringes the core human right. 7. Where a statute is Expropriatory or Confiscatory in nature. 8. Where a statute prima facie seeks to interfere with sovereignty and integrity of India. However, by no means, the list is exhaustive or may be held to be applicable in all situations. As we have already stated, in the event the state issues any instruction through circular in the National Capital Territory of Delhi to this effect, the same will deserve strict scrutiny. After following the precedent with respect to strict scrutiny it is pertinent to explore some foundational principles in this regard. We think we should. The decisions referred to hereinbefore clearly suggest that we are bound by a Constitution Bench decision. We have referred to two Constitution Bench decisions, namely Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao 1990 (5) TMI 235 - SUPREME COURT and E.V. Chinnaiah 2004 (11) TMI 522 - SUPREME COURT . Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao had been followed by this Court in a large number of decisions including Three Judge Bench decisions. Pushpa, therefore, could not have ignored either Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao or other decisions following the same only on the basis of an administrative circular issued or otherwise and more so when the Constitutional scheme as contained in clause (1) of Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution of India putting the State and Union Territory in the same bracket. Following Dayanand 2008 (11) TMI 679 - SUPREME COURT , therefore, we are of the opinion that the dicta in Pushpa 2005 (2) TMI 849 - SUPREME COURT is an obiter and does not lay down any binding ratio. Thus, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained which are set aside accordingly. The appeal and the writ petition are allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs.
Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation and application of notifications and circulars issued by the National Capital Territory of Delhi in terms of Article 341 of the Constitution of India. 2. Validity of caste certificates issued to migrants for claiming Scheduled Castes (SC) or Scheduled Tribes (ST) benefits in Delhi. 3. Whether a person migrating from one State to another retains the SC/ST status in the new State. 4. The distinction between State Civil Services and Central Civil Services in the context of reservation benefits. 5. Validity and binding nature of previous Supreme Court decisions on similar issues. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Interpretation and Application of Notifications and Circulars: The judgment involves interpreting notifications and circulars issued by the National Capital Territory of Delhi under Article 341 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court examined the circulars dated 2.5.1975, 22.3.1977, and 8.4.1994, which outlined the verification process for SC/ST status and addressed the issue of migrants. The Court noted that these circulars emphasized that a person migrating from one State to another could claim SC/ST status only in their State of origin, not in the State to which they migrated. 2. Validity of Caste Certificates Issued to Migrants: The Court scrutinized the legality of caste certificates issued to migrants and their progenies for claiming SC/ST benefits in Delhi. The original writ petitioners argued that their caste certificates, based on their parents' certificates from their native States, should be valid in Delhi. The Court examined the High Court's interpretation, which differentiated between first-generation migrants and their progenies, and ultimately disagreed with this view, emphasizing that such benefits cannot be extended to migrants or their descendants in the new State. 3. Migrants Retaining SC/ST Status: The Court addressed whether a person migrating from one State to another retains their SC/ST status in the new State. It relied on the Constitution Bench decisions in Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao and Action Committee, which held that SC/ST status is specific to the State of origin and does not transfer upon migration. The Court reaffirmed that a caste or tribe specified in one State does not automatically confer the same status in another State. 4. Distinction Between State Civil Services and Central Civil Services: The judgment distinguished between State Civil Services and Central Civil Services regarding reservation benefits. It clarified that while Central Civil Services allow SC/ST candidates from any State to claim benefits, State Civil Services and Union Territory Services are confined to the SC/ST categories specified for that particular State or Union Territory. The Court emphasized that the machinery for recruitment and conditions of service differ between these categories. 5. Validity and Binding Nature of Previous Supreme Court Decisions: The Court examined the binding nature of previous Supreme Court decisions, particularly Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao and Action Committee, which were not adequately considered in the S. Pushpa decision. The Court held that S. Pushpa did not constitute a binding precedent as it overlooked the Constitution Bench decisions. The Court reiterated that decisions of larger Benches take precedence over those of smaller Benches and that any deviation from this principle must be justified by compelling reasons. Conclusion: The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgments, reaffirming that SC/ST status is specific to the State of origin and does not transfer upon migration. It emphasized the importance of adhering to constitutional provisions and binding precedents, ensuring that reservation benefits are granted only to those entitled within the framework of the Constitution. The appeal and writ petition were allowed, with no orders as to costs.
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