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Issues Involved: Legality of dismissal and suspension resolutions, procedural regularity, the applicability of Section 71 and Section 90 of the U.P. District Boards Act, and the power of suspension pending appeal.
Detailed Analysis: 1. Legality of Dismissal and Suspension Resolutions: The plaintiff, employed as Secretary by the District Board of Shahjahanpur, faced dismissal after charges were framed against him. The Board passed resolutions for his dismissal and suspension on January 29, 1940. The plaintiff's appeal to the Government against his dismissal was dismissed on December 19, 1940. The plaintiff then filed a suit for a declaration that these resolutions were illegal and ultra vires, seeking reinstatement, arrears of salary, and damages for illegal dismissal and suspension. 2. Procedural Regularity: The trial court found that the resolutions were properly passed without procedural irregularity. It upheld the dismissal resolution but deemed the suspension resolution illegal. The High Court concurred on procedural regularity but upheld both resolutions as valid and binding. The Supreme Court noted that both lower courts agreed on procedural propriety, making the primary issue the validity of the suspension resolution. 3. Applicability of Section 71 and Section 90 of the U.P. District Boards Act: Section 71 outlines the procedure for dismissing a secretary, requiring a special resolution passed by a two-thirds vote, with the right of appeal to the State Government. The resolution does not take effect until the appeal period expires or the Government decides on the appeal. Section 90 regulates suspension, distinguishing between suspension as punishment and suspension pending inquiry or orders. The trial court found Section 90 exhaustive and concluded that the suspension resolution was ultra vires. The High Court attempted to harmonize Section 71 and Section 90, suggesting a liberal interpretation to include suspension pending appeal. 4. Power of Suspension Pending Appeal: The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's liberal interpretation. It emphasized that the Board's powers are strictly defined by statute and cannot be extended by general or implied powers. Section 90's provisions did not accommodate suspension pending appeal, as the resolution for dismissal did not require Government sanction but awaited the appeal's outcome. The Court held that the suspension resolution was ultra vires, as the statutory framework did not support such a suspension. Conclusion: The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court erred in validating the suspension resolution. It restored the trial court's decree, affirming that the suspension was ultra vires. The Court noted that the awarded sum had already been paid to the plaintiff, leaving only the issue of appeal costs. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs, and the appeal was allowed, restoring the trial court's decree.
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