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Issues Involved:
1. Right to Silence and Self-Incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution. 2. Scope of Section 161(2) of the Cr. P. Code. 3. Applicability of Article 20(3) during police interrogation. 4. Definition and scope of "compelled to be a witness against himself." 5. Parameters of Section 179 I.P.C. and its mens rea component. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Right to Silence and Self-Incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution: The judgment emphasizes the importance of Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which protects individuals from being compelled to be witnesses against themselves. The court stated, "The principle against self-incrimination enshrined in Art. 20(3) of our Constitution and embraced with specificity by Section 161(2) of the Cr. P. Code." The judgment underlines that this protection extends beyond court proceedings to police interrogations, ensuring that individuals are not forced to incriminate themselves at any stage of the criminal justice process. 2. Scope of Section 161(2) of the Cr. P. Code: Section 161(2) of the Cr. P. Code mandates that a person must answer all questions truthfully except those that would expose them to a criminal charge. The court noted, "Section 161(2) Cr. P.C. enjoins: 'such person shall be bound to answer truly all questions relating to such case put to him by such officer, other than questions the answers to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture.'" This provision is seen as a parliamentary gloss on Article 20(3), ensuring that individuals are not compelled to provide self-incriminating information during police investigations. 3. Applicability of Article 20(3) during police interrogation: The court clarified that the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) applies not only in court but also during police interrogations. "The ban on self-accusation and the right to silence, while one investigation or trial is underway, goes beyond that case and protects the accused in regard to other offences pending or imminent." This interpretation ensures that individuals are protected from self-incrimination at all stages of the criminal process, including police questioning. 4. Definition and scope of "compelled to be a witness against himself": The judgment elaborates on what constitutes being "compelled to be a witness against himself." It includes not only physical coercion but also psychological pressure and environmental factors that may compel an individual to provide self-incriminating information. "We are disposed to read 'compelled testimony' as evidence procured not merely by physical threats or violence but by psychic torture, atmospheric pressure, environmental coercion, tiring interrogative prolixity, overbearing and intimidatory methods and the like." This broad interpretation ensures comprehensive protection against various forms of compulsion. 5. Parameters of Section 179 I.P.C. and its mens rea component: Section 179 I.P.C. penalizes individuals who refuse to answer questions posed by public servants when legally bound to do so. The court emphasized the necessity of mens rea, stating, "We have no doubt that section 179 I.P.C. has a component of mens rea and where there is no wilful refusal but only unwitting omission or innocent warding off, the offence is not made out." The judgment further clarifies that the refusal to answer must be willful and not based on a reasonable apprehension of self-incrimination. Conclusion: The court quashed the prosecution against the appellant, emphasizing that the right against self-incrimination must be protected at all stages of the criminal justice process. The judgment underscores the need for safeguards to ensure that individuals are not compelled to incriminate themselves, whether through physical or psychological means. The appellant was directed to answer all non-incriminatory questions while being protected from self-incriminatory interrogation, reinforcing the constitutional protections under Article 20(3).
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