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Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the District Judge under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.) to transfer a reference made by a Magistrate under Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr. P.C.). 2. Whether a reference under Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. is to a "persona designata" or a constituted court. 3. Whether the proceeding before the civil court under Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. is a civil proceeding. Detailed Analysis: 1. Jurisdiction of the District Judge under Section 24 C.P.C.: The primary issue in this appeal was whether the District Judge had jurisdiction under Section 24 C.P.C. to transfer a reference made by a Magistrate under Section 146 Cr. P.C. to another civil court. Proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C. were initiated due to a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace concerning a plot of land. The Magistrate, unable to determine possession, referred the case under Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. to a civil court. One party requested the District Judge to transfer the case to another court, which was done without objection from the other parties. The appellants later contested the jurisdiction of the transferee court, claiming the District Judge had no authority to transfer the case, rendering subsequent proceedings null. 2. Reference under Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. to a "persona designata" or a constituted court: The appellants argued that the reference under Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. was to a "persona designata" and not a constituted court, thus making Section 24 C.P.C. inapplicable. However, the court clarified that Section 146(1) empowers a Magistrate to refer the matter to a civil court of competent jurisdiction, not to a specific individual. The reference is to a constituted court, enlarging its ordinary jurisdiction, and not to a "persona designata." This distinction was supported by precedents, including the case of Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar, which differentiated between determinations by a "persona designata" and a legal tribunal. 3. Nature of the proceeding before the civil court under Section 146(1) Cr. P.C.: The appellants contended that the proceeding before the civil court retained its criminal character and was not a civil proceeding. They relied on the judgment in Sri Sheonath Prasad v. City Magistrate, Varanasi, which suggested that the proceeding remains criminal as the Magistrate retains ultimate jurisdiction. However, the court disagreed, citing decisions like Adaikappa Chettiar v. Chandrasekharca Theyar and Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin, which established that when ordinary courts handle disputes over legal rights, they follow ordinary procedural rules. The court held that the proceeding before the civil court is indeed a civil proceeding, as supported by the decision in Narayan Row v. Ishwarlal. The court further addressed the argument that the civil court, in handling the reference, acts as a criminal court. It refuted this by stating that the Magistrate, while exercising criminal jurisdiction under Section 145 Cr. P.C., does not confer criminal jurisdiction on the civil court through the reference. The civil court operates within its civil jurisdiction, and the proceeding before it is governed by civil procedural rules. The court also dismissed the contention that Section 141 C.P.C., which applies to civil proceedings, was not relevant. It emphasized that Section 24 C.P.C. encompasses "any proceeding" pending in a subordinate court, not just civil proceedings. Therefore, the District Judge's transfer of the case under Section 24 C.P.C. was valid. In conclusion, the court affirmed that the District Judge had the jurisdiction to transfer the case under Section 24 C.P.C., the reference under Section 146(1) Cr. P.C. was to a constituted court, and the proceeding before the civil court was a civil proceeding. The appeal was dismissed.
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