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Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of the term "specially empowered" in s. 2(c) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956. 2. Jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Rajkot to try offences under the Act based on the State Government notification. Summary: 1. Interpretation of "specially empowered": The controversy centers around the interpretation of "specially empowered" in s. 2(c) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956. The term "Magistrate" is defined in s. 2(c) as "a District Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate of the First Class specially empowered by the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to exercise jurisdiction under the Act." The judicial opinion is divided into two views: the narrow view and the broad view. The narrow view suggests that "specially" refers to the mode of empowerment, implying selection or discrimination regarding the individual on whom the power is conferred. The broad view, however, posits that "specially" refers to the special purpose of the empowerment and not the mode, allowing the State Government to confer powers on some or all Magistrates of the First Class. The Court preferred the broad view, emphasizing that the term "specially" qualifies the word "empowered" and not the person. This interpretation aligns with the purpose of the Act, which aims to suppress immoral traffic and requires a special machinery for enforcement. The Court noted that the narrow view introduces unnecessary inconvenience and confusion, while the broad view promotes the object of the provision and ensures smooth working. 2. Jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Rajkot: The State Government issued a notification on July 22, 1958, empowering all Judicial Magistrates of the First Class to exercise jurisdiction under the Act. The High Court of Gujarat had previously ruled that this notification did not make Mr. Modha, Magistrate First Class Rajkot, a "Magistrate of the first class specially empowered" within the meaning of s. 2(c) of the Act, thus lacking jurisdiction to try the offences. The Supreme Court, however, held that the notification did indeed confer jurisdiction on the Judicial Magistrate First Class Rajkot. The Court reasoned that the empowerment of all Magistrates of the First Class by virtue of their office to try offences under the Act is "special" and not "general." This interpretation is consistent with the trend of recent decisions and the principle that a person can be specially empowered by virtue of their office. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court, and directed that the cases be sent back to the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Rajkot for further proceedings in accordance with law, emphasizing the need for expedited disposal. Appeals allowed.
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