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Issues Involved:
1. Entitlement to the benefit under section 25(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act in respect of capital gains assessed under section 12B. 2. Liability to pay capital gains tax in respect of profits and gains arising from the sale of assets to limited companies. 3. Applicability of section 12B of the Indian Income-tax Act to the case. 4. Tribunal's misdirection in law or disregard of material evidence in making the valuation of assets as on January 1, 1939. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Entitlement to the Benefit under Section 25(3): The first issue was whether the assessee firm was entitled to the benefit contained in section 25(3) in respect of the capital gains assessed to tax under section 12B. The court held that neither of the contentions raised by the assessee could be accepted. The first contention was concluded by a decision in Ambalal Himatlal v. Commissioner of Income-tax, which stated that the expression "income, profits and gains" did not include capital gains. The second contention, that capital gains could be regarded as income from business, was also rejected. The court distinguished the present case from Commissioner of Income-tax v. Chugandas & Co., stating that capital gains arise from the disposal of capital assets and not from business activity. The court concluded that capital gains could not be regarded as income from business simply because the assets were held for business purposes. The first question was answered in the negative and against the assessee. 2. Liability to Pay Capital Gains Tax: The second issue was whether the assessee firm was liable to pay capital gains tax in respect of profits and gains arising from the sale of its assets to limited companies. The court referred to the Supreme Court decision in James Anderson v. Commissioner of Income-tax, which held that "distribution of capital assets" under the third proviso to section 12B(1) meant distribution in specie and not distribution of sale proceeds. Since there was no distribution in specie of the assets by the assessee firm, the third proviso to section 12B(1) did not apply. The court concluded that the assessee was liable to pay capital gains tax and answered the second question against the assessee. 3. Applicability of Section 12B: The third issue was whether section 12B of the Indian Income-tax Act applied to the assessee's case. The court rejected the contention that section 12B(1) would not apply where there was a transfer of the business lock, stock, and barrel. The court held that capital assets, as defined in section 2(4A), included property of any kind held by an assessee, whether connected with business or not. The gain arising on the sale, exchange, or transfer of such assets constituted a capital gain. The court concluded that section 12B(1) applied to the case and answered the third question in the affirmative. 4. Tribunal's Misdirection in Valuation: The fourth issue was whether the Tribunal misdirected itself in law or acted without evidence or in disregard of material evidence in making the valuation of the applicant's assets as on January 1, 1939. The court noted that the assessee had placed considerable material before the income-tax authorities for determining the valuation of the assets as on January 1, 1939. The Tribunal, however, did not consider this evidence, taking the view that it was not open to the assessee to rely on such valuation. The court held that the assessee was entitled to substitute the fair market value of the assets as on January 1, 1939, for the purpose of determining capital gains. The Tribunal's view that the valuation as on January 1, 1939, was not relevant was unjustified and unwarranted. The court concluded that the Tribunal had misdirected itself in law and had not properly applied its mind to the material on record. The fourth question was answered in the affirmative. Conclusion: The court answered the first, second, and third questions against the assessee and the fourth question in favor of the assessee, concluding that the Tribunal had misdirected itself in law and had not properly considered the material evidence on record. There was no order as to costs.
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