9911796707
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Issues:
- Competency of remote reversioners to sue on a compromise decree obtained in the lifetime of the female next reversioner. - Effect of the female next reversioner being alive on the right of remote reversioners to enforce a compromise decree. - Interpretation of the binding effect of a compromise decree in a property dispute. - Validity of the respondent's plea regarding the competency of the suit filed by remote reversioners. - Impact of the death of the female next reversioner on the rights of the remote reversioners. Analysis: The case involved a dispute where the remote reversioners, appellants in this case, challenged a gift deed executed by Sunder in favor of Brij Lal, a distant collateral. The suit was compromised, and a decree was issued for the remote reversioners to receive a share of the property after Sunder's death. The issue arose when Brij Lal resisted the appellants' claim, arguing that the female next reversioner, Lilan, being alive, rendered the suit incompetent. The Trial Court and the Single Judge upheld the appellants' right to possession based on the compromise decree, but the Division Bench set aside the decision, stating that Lilan's existence affected the suit's maintainability. The Supreme Court analyzed the customary Hindu Law, noting that a reversioner could challenge alienation without legal necessity, and such rights extended to joint family property. The Court affirmed that the suit by remote reversioners against a stranger was maintainable, and a decree against alienation benefited all reversioners. The Court emphasized that a nearer reversioner could displace a remote reversioner but not a third party like Brij Lal. The compromise decree, binding between parties, could not be disregarded, and Brij Lal could not escape its effects, especially after benefiting from the transaction. The Court rejected the respondent's argument that the remote reversioners were incompetent to sue due to their distant relation, citing precedents where the competency to sue was not solely based on proximity. The Court highlighted the equitable principle that a party could not cherry-pick advantages from a compromise decree. The Court also addressed the respondent's reliance on previous judgments, clarifying that those cases involved different circumstances and did not apply to the present situation. The Court acknowledged Lilan's death during the appeal, activating the dormant rights of the remote reversioners. Utilizing its powers under relevant legal provisions, the Court granted a decree in favor of the appellants, reinstating the Single Judge's decision. The Court emphasized that Lilan's failure to challenge the compromise decree during her lifetime did not prejudice the remote reversioners' rights. Ultimately, the Court allowed the appeal, overturning the Division Bench's ruling and restoring the Single Judge's order, with each party bearing its own costs.
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