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Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal to review its own order. 2. Whether a prima facie case was made out for the termination of the respondent's service. 3. The application of the principles of natural justice and unfair labor practices or victimization. Detailed Analysis: 1. Jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal to Review Its Own Order: The appellant contended that the Labour Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to review its order dated October 14, 1955, as it had become functus officio. The application made by the respondent on December 6, 1955, was an omnibus one, relying on various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), including Order 47, Rule 1 for review, Order 41, Rule 21 for restoration, and Order 9, Rule 13 for setting aside the ex parte order. The Labour Appellate Tribunal, being a statutory body, derives its powers from the statute itself. Section 9 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, provides the Tribunal with the same powers as a civil court under the CPC when hearing an appeal. The Tribunal exercises both original and appellate jurisdiction under sections 7, 22, and 23 of the Act. The words "when hearing an appeal" refer to a civil court and not the Tribunal, thereby granting the Tribunal powers akin to those of a civil court when hearing appeals. Order 41, Rule 21 of the CPC allows for rehearing an appeal if the respondent was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing. The respondent was not served notice due to it being addressed incorrectly, constituting sufficient cause for non-appearance. Thus, the Tribunal had the jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte order and restore the application. Additionally, under Section 9(10) of the Act, the Tribunal can regulate its practice and procedure, applying the CPC provisions as long as they are not inconsistent with the Act. The Tribunal's inherent power to make necessary orders for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process, analogous to Section 151 of the CPC, justified the order passed on March 6, 1956. Therefore, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review and restore the application. 2. Whether a Prima Facie Case Was Made Out for the Termination of the Respondent's Service: The appellant argued that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Act by concluding that no prima facie case was made out for terminating the respondent's service. The Tribunal's role under Section 22 is not to adjudicate industrial disputes but to consider whether the ban on altering employment conditions or discharging a workman should be lifted. A prima facie case must be made out by the employer, provided there is no mala fide action, unfair practice, or victimization. The respondent's work and conduct were unsatisfactory, with repeated warnings and leniency shown by the appellant. Despite this, the appellant did not conduct a formal inquiry or provide a charge-sheet, which would have justified the termination. The Tribunal, therefore, had to determine if a prima facie case existed based on the evidence presented. The evidence, including affidavits and oral testimony, was insufficient to prove a prima facie case. The appellant failed to produce Mr. Hooper's reports or lead oral evidence about their contents. The Tribunal meticulously analyzed the evidence and concluded that no prima facie case was made out. A prima facie case does not require proof beyond doubt but should be established if the evidence is believed. The Tribunal's finding was correct as the appellant did not meet this standard. 3. Principles of Natural Justice and Unfair Labor Practices or Victimization: The appellant's failure to conduct a formal inquiry and provide a charge-sheet violated the principles of natural justice. The respondent was not given an opportunity to respond to the charges, leading to an arbitrary and unfair process. The Tribunal found no evidence of unfair labor practices or victimization by the appellant, but this did not affect the conclusion that no prima facie case was made out. Conclusion: The Labour Appellate Tribunal had jurisdiction to review its order and restore the application. The appellant failed to make out a prima facie case for terminating the respondent's service due to insufficient evidence and lack of adherence to natural justice principles. The Tribunal's decision to refuse permission under Section 22 of the Act was correct, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.
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