1966 (4) TMI 76 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the suit is barred by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.
2. Whether the compromise decree is invalid due to the Commissioner not representing the deity.
3. Whether the compromise decree was beyond the scope of the proceedings in O.P. No. 3 of 1950.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the suit is barred by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act:

The appellants contended that declaratory suits are governed exclusively by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, and if the requirements of that section are not fulfilled, no relief can be granted in a suit for a mere declaration. They argued that the plaintiff, as a mere worshiper of the temple, has no legal or equitable right to the properties of the temple and thus does not satisfy the conditions of Section 42. The court examined the legal development of declaratory actions, noting that the practice of making declaratory orders without consequential relief originated from the Court of Chancery and was later codified in Indian law. The court referred to precedents, including Fischer v. Secretary of State for India in Council and Pratab Singh v. Bhabuti Singh, to establish that Section 42 is not exhaustive of all cases where declaratory relief may be granted. The court concluded that the present suit, seeking a declaration that the compromise decree is not binding on the deity, falls outside the purview of Section 42 and is maintainable under the general provisions of the Civil Procedure Code.

2. Whether the compromise decree is invalid due to the Commissioner not representing the deity:

The court addressed whether the compromise decree is invalid because the Commissioner did not represent the deity. The High Court had held that the Commissioner could not represent the deity, as Section 20 of the Hindu Religious & Charitable Endowments Act provided only for the administration of endowments under the Commissioner's superintendence and control, but not the authority to represent the deity in judicial proceedings. The court affirmed this view, stating that the only person who can represent the deity in legal matters is the Shebait, and in cases where the Shebait is negligent or the guilty party, worshippers or other interested persons may file suits to protect the trust properties. In this case, the deity was not represented by a disinterested next friend appointed by the court, rendering the compromise decree non-binding on the deity.

3. Whether the compromise decree was beyond the scope of the proceedings in O.P. No. 3 of 1950:

The court examined whether the compromise decree exceeded the scope of the proceedings in O.P. No. 3 of 1950. The original petition was brought under Section 84(2) of the old Act (Act II of 1927) for setting aside the Board's order declaring the temple as a public temple and for a declaration that it was a private temple. After the enactment of the new Act (Madras Act 19 of 1951), the petition was amended to include a declaration that the disputed properties were personal properties of the petitioner's family. The court found that such a declaration was outside the purview of Section 84(2) of the old Act and could not have been granted. Consequently, the court held that the compromise decree was invalid and not binding on the Sri Kodandaramaswami temple.

Conclusion:

The court set aside the trial court's decree and granted the plaintiff-respondent a declaratory decree that the compromise decree in O.P. No. 3 of 1950 is not valid and binding on the Sri Kodandaramaswami temple. The appeal was dismissed, and the parties were ordered to bear their own costs throughout.