2004 (3) TMI 785 - SC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Constitutionality of Paragraph 80(2) of the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952.
2. Alleged Discrimination Against Newspaper Establishments and Employees.
3. Applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
4. Delay in Challenging the Provision.
5. Impact on Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19(1)(a).

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Constitutionality of Paragraph 80(2) of the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952:
The petition challenged the constitutionality of Paragraph 80(2) of the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The impugned paragraph excluded newspaper employees from the category of "excluded employees" regardless of their pay, thereby entitling them to the benefits of the Provident Fund Scheme without an income ceiling. The petitioners argued that this provision was discriminatory and arbitrary, violating Article 14 of the Constitution.

2. Alleged Discrimination Against Newspaper Establishments and Employees:
The petitioners contended that the impugned provision was discriminatory because it singled out newspaper establishments and employees for special treatment by excluding them from the income ceiling applied to other industries. They argued that this created an unjust financial burden on newspaper establishments, especially given the economic challenges faced by the industry, such as declining advertisement revenues due to competition from electronic media.

3. Applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution of India:
The Court examined whether the classification of newspaper employees as a separate class was arbitrary and violated Article 14. The principles of reasonable classification under Article 14 were reiterated, emphasizing that classification must be based on an intelligible differentia and have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved. The Court referred to the decision in Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. & Anr. v. The Union of India & Ors., which upheld the classification of working journalists as a distinct class deserving special treatment. The Court concluded that the classification of newspaper employees was rational and had a reasonable relation to the object of providing social welfare benefits, thereby not violating Article 14.

4. Delay in Challenging the Provision:
The Court addressed the issue of delay in challenging the provision, noting that the impugned provision had been in effect since 1956. It was argued that the delay in filing the petition was not a valid ground to dismiss the challenge, especially when constitutional validity was in question. However, the Court also recognized that the constitutional remedy under Article 32 is discretionary and that delay could be a relevant consideration in some cases. In this case, the Court found no satisfactory explanation for the delay of over forty-five years and held that the petition could be rejected on this ground alone.

5. Impact on Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19(1)(a):
The petitioners faintly suggested that the additional financial burden imposed by the impugned provision could affect the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) by making it difficult to maintain newspaper prices, thereby reducing accessibility to the public. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the financial burden on employers did not amount to "harsh treatment" and that the benefit extended to employees was in furtherance of the freedom of press. The Court emphasized that the employees of newspaper establishments played a dominant role in disseminating information, and the impugned provision was aimed at promoting their welfare.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the constitutionality of Paragraph 80(2) of the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952. The Court found that the classification of newspaper employees as a separate class was rational and had a reasonable relation to the object of providing social welfare benefits. The delay in challenging the provision and the argument regarding the impact on freedom of speech and expression were also rejected. The petition was accordingly dismissed.